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This book was written over several months in 2015 during which 
I was visiting, calling, or having procedures done at Brigham and 
Women’s Hospital almost every other week. As stressful as that 
may have been, I am deeply thankful to Brigham and Women’s for 
providing an unparalleled level of care, and especially to Dr. Peter 
Banks — it remains the only hospital I have ever been in without 
yelling at a single staff member (apologies to Smilow Cancer Care 
Center at Yale). I am also very thankful to Eileen Joy and Chris 
Piuma at punctum books for their support of this project, and to 
Full-Stop and Meagan Day, who first published the essay “Daily 
Survivor #1.” And as always, none of this could have happened 
without the unending support, care, and patience of the Dolphins, 
the Krutes, and the Dolphin-Krutes, and of Jesse Kenas Collins, a 




I am standing in a fluorescent-lit hallway at 6:45am. It is actually, 
probably, closer to 7:00am; 6:45 was when I got here. Behind me are 
double glass doors, shut, heavy. The rest of the corridor is in front 
of me, turning off to the right at a midway point, but what’s there 
I can’t see. It would be the kind of opening for an elevator bank. 
There are elevators behind me, too, if you made a right from the 
glass doors instead of pushing them open into an also fluorescent-
lit office. Bathrooms also. Bathrooms with heavy doors but faulty 
locks, bathrooms I have already been in, twice, in fifteen minutes, 
first out of necessity and then to wash my face to keep from or stop 
crying. I am in the Shapiro Cardiovascular Center at 6:45 in the 
morning. My insurance company has just declined to cover a ct 
scan I came here to get. Although the doors are heavy, now, after-
wards, I wonder whether anyone inside the imaging center heard 
me on the phone, when I called my father to (begin to) sort this out, 
when I started (or tried to keep from) crying, when I cursed in a 
loud or maybe not that loud voice. It was hard to tell, because until 
6:45 on this Monday, I had never been down here, on level 2, of the 
Shapiro Cardiovascular Center at Brigham and Women’s Hospital. 
Emblem
In his now classic work, A Pattern Language, architect Christopher 
Alexander lays out, in three volumes, a method of planning for and 
building a town and all of the many kinds of buildings within it. 
The pattern is really more of a series, of pieces and structures from 
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“Architectural Valleys” and “Building Thoroughfare” to “Floor 
Surface” and “Filtered Light,” which can be chosen from and fitted 
together depending on the needs of the project at hand. The pat-
tern includes, or describes, not only buildings but what goes on in 
them: infrastructure. For piece 147, “Small Services Without Red 
Tape,” Alexander describes the way that bureaucracy, whether gov-
ernmental or private, should function so as to remain as accessible 
as possible. That is, in his words, to remain human, and not become 
impersonally bureaucratic. To do this, “no service should have more 
than 12 persons total  . . . 12 seems to be the largest number of people 
that can sit down in a face to face discussion.”1 Though he doesn’t 
say why it seems like this, only one reason comes to mind: When is 
a group of 12 people in a face-to-face discussion ever anything but a 
jury?
Nesson
I’ve never been down here, a basement if it weren’t a hallway, if 
there weren’t even other levels below l2, because usually I go to the 
Richard H. Nesson Ambulatory Care Center at Brigham and Wom-
en’s Hospital. There, they have rows of snake plants and zamiifolia 
plants dividing space in the front entrance; Shapiro has only snake 
plants. Nesson is also fluorescently lit, though there are windows in 
the waiting room of the doctor I go there to see. The blinds are usu-
ally partially drawn. They do not stock magazines. The bathroom in 
the hallway outside the (also heavy but wooden) doors of the prac-
tice also has a faulty lock. There is a number you can text to report 
facilities complaints like this (I don’t). 
I have not been to Nesson since August. When I was at Shap-
iro, it was the beginning of September. I have not been to Shapiro 
again since then, because my insurance company has continued to 
deny coverage for the ct scan or anything else that takes place in 
Shapiro or Nesson or other Brigham and Women’s buildings. Is this 
1 Christopher Alexander, Sara Ishikawa, Murray Silverstein, Max Jacob-
son, Ingrid Fiksdahl-King, and Shlomo Angel, A Pattern Language: 




continued denial one by a jury? Would it be better, more under-
standable (more human), if it were?
Smilow
When I am in places like Shapiro and Nesson or the Smilow Cancer 
Care Center at Yale New Haven Hospital, where I have also been a 
patient, are these places really like other buildings? Or, more specifi-
cally, is being in these places more like being in a building or more 
like being with people? Are Nesson and Shapiro and Smilow only 
physical spaces or people who have shaped physical spaces? How do 
these people shape one’s experience of a place?
After visits to Smilow Cancer Care Center, my mother and I 
would go to a nearby Ikea, which I loved, because how nice to walk 
through fluorescent-lit spaces that tell you where to go so specifi-
cally they even have arrows on the floor. I don’t know if Christopher 
Alexander would approve or not. 
Emblem
Yesterday, almost a month after the first and only time I was in the 
Shapiro Cardiovascular Center, I went to the website of Emblem 
Health, my insurance company. It’s the only place of theirs that one 
can visit. Or, seeing as how they do, actually, run several commu-
nity health centers in and around New York, the website is the only 
place one who is distinctly out-of-network and not there in person 
can go. The website features a blog called “Who’s Caring For You?” 
Good question. I’d like to ask them. I’d like to ask them in an email, 
since I have no in-person options, an email that would be more like 
a poem. Both because a poem is neither a threat nor a complaint, 
nothing that could be deserving of retaliation, nor is it something 
that could be wholly understood or answered. “Who’s Caring For 
You?”
Shapiro
Are networks always about what is within and outside of them? 
Like collections, in a way, because the moment something is called 
a collection what becomes most apparent are all of the things still 
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to collect. Networks provide a surface over this absence, though, a 
net, really, that seems all encompassing. Community health centers. 
Or, if not all-encompassing, familial, like how Carl J. and Ruth Sha-
piro’s son-in-law is the Chief of Surgery at Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital. I wonder how Shapiro’s endowment of the building 
affects his son-in-law’s presence in its surgical suites, how different 
this presence is from my own. 
His other son-in-law is a broker. Investment is, actually, the 
source of most of Shapiro’s wealth. Like the $25 million donation 
that created the Carl J. and Ruth Shapiro Cardiovascular Center. 
Which was $600 million less than the settlement Shapiro reached 
with the United States government after his potentially complicit 
involvement in Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme came to light.2
Networks become gothic. 
Emblem
The fluorescent-lit hallways at both Shapiro and Nesson are striking 
on multiple levels. Not only because of their overall dimness, their 
basement feel, but because of how at odds with certain tenets of 
architecture this fluorescence is. Namely the relationship between 
light and buildings that developed during the Age of Reason; the 
Enlightenment, literally. Architecture became a way of letting in the 
light, a way to embody a clearing out and lighting up of the dark 
spaces of human minds. Fluorescent lights do not make things par-
ticularly clear. 
I am drawn instead to the bright white margins and naturally 
lit photographs of “Who’s Caring For You?” The bright white 
is at odds with the very gothic nature of the Emblem Health hip 
network and the buildings it takes place (and doesn’t take place) 
in. “Gothic” both in the sense of haunted and as in gothic archi-
tecture and the way that is marked in particular by an excess of 
ornamentation. 
2 Beth Healy and Todd Wallack, “Madoff Client to Return $625 Mil-





“Emblem” is too easy. It would be too easy to read “Emblem” 
within ornamentation, as one of the many signs of faceless bureau-
crats, covered over by the ornamentation bureaucracy provides. 
Emblematic. 
Instead, what I am reminded of is the common technique of 
being taught to draw by using one’s body to measure the distance 
between two things or their size. You hold your hands up, with one 
eye closed, superimposing your thumb or arm on the scene, imag-
inary marks being made in your mind’s eye, on your body, marks 
that can then be transferred to those same objects on your paper. It’s 
a remarkably accurate process. It’s remarkably accurate the way the 
body can be used as a measuring device more generally: How many 
steps between elevator, bathroom and heavy glass doors? How long 
did I look at “Who’s Caring for You?” before curiosity became the 
rage unique to bureaucratic anger? How far out-of-network, out of 
Emblem Health hip (out of being emblematic, out of health) am 
I, and how can this distance be recorded through the absences in 
my body? Will my insurance company consider certain forms of 
entropy as a kind of co-pay? The unabashed yearning at the heart of 
this out-of-network state is gothic. 
Of course the insurance company won’t really take my body’s 
losses as a kind of payment. Some states do have a form of medi-
cal error litigation based on the idea of a “lost chance;” as in, if 
error hadn’t prevented your timely diagnosis, you would have had 
the chance to live longer or to just not die altogether. “Have had” 
being the key words here. “Have had,” as in having had the pains 
and various symptoms I’m (not) currently being tested for, for any-
where from four months to four years, depending on the specific 
symptom, at what point (if any) were chances lost? If an illness is 
chronic do I still get any chances? S. Lochlann Jain details further 
paradoxes at the heart of medical malpractice litigation: “It is truly 
ironic that, while basing large fees on the inherent value of life, the 
medical industry with its doctors, lawyers and administrators, have 
been able at the same time to lobby for caps on damage awards in 
most states, stunting that same valuation.”3 
3 Sarah Lochlann Jain, Malignant: How Cancer Becomes Us (Berkeley, 
ca: University of California Press, 2013), 101.
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I suppose what I really meant, earlier, about Michael Zinner 
(Carl J. Shapiro’s son-in-law) and my presences in the Brigham and 
Women surgical suites was that I currently owe the hospital $1,600 
for a surgery I had several months ago (because my insurance chose 
to pay only $700 of a $2,300 bill) and how, exactly, does this money 
(that ultimately my father paid) stand in relation to Zinner’s father-
in-law’s money? What do the amounts or responsibilities for pay-
ment say about the positions of our bodies in the hospital?
Lochlann goes on to write that, in medical malpractice cases, 
“juries disproportionately favor physicians.”4 Maybe this is why 
“Small Services With No Red Tape” function best with only 12 peo-
ple: Juries come to a consensus about what is important to uphold. 
Why is it that 12 is the example given and not, say, a classroom, a 
larger group of people; a group, though, who can leave the room 
before a consensus is reached? 
Smilow
Much as medical malpractice lawsuits are caught between different, 
opposing ways of valuing life, so too are buildings caught between 
different sets of values. Although it’s not, actually, that life and the 
value of it set the opposition in medical malpractice cases, it’s who is 
paying for that life. 
Architecture is seen as existing within “a sanctified and aestheti-
cized cultural sphere of value (understood as inspiration, creation, 
taste, test of time, intrinsic and transcendental value) and, on the 
other [hand], within an economic sphere of value (calculation, ref-
erences, costs, benefits, prices and utility.”5 In some settings these 
values coalesce beautifully, places that are (or sell) affordable, time-
less (but also current) good design and make that design easy to 
navigate. Ikea. Hospital architecture is both an intensification of 
the distinction between these sets of values and completely exempt 
from critique under most of them, because hospitals are pure util-
ity; they are meant to do a thing and do it well, and keep removed 
from overt reminder that a large part of the thing it does is make 
4 Jain, Malignant, 101.
5 Stephen Cairns and Jane Jacobs, Buildings Must Die: A Perverse View of 
Architecture (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 2014), 49.
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you pay for your body. Keep it from overt reminder through things 
like water features (in the foyer of Smilow Cancer Care Center) 
and those rows of zamiifolia plants and snake plants, which I usu-
ally notice more than I notice how much I am paying (or my family 
or my father’s employer or Emblem Health hip is paying) for my 
body, except in moments when I am told that no one will be paying. 
“Who’s Caring For You?”
Maybe it feels that hospital architecture is in some ways exempt 
from the values of other forms of architecture because it is Carl J. 
Shapiro’s name that is apparent, not the architect. If the knowledge 
of Shapiro’s relationship with Bernie Madoff were more concrete, 
if it were known definitively that Shapiro was in no way coerced, 
how would this further augment the $25 million already augment-
ing bodies inside the Shapiro Cardiovascular Center? Augmenting 
bodies both literally, surgically, and metaphorically, repositioning 
us. The obvious argument, given the beneficial ability to perform 
potentially life saving operations, is that it should just matter that 
the money is there, not where it came from. Even the billions at 
stake in the Madoff scheme is not blood money on the scale of war 
or conflict diamonds, for example. Perhaps “blood money” should 
include not only the blood shed in the gaining of the money but the 
blood saved by it. Or the blood created by it. 
Smilow, Joel E. Smilow, that is, is also connected to blood, though 
in an admittedly tangential way. Playtex Sport, longest running 
competitor to Tampax, inventor of the plastic tampon applicator, 
is a key holding of Playtex Inc., the company Joel E. Smilow was the 
President and ceo of and where his money was made. A feminine 
blood money. Playtex also sells bras and many household products 
and counts among either its holding or business partners brands 
and companies ranging from Max Factor and Revlon to Procter & 
Gamble and Hanes. It is much too large a network to attempt to list 
everything here. It is as if Joel E. Smilow is more like an organization 
and less like an individual, personal, human. 
There’s nothing (seemingly) personal about Smilow Cancer Care 
Center either because, unlike Shapiro, there are no immediately 
apparent personal or familial relationships that seem slightly disar-
rayed. This is also, surely, a feeling influenced by the distinct imper-
sonalness of the care at Smilow Cancer Care Center, an effect of its 
function as part of Yale New Haven Hospital, a teaching hospital. 
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Which means, pragmatically, that first you speak to one or more 
medical students who then speak, without you, to your doctor, who 
then all return to speak to you or to tell you what they discussed or 
to tell you what they have already decided before speaking to you. 
Maybe a classroom really wouldn’t be better than a jury. 
Emblem
Here is another way that I understand as a method (such as it is) of 
using my body to measure distance, one Emblem surely can’t (or 
doesn’t want) to understand: It is nearing the end of the year and it 
took me the past several weeks to bring myself to buy a new planner, 
one that extended past the next several months. It was not a ques-
tion of money or opportunity. But if the distance between now and 
next week or now and when I am finally able to have the ct scan 
or now and whenever what the scan does or doesn’t show is under-
stood, cannot or may not be able to be contained by my body, how 
could the next year? 
There it is again, a gothic-appropriate yearning. It is a feeling dis-
tinct to the gothic, to Lena’s lust for pale female flesh. It’s not a sen-
timentality, exactly, inasmuch as my awareness of it here is not one 
of embarrassment, like being embarrassed for seeming so melodra-
matic, but just a sense of fitting, almost ironic, yearning. So roman-
tic, so gothic, and, yet, so bureaucratic. Which is, perhaps, exactly 
what the gothic refers to: desires of outsiders at a time of defining 
borders and morals and ideals, defining done by groups of people, 
government, media; bureaucracies. 
It’s not only about the outsiders though. The gothic is also about 
defining the groups themselves. And, specifically, the spaces these 
groups occupy; the gothic is the empty castle. “Who’s Caring For 
You?” and the entire Emblem website is an empty castle. Consider 
again Dracula and the journey Dr. Van Helsing is able to take to 
come to Transylvania; the power of the empire as expressed through 
a mobile, border-crossing, physical presence. The power of Emblem 
as expressed through bright white margins, a url; friendly, accessi-
ble, but something you must choose to enter into — Emblem is not 
coming to you. “Who’s Caring For You?” attempts to counteract 
this very emptiness, the facelessness, the inability to define the mon-
ster that lies at the heart of the gothic narrative, by providing a face, 
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many faces, people for you to get to know. But who do you really 
know besides Emblem Health hip? And do you even really know 
them? When you call a customer service number and hear a record-
ing tell you that you’ve reached Encore Health, formerly known as 
another health company whose name is also not Emblem, will you 
be surprised? How does an interaction with / in “Who’s Caring For 
You?” compare to an interaction within a building named for a per-
son? Both are sites that function as physical expressions of social, 
byzantine, networks and as host to the more personal, gothic, net-
works of those involved in the building itself. How does an attrac-
tion to the bright white space of “Who’s Caring For You?” come to 
supplement the fluorescent lights in the Carl J. Shapiro Cardiovas-
cular Center? Do I know Emblem Health or Carl J. Shapiro better? 
Who’s caring for me?
I am not alone in my yearning. In regards to Emblem Health hip 
I may be, but Carl J. Shapiro and Joel E. Smilow and Richard H. 
Nesson surely wanted something more than to be relieved of many 
millions of dollars. Nesson stands out in this regard, though, as the 
only one of the three for whom Brigham and Women’s dedicated 
the building. He gave no money, but did serve as Hospital Presi-
dent for many years, overseeing the formation of a partnership with 
other area hospitals (Mass General, Boston Children’s, Dana Farber; 
why do I know this from memory?) to form Partners Healthcare. 
A partnership that looks like a simultaneous huge expansion and 
solidification, a closing up of the castle. Because while it certainly 
succeeded in bringing healthcare to more people through commu-
nity initiatives, Partners Healthcare also represents a consolidation 
of billions of dollars’ worth of providers and the bodies they care 
for. And, to further solidify the importance of a few key hospitals, 
Partners Healthcare works with teaching and medical research cen-
ters run by Harvard University, thus ensuring that educational stan-
dards, once set, will be passed down. Classrooms and juries both. 
Not that I mean to sound ungrateful. I am incredibly thankful to 
have access to the level of care I have / had at Brigham and Women’s 
(disregarding current snafu) but just because Partners Healthcare 
or even Emblem Health hip ultimately benefit many more people 
than not, doesn’t mean that the ways in which their organizations 
are or become gothic networks should be disregarded, especially 
given the ways these networks affect physical bodies and are built 
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into the spaces they move through. After all, so much has been done 
under the banner of the greater good that ultimately turned out to 
be not that good for anyone. 
Fernald
Outside of the reoccurring castle motif it seems that, especially in 
more recent iterations of what are still gothic novels, the school is a 
common threatening or threatened space. One of the most gothic: 
The Walter E. Fernald School for Boys, in Waltham, Massachusetts. 
Still standing, but empty, the Fernald School is the oldest school 
in the country for boys with disabilities (or orphans). Waltham is 
not particularly far from where I live in Boston; its distance could 
be measured by the long walk it would take me to get there. Or, I 
could use my body to measure my distance to the Fernald School in 
a different way, because in the 1940s and 50s, the Fernald School was 
the site of ongoing experiments led by the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology and Harvard University, for the United States gov-
ernment, funded by the Quaker Oats company. Experiments that 
were never acknowledged as such, experiments for which informed 
consent was never given by the parents of the boys involved, experi-
ments that were run as the Boys’ Science Club: a group of students 
who were treated with trips to baseball games and other outings and 
who were, additionally, given a breakfast every day that consisted of 
oatmeal that had been dosed with radiation. 
I first learned about the Fernald School not because it’s nearby but 
in a medical ethics textbook (as a case about informed consent in 
medical testing) as part of coursework. A few days after this, I went 
into the hospital (White Plains Hospital; no name that I remember) 
to have a gastric emptying scan, a procedure that begins when the 
radiology technician brings you a breakfast of an egg sandwich to 
which has been added radioactive material. 
Ostensibly, the Fernald experiment was designed as a nutri-
tion study, which I understand as an early attempt at what is now 
a commonplace item: fortified cereal. My understanding is a little 
lacking though because the information around the experiments is 
understandably lacking as well. When the Boys’ Science Club was 
found out, in the 1990s, the surviving members pursued litigation 
that resulted in a $1.85 million settlement. It was difficult to prove in 
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court how much of what kind of damage was done, with the United 
States government arguing that the amounts of radiation fed to 
the boys were no more than the amount of background radiation 
absorbed in a city during the course of a year.6 Which is, I would 
imagine, a common difficulty and disadvantage in medical malprac-
tice cases involving already sick people. 
It was in a fairly common medical ethics textbook that I learned 
about the Fernald School. Maybe one used, today, by the Harvard 
School of Public Health or elsewhere within Partners Healthcare.
What kind of blood money was the settlement given to the 
Fernald School boys? More or less of the same kind of blood or 
money as the sponsorship originally provided by the Quaker Oats 
company? Blood money is not too strong a term because both the 
experiment itself and the lawsuit that followed are a form of vio-
lence. A “bureaucratic violence” which consists of “attacks on those 
who insist on alternative schemas or interpretations.”7 That is, like 
the borders of England against Dracula, the gothic bureaucracy 
must keep the in- and out-of-network state clear, precisely through 
such acts as governments, educational institutions and corporations 
deciding what bodies should or shouldn’t be informed about the 
radiation they are or are not being administered. 
Given the high stakes and violence involved in networks like 
those related to the Fernald School, what or whose purpose does 
it serve to rewrite a gothic romanticism into such relationships? 
My irradiated breakfast was a few years ago (and fully covered by 
Emblem Health hip) but I do, now, remember that while eating an 
irradiated egg sandwich was not cool, exactly, it was certainly a novel 
experience. It was eerie. It was the first time that so many bureau-
cratic distances collapsed in(to) my body. Literally, into my body via 
not a distance but a number: a tracer dose, an amount of radiation, 
an amount given daily to the Fernald School boys and roughly equal 
to the doses given in nuclear medicine imaging studies today. 
6 Zareena Hussain, “mit to Pay Victims $1.85 Million in Fernald Radia-
tion Settlement,” The Tech 117.65, January 7, 1998, http://tech.mit.edu/
V117/N65/bfernald.65n.html.
7 David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the 





It takes imagination to rewrite bureaucracies as gothic romances. 
This is important when the bureaucratic violence perpetrated in 
cases like the Fernald School boys is a product of a system in which 
bureaucracies are “ways of organizing stupidity — of managing 
relationships that are already characterized by extremely unequal 
structures of imagination.”8 Further, to follow the “Italian philoso-
pher Giorgio Agamben [who] argued that from the perspective of 
sovereign power, something is alive because you can kill it,”9 certain 
systems of bureaucratic violence are expressions of an inability to 
imagine that certain bodies are alive enough to be killed. It’s telling 
that the experiments and subsequent revealing of them were under 
the auspices of the us Department of Energy, not the Department 
of Health and Human Services. 
Is being in the Shapiro Cardiovascular Center or Smilow Cancer 
Care Center more like being in a building or being with a person? Is 
being in a gastric emptying scan more like being in an imaging suite 
or being with the bodies who helped (were used to) determine the 
safety of the scan for you? Is such a distinction really necessary or 
even possible, though? Who benefits from a separation of physical 
and social space except those for whom Carl J. Shapiro Cardiovascu-
lar Center should remain a life-saving building and not a building 
constructed by familial ties both nearly nepotistic and financially 
fraudulent? Who benefits from a separation of physical and social 
space if not those who fully understand that “deface” is something 
that can be done to both people and buildings?
Deface as in: spaces so faceless no amount of fluorescence or 
natural lighting can make them clear. Deface as in: on some imag-
ing machines, like mris, one is in an internal space with small lights 
overhead but in nuclear imaging devices there are no lights and 
I remember the darkness of the ceiling lights, panels, of the room 
itself and I remember the darkness of the mit newspaper website 
where I read about the Fernald School settlement and I remember 
that nowhere was bright enough for me to see the boys themselves. 
Deface as in: today, finally, the last of the necessary information 
8 Graeber, The Utopia of Rules, 81.
9 Graeber, The Utopia of Rules, 86.
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will be sent to Emblem Health hip (in the continued aim of get-
ting the ct scan, sometime) but whatever the blinking lights of the 
fax machine convey, my body remains out-of. Deface as in: Brigham 
and Women’s has been under construction for all the years I’ve been 
going there; campuses and buildings have footprints as much as 
bodies do. 
Deface as in: light is as much about creating reflections as it 
is about dispelling shadows. I was in a fluorescent-lit hallway at 
6:45am one month ago and the fluorescent lights were overhead but 
also in the shine of the floor and also in the heavy glass doors behind 
me and also now. 
Coda
Yesterday I discovered that Emblem Health hip has 45 one-star 
reviews on Yelp (to be clear: there are nothing but one-star reviews). 
I love them all. All seem to be complaints along such similar lines as 
mine: a doctor orders a test or a referral and Emblem declines to pay 
for it, and Emblem gives the complaint holder a runaround during 
any attempts to access customer service. Especially compared to the 
mostly inaccessible complaints on the Better Business Bureau web-
site, these Yelp reviews are a kind of poetry. I love them all. These 
reviews are distinct from other Yelp pages, reviews of shops or busi-
nesses, because they are differently personal. Instead of the personal 
experience and indignation in a review concerning poor service in 
a store, for example, these reviews are tinged with outraged des-
peration; a long wait for dinner is one thing, a long way for a doc-
tor’s appointment entirely different. It is as if the Yelp reviewers of 
Emblem Health live in a world where it is permanently the summer, 
where health services are permanently staffed by first year medical 
students and the computer systems are always only changing. One 
reviewer writes that she read all of these one-star reviews and chose 
to sign up for (to buy) Emblem Health anyway, thinking that all 
insurance companies are bad. She writes that she was wrong, that 
she discovered a horror unique to Emblem Health. I love her espe-
cially. This love goes beyond vindication, because, anyway, is vin-
dication even possible or fulfilled if Emblem Health continues to 
deny me? It is a love of humanness; the satisfaction of seeing the 
gothic facelessness of Emblem Health dissolve into a sea, a page, of 
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very real people writing words very close to my own. It is a return 
of not only humanity, personality, to bureaucracy, but a return 
of imagination as well, a balancing of imagination. I can imagine 
exactly what it must have been like for the woman awaiting hip sur-
gery or the person billed $1,800 for routine blood work ordered by 
an in-network doctor, and I know that they must, also, be able to 
imagine my own wait time, my own anonymous case numbers. All 
too well. Our own Emblem. 
* * *
And, lastly, a final update a year after initially writing this essay, nec-
essary now to fully consider the implications of my relationship to 
Emblem Health: I never received the ct scan my doctor originally 
ordered. Instead, an in-network doctor I had also been seeing rec-
ommended doing a colonoscopy, a procedure that would look at 
more or less the same area. I had none of what either of my doctors 
were looking for. What my doctor was not looking for, and which 
he had previously told me he would not find in a 22-year-old, but 
did find, was an adenoma — a small intestinal growth, like a mole, 
that develops into colon cancer if left in place. The ct scan my doc-
tor originally wanted would not have found this growth; nothing 
would have been found, and no further tests would have similarly 
gone looking. Given that routine colonoscopies for colon cancer 
screening are not recommended until age 50, I feel it’s safe to assume 
that I would never have had a colonoscopy and I would have had 
colon cancer by the time I was 30. “Who’s Caring For You?”
Daily Survivor #1
Daily Survivor
The American Chronic Pain Association recommends mak-
ing decoupage boxes (among other crafts) as a form of pain 
management.
Daily
If being in pain every day necessitates surviving said pain every day 
which (if successful) results in the state of being a daily survivor, 
how often or to what extant can “daily” build up on itself before 
completely obliterating any meaningful definition of “survivor”? 
What are the temporal dimensions of “survivor”?
Daily Survivor
The American Chronic Pain Association does not recommend 
doing manual labor for a living as part of a pain management strat-
egy, especially for those who are legally disabled. 
Survivor
Recently, much scholarly attention has been given to trauma, sur-
viving trauma, and plasticity.1 Plasticity meaning, very generally, 
1 See Catherine Malabou, Ontology of the Accident: An Essay on De-
structive Plasticity (Cambridge, uk: Polity, 2012) and Antonio Damasio, 
Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain (San Diego, ca: 
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physical, mental, and specifically neurological changes and growth 
that occur in the aftermath of traumatic events (whether physical or 
mental to begin with). These new survivors, people left affectively 
different, either positively, neutrally, or negatively, are left as such 
after events that are exactly that: events, as in moments or accidents 
or temporal instances in some way limited by distinct parameters of 
time. 
Daily 
Does being a daily survivor imply that singular events happen every 
day which must be survived or that the very quality of daily-ness 
(which includes the qualities of ordinariness and unending repeti-
tion) is a traumatic event to be survived? Or, really, is it the pain that 
needs to be survived or the fact that it happens every day?
Daily Survivor
The American Chronic Pain Association does not recommend 
doing manual labor while legally disabled because that would be too 
much like fighting fire with fire (as opposed to decoupage boxes). 
Daily
Although, actually, the hidden genius of decoupage boxes as a daily 
pain management strategy is that decoupage boxes are daily-ness 
itself and thus making decoupage boxes as a daily pain management 
strategy fully actualizes fighting fire with fire because both decoup-
age boxes and daily-ness itself are ubiquitous, all-accessible, every-
where, boring. 
Daily Survivor





The trauma of daily-ness, as it is shaped by both ordinariness and 
temporal conditions of ceaselessness, is that it is boring. Being in 
pain daily, being in daily-ness, is boring because it is always the same 
(because the pain is always there) and also always changing (because 
the pain is never the same and because it is always a new day). 
Daily Survivor
Being in pain every day is boring because it does not provide oppor-
tunities for personal growth and resiliency in the face of singular 
traumatic events. 
Being in pain every day is boring as a problem deserving academic 
or scholarly attention because it does not provide opportunities 
for groundbreaking neurology and positive thinking and personal 
growth. Even as a problem examined within affect theory and by 
scholars who study ordinary life, being in pain every day isn’t actu-
ally ordinary enough because it is only the realm of the already sick. 
The American Chronic Pain Association does not admit that 
being in pain every day is boring nor do they give suggestions for 
managing this boredom. (Though decoupage boxes may be a form 
of admission.)
Survivor
The problem of the boringness of being in pain every day, and part 
of the reason this is a problem for scholars, is that there is no resil-
iency. Resiliency is inherently about sponginess, about bouncing 
back (to normal), about recovery. What kind of recovery is pos-
sible when what is wrong is wrong in the very daily-ness of one’s 
existence?
Daily Survivor
In some ways, doing manual labor for a living as a pain management 
strategy follows the American Chronic Pain Association’s boring 
logic, the logic of immersion in daily-ness as a way out of it, because 
manual labor is what the majority of people do on a daily basis. 
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As I write this, I am at the public library watching a landscap-
ing crew mulch around trees outside. (Tomorrow I will load bags 
of mulch into people’s cars as part of [one of] my jobs at a garden 
center.)
Daily
Being in pain every day is boring because boring is a quality that 
experiences have; boredom is the state of being bored. So saying 
“Being in pain every day is boring” is different from saying “I’m 
bored because I’m in pain every day” because the former identi-
fies the pain as the thing which is boring, it does not mean that I’m 
bored. 
Simultaneously, being is pain every day is boring means finding 
oneself unafraid, because you cannot be bored and afraid at the 
same time. 
Daily Survivor
You can, however, find something boring and be angered by this 
boringness at the same time. 
Daily
Would it be boring if it didn’t happen every day? Would it be bor-
ing if it provided the groundwork for being able to make serious, 
resilient, personal growth? Would it be boring if I weren’t so mad? 
Daily Survivor
Being in pain every day is not about resiliency because when being 
in pain every day is the only daily state possible there is nothing to 
resiliently return to; when being in pain happens every day there 
is never, exactly, a daily return of the pain but simply a repetition. 
Being in pain every day instead becomes about stamina, because 
stamina is not about surviving moments or events but about surviv-
ing time itself. 
Being bored by pain means not being afraid because you cannot 
be afraid (and waiting) to die and bored simultaneously. Being in 
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pain and bored means not being afraid of dying (or being too bored 
to be afraid). But is being angry really any better?
Daily
This bored un-afraidness is not a death acceptance / relinquishing of 
existentialism because being bored is not about not caring or not 
taking the pain seriously or deciding to simply spend all your time 
making decoupage boxes. It is simply what happens when pain hap-
pens every day, when you know that pain as well as you know how 
to unthinkingly get up and make coffee and brush your teeth. The 
moment being in pain every day turns into being (in pain) every 
day, it’s boring because do you really find getting up and making 
coffee and brushing your teeth to be that interesting?
Daily Survivor
Doing manual labor every day is also (sometimes) boring. But it is 
invaluable as a pain management strategy because if my legs and 
arms and feet are sore than my stomach hurts less (noticeably): and, 
I can remember how hard I worked the previous day when it is now 
the middle of the afternoon on a weekday and I am lying in bed 
with a hot water bottle and a book doing my other work. 
Daily
Being in pain every day is a form of manual labor. This makes the 
application of words like “management” (i.e. “pain management”) 
all the more applicable, because being in pain every day is a form of 
activity that you have to do and manage yourself in doing as you 
would any other job. 
Especially when writing about being sick, writing based either 
overtly or subtly on being in pain every day, is your other work. 
Especially when you are contracted for this other work but not for 
the manual labor day jobs which fund your ability to be in pain and 




That being in pain every day is a form of manual labor downplays 
the significance or importance or value of your ability to survive 
because at this point you are just doing your job. 
It does not, though, make being in pain every day any less boring. 
Because, ultimately, your task in this job is to simply get through it, 
to move through time. 
Being in pain every day is a form of manual labor in which the 
hours are unpredictable but endless and ultimately the most pre-
carious situation to find yourself in. 
Daily Survivor
Being in pain every day is boring and boredom is not the worst 
feeling. 
Survivor
In fact, boredom is preferable to many other feelings (namely fear) 
and can even be comforting. Because although being in pain every 
day with a certain consistency in that pain, there are still moments 
capable of causing fear or surprise or worry. Being bored is comfort-
ing when it means that the focus is on boredom and not on pain. 
Being in pain every day, boringly, also means that the boredom 
itself can be painful, tedious. But even this kind of pain is still 
preferable. 
Daily
Boring-ness is comforting because having everything (even pain) 
(especially pain) stay the same is preferable when change only means 
getting worse. Boring-ness is comforting when it means finding sta-
bility in a precarious situation. 
Daily Survivor
Being in pain every day is boring because being in pain doesn’t 
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necessarily mean suffering; at least suffering would provide some-
thing to do. 
Survivor
What does the manual labor of being in pain every day produce? 
The state of being a survivor. Which is intricately twined to the dual 
nature of the not interesting / tedious mental / physical nature of the 
boredom of being in pain every day, because it means that the man-
ual labor of being in pain every day is a physical act which produces 
a mental state, the state of being a survivor. 
Daily
Doing repetitive manual labor every day is not in and of itself pre-
carious; Sisyphus could at least take a sick comfort in the fact that 
nothing about his situation was ever going to change (or get worse). 
Daily Survivor
Being in pain every day is boring and it is an intense privilege to find 
oneself bored by this pain; this is part of the comfort of boredom, 
that when it is unending and repetitive it becomes a form of deep 
boredom. Deep boredom is not a transcendental form of boredom, 
because it doesn’t make being in pain or being bored at all pleasur-
able. If anything, it is sub-boredom, so repetitive (and painful) that 
one cannot even build a narrative of having survived an individual 
episode of boredom. But deep boredom is still a privilege because 
being deeply bored and in pain still means not (being dead or) being 
in such pain as to be unable to be bored. I will take all the moments 
of boredom I can get. 
Survivor
Part of the pain of boredom is some sense of shame at finding, ulti-
mately, only boredom and no transcendence in being in pain every 
day. Being a survivor makes everyone, even and especially those 
who have nothing to survive (yet), feel better. Being bored helps 
no one. Which is, of course, the beauty and entertainment value of 
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life-changing narratives; no one ever tells or is entertained by a nar-
rative of life changed only by its very un-changing-ness. 
Daily Survivor
Not only does it fully capture daily-ness, decoupage boxes are also 
an appropriate metaphor for the particular boredom of being in 
pain every day, because decoupage is about building up and affixing 
layers: if being in pain is like a blister, then being in pain every day 
and finding it boring is like a callus, because one is filled with some-
thing and the other only ever becomes more and more of itself, “it’s 
Infinite contain.”2
Daily
Layering up metaphors like decoupage boxes is the only kind of 
thinking possible about (and within) the boredom of being in pain 
every day: oblique. Because what is there when trying to face and 
think about boredom directly? Nothing (pain). 
Survivor
Is the failure to craft or produce a narrative of survival a failure of 
the manual labor of being in pain every day or a failure of the men-
tal (non)work of boredom?
Daily
Deep boredom is or can become a part of this oblique thinking, 
adding positively to it, because deep boredom is a form of atten-
tion. If boredom is characterized by an inability to find something 
capable of absorbing one’s attention completely, deep boredom is a 
constant awareness of this inability to fully pay attention to a thing 
which itself is also always present. 
2 Emily Dickinson, The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson (Boston, 




The manual labor of being in pain every day is precarious (in part) 
because it is not a job you are paid to do, but a job that you pay to 
do, with your attention. 
Daily
Although deep boredom is about always partially paying attention 
to something (else, something you are not capable of giving your 
full attention to) it does not produce a state of being distracted. 
In fact, deep boredom prevents distraction because it constantly 
acknowledges present pain and how boring it would be to fully be 
in this pain and what a distraction this pain would become. 
Daily Survivor
Deep boredom in which pain is paid attention to and always already 
displaced (by boredom, by not fully paying attention, by refusing to 
be distracted) is a way of being a daily survivor. 
Survivor
On the other hand, deep boredom and an ability to not fully find 
oneself immersed in the manual labor of being in pain every day 
means always constantly having to find other things to pay atten-
tion to, anything better than being in pain (even boredom).  
Death is a Deadline
Being in pain every day, because it is boring, because this boredom 
must be managed, is a problem not only of pain management but 
of time management as well. Because, after all, “Death is like a 
deadline.”3
3 “For Man with Cystic Fibrosis, ‘death is like a deadline’,” National Pub-





Having a deadline implies having a product that must be due by 
that time. The deadline of death means optimizing your pain and 
time management strategies to produce a narrative of how well you 
survived before you die. 
Death is a failure of management. 
Survivor
This deadline shouldn’t be a problem, though, because being 
bored, especially being in deep boredom, doesn’t mean doing noth-
ing. Except that optimized management and being a survivor in the 
face of the deadline of death isn’t enough: optimized management, 
especially of time, should result not only in narrative production 
but in the production of productivity itself. 
Death is a Deadline
But what kind of time management is possible when being in pain 
every day is boring and does not come with a set or definite disease-
related life expectancy? Or, what is the difference between life expec-
tancy as an amount of time and life expectancy as a quality of time?
Daily Survivor
Or, as my coworker put it when telling me about how, upon learn-
ing of her rheumatoid arthritis diagnosis, all but one of her profes-
sors recommended finding an alternate career to horticulture and 
landscaping: sometimes in chronic illness it is not just chronic illness 
but also chronic bullshit. 
Death is a Deadline
The chronic bullshit of being in pain every day and finding it boring 




How does anticipating having to survive a quality instead of an 
amount of time change what it means to be a daily survivor?
Daily
The problem of the boredom of being in pain every day stems not 
just from the pain itself but from how boring (almost) everything 
else, like decoupage boxes, seems in the face of said pain. This bore-
dom is inseparable from the anger it produces. Why isn’t anything 
interesting enough? Why suggest decoupage boxes as an alternative, 
as if it were really that easy?
Death is a Deadline
Here is an example of the quality that is my life expectancy and the 
way that I will find it taxing, as in, the way I will have to pay, which 
is with my attention. Like when I find myself non-bored, reading 
Donald Hall’s Life Work until I am derailed by the sentence “And 
then Jack found a problem in his abdomen” and I will not remem-
ber or pay attention to anything past that on page 8.4
Daily Survivor
Although being dead is presumably even more boring. 
When “life itself has been put to work,” when the pain and bore-
dom of being in pain every day becomes a form of manual labor 
to which the rules of pain and time management can (must) be 
applied, what sort of work ethic is possible?5 Just as the problem of 
being in pain every day is not just about pain but about boredom, 
the question of a work ethic is about both how to do this kind of 
manual labor but also about how to ethically hold a position that is 
predicated on the privilege of being able to find pain boring. 
4 Donald Hall, Life Work (Boston, ma: Beacon Press, 1993), 8. 
5 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Declaration (New York: Argo-Navis 




Time management includes not just time but the larger area of 
logistics management, how to move stuff and schedule this moving: 
how to schedule procedure appointments so they interfere with nei-
ther your vacation time nor your (day job) work schedule. 
Daily Survivor
Having a strong work ethic is an intrinsic part of the American 
dream because it’s the route to all success. Despite having however 
many day jobs and other work, being in pain every day and sick 
is my all-the-time job. Manual labor, definitely, but this job also 
involves affective and caring labor. A kind of affective labor closely 
aligned with (historically) feminine, mothering (invisible) forms 
of labor, oft taken for granted and long discounted as being actual 
work. The problem in applying the term “logistics” here, therefore, 
is that the scale is wrong, because logistics is inherently about mas-
sive quantities; it is this mass which institutes the necessity of man-
agement. The work of being in pain every day is intensely, specifi-
cally, domestic. 
Daily
Before moving on, though, to questions of a work ethic and care 
labor and the work of being in pain every day, I feel the need to fur-
ther clarify this notion of boredom, though that itself may seem 
redundant and boring. But it’s because I’m not quite getting it. Yes, 
being in pain every day is boring and this boredom involves anger 
and work and time management and attention and it becomes such 
an embedded part of daily life that it seems not just like a job but 
like deep boredom: an unending almost non-boring daily-ness that 
takes work to maintain. But it’s exactly this work that I’ve neglected. 
Because there is, on the one hand, the very manual labor of being 
in pain and the affective work necessary to do this pain / work more 
easily around others, and then, less manually, less physically, there 
is the work of boredom, the mental and affective work needed to 
negotiate the constant daily resource drain (on attention, energy) 
that being in pain every day becomes. This work of boredom is 
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pure, banal, management, a kind of anti-mindfulness wherein part 
of the process is always about ignoring something, ignoring physical 
pain or anger or those decoupage boxes that seem like the only alter-
native. Or, perhaps, it’s a death deadline-specific kind of mindful-
ness. Or, it is nothing more than logistics management at its most 
domestic level, because it is entirely a working life spent “simplify-
ing or accelerating functions of unreasonable banality.”6
Life’s Work
Life’s working means (having to) work to make life. 
Daily Survivor
Being a daily survivor is work. In addition to all the aforementioned 
qualities and conditions of this work, it is, absolutely, a work of 
narrative. It is work in the form of saying “being a daily survivor is 
work.” It is work in the form of saying “I am an invalid.”
Life’s Work
Finding one’s life work, coupled with or driven by or dependent on 
one’s work ethic, is also a key part of the American dream process. 
Even when one doesn’t or is unable to choose one’s life work and is 
instead, simply, (simply?) made to have one?
Daily Survivor
Being a daily survivor is a form of life’s work because it is sometimes 
the only way to make life (work). 
Survivor
But, on the other hand, a very big part of the anger inherent in the 
boredom of being in pain every day is anger at the commoditization 
6 Alain De Botton, The Pleasures and Sorrows of Work (New York: Pan-
theon Books, 2009), 44.
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of this kind of pain and the way that commoditization results in the 
products of heroic survivor narratives. 
I am not that kind of daily survivor. 
Life’s Work
In a way, having one’s life work chosen for you is an easier starting 
point than having to start from nothing because it means not feel-
ing pressured to seek redemption or transcendence through work, 
when, as Donald Hall says, “Work is not redemptive . . . but it is or 
can be devoted.”7
Daily Survivor
What is the object of devotion required for the work of being a daily 
survivor? Is being devoted affected, as in, is the quality or outcome 
of that devotion affected by whether or not it’s actual devotion or an 
obligation? Is boredom always already apathy?
Life’s Work
The work of writing “being a daily survivor is work” is sometimes 
work that I do while on my legally mandated half-hour break at my 
other manual labor day job. 
Survivor
By refusing to work towards a heroic survivor narrative, am I a 
slacker?
Daily Survivor
The labor of being in pain every day is hard work but, simultane-
ously, hard work is the answer to being in pain every day. 
7 Hall, Life Work, 9.
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Pain Exists for a Reason
The reason being that pain “provides us with a built-in warning.” 
The pain and boredom of being in pain every day is a warning 
against that very boredom. 
Daily
Actually, not the exact same boredom of being in pain every day. It 
is instead a warning of the boredom and pain of not being in (this) 
pain, of the absence of (the necessity of) hard work. As counterin-
tuitive as this may seem, “pain free” doesn’t always really mean free. 
Because if you have worked to make your life(’s work), what is the 
cost of losing that?
Pain Exists for a Reason
On the other hand, chronic pain as experienced by millions of 
Americans costs “$635 billion a year in medical care and lost labor.”8 
Daily
While the pain of being in pain every day does carry its own warn-
ing, if your pain is caused by or a part of a chronic illness, there’s no 
real risk in that chronic ceasing. 
Daily Survivor
Is the term “lost labor” meant to indicate a withdrawal from the 
workforce by people who are in pain or does “lost” also carry impli-
cations of the fact that care labor, the labor of being in pain every 
day, is always already lost both because it is not generally considered 
valuable and because lost can imply invisible or otherwise out of 
sight?
8 Stephani Sutherland, “Pain That Won’t Quit,” Scientific American, De-





My other manual non-lost labor is worth approximately $12 / hour 
(before taxes). My other manual non-lost labor provides more of an 
income than disability benefits would. 
Pain Exists for a Reason
Pain exists as a way of providing work to people who (may) need it. 
Survivor
In a review of the television show The Unbreakable Kimmy 
Schmidt, the critic Emily Nussbaum identifies the protagonist as 
practicing a “powerfully girlish model of toughness.”9
Pain Exists for a Reason
Pain exists a way to provide a powerfully disabled model of 
toughness. 
Daily
The muscles I develop at my manual labor day job are not exactly 
strong enough to mend internal organs. 
Pain Exists for a Reason
Maybe, actually, pain really just reinforces a “girlish model of tough-
ness” because chronic pain is more prevalent among women than 
men and because (in part) (talking about) being in pain is more 
often associated with being a wimp than a laborer and wimps are 
girlish. 





Maybe pain and its lost labor only reinforces girlishness because lost 
labor is already in the realm of the feminine in that invisible care 
labor is predominantly done by women. 
Pain Exists for a Reason
The kind of pain that provides a girlishness-reinforcing disabled 
model of toughness is not daily pain nor the pain of dailyness but 
is only ever other people’s pain. Specifically, other people’s pain as 
expressed in heroic survivor narratives. 
Survivor
By refusing to work towards a heroic survivor narrative am I a 
slacker? Or, am I a slacker simply because the work that I do in 
being in pain every day is unseen?
Daily Survivor
Not entirely unseen by everyone, though, because there is that 
coworker, and other coworkers as well, other women employed in 
multiple forms of chronic labor. 
Life’s Work
Other coworkers of a kind, because I am thinking of people I do 
not necessarily work with, but who I know to also be engaged in the 
work of being in pain every day. The thing about having coworkers 
in this work, though, is that as much solidarity as can be felt, there 
is also always a sense that when working to make one’s life(’s work), 
it is impossible to fully escape the particularities of that life and the 
work that must be done. 
Daily Survivor
When I say that hard work is the answer to the (other) work of being 
in pain every day, I do not mean the kind of moralizing goodness of 
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working hard, the kind of moral superiority of self-made men, but 
that hard work is as good an alternative as decoupage boxes. 
Daily
Except in times like these when I am sitting in the library (on my day 
off) and it is (becoming) very clear that lost labor really only means 
exactly that — because I am in pain and distracted and anticipating 
more pain and there is no work that I will be able to get done, hard 
or otherwise. 
Daily Survivor
Hard work is as good an alternative to decoupage boxes as any 
because it means that my coworkers and I are firmly in the oppo-
site camp as bed-ridden invalid non-workers. Hard work is as good 
an alternative as decoupage boxes because valuing my labor as it is 
expressed in a decorative craft project meant only for my consump-
tion means valuing my body as something capable of only that kind 
of pseudo-production. 
Pain Exists for a Reason because Death is a Deadline for Life’s 
Work
Maybe decoupage boxes would actually be harder than working 
hard because decoupage boxes seem to imply having to find value 
inherent in pain instead of value in the things pain allows you to do. 
Dead-End Job
Maybe. Or maybe only a slacker in a dead-end job. That is, a slacker 
made such by the very predetermined unnecessariness of the job. 
Unnecessary not because the work itself is unneeded but because 
the dead-endedness of it renders any given task or larger project 
(slightly) null and void; even a survivor narrative is only valid until 




The other aspect of being, feeling like, a slacker in this job is the way 
that being in pain every day becomes automatic. Not the automa-
tion of robots capable of taking over your job, but the way that cer-
tain physical functions, like pain, automate you. In multiple ways. 
In the logistical sense of requiring the same basic care functions 
daily. But also the kind of automation implied by states and atti-
tudes towards states like, for example, pms, wherein menstruation 
explains away any “craziness.” (Certain) biological functions absolve 
you of the responsibility for certain emotional states; it’s only pms. 
It’s only the pain talking. 
Daily Survivor
Being in pain every day is a boring dead-end job that absolves you 
of having to be apologetic about the anger, frustration, boredom or 
general old cranky reclusive-ness that may result. 
Daily
Having a dead-end job doesn’t mean having no work, though, 
because it is still something you’re employed in doing, and thus can 
be considered a “filled present,” wherein “activity and speed distin-
guish the filled present, rather than emotional investment.”10 Simul-
taneously, the speed that characterizes a filled present may actually 
be a lack thereof. 
Survivor
In the same way that biological functions explain away emotional 
states, they also invalidate emotions that may, actually, not be inher-
ent. Thinking that it’s only the pain talking renders the pain-having 
person mute. This is the truth of the process of automation within a 
dead-end job: having a dead-end job means your agency has become 
dead-ended, means you are now just a body that does a thing (to 
10 Kathy Charmaz, Good Days Bad Days (New Brunswick, nj: Rutgers 
University Press, 1993), 241.
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you), that is in pain every day, that bores you and creates mount-
ing bored-frustration which threatens your ability to project (affect) 
manage. 
What, exactly, is the thing that has to be survived about being in 
pain every day? Is the pain or the boredom worse? Is the fact that 
thinking about, writing about, being in pain every day necessitates, 
always, the use of analogy and the laying of other systems over this 
pain, a symptom of the boredom or an inability to deal directly 
with certain physical experiences? When trying to think about what 
it is to survive is an ongoing thing, how can this thinking ever not 
reset at the end of any day? As in, how can the idea of being a sur-
vivor lengthen or expand to encompass a span of time longer than 
24 hours? This is why “survivor” seems, as a concept, suited only 
to people who go through and come fully out of a singular event. 
Because when you are going through and coming (maybe fully, 
probably only partially) out of only a day at a time, how is this at all 
different from just being alive? 
Daily Survivor
It’s different because of the pain. It’s different because while “being 
a survivor” is better suited to singular events, “surviving” can imply 
an ongoing process, without end, with an ongoing set of emotional 
processes tied to singular survived events as well as to the affective 
work of the everyday. This everyday is never, can never, be ordinary 
(as in normal) but is also simultaneously intensely ordinary, because 
it happens every day and because pain is, actually, intensely ordinary 
because it is only ever what (all) bodies do. 
Given these parameters of survivorship, what is the measure of 
success in this job of being in pain every day? Some hugely mean-
ingful end product or simply the drive to create, to work hard at, 
one? But this all too often is the only mark of successful survivor-
ship, the mark of emotional strength and a best-selling memoir 
and a foundation in your name. None of this is meaning. Which 
is why, in addition to actually dying at the end, being in pain every 
day is a dead-end job: the oppression inherent in the way that cer-
tain kinds of survivors are lauded, renders anything you do, as not 
that kind of survivor, slightly pointless. Or not pointless, exactly, 
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but meaningless in the eyes of a society that has chosen to value 
images (of success) over being alive (and knowing when that is suc-
cess enough). 
Survivor
But, at the end of the (this) day, who really can judge you when your 




Many times I have seen written the phrase “illness as metaphor.” I 
have mostly seen it written like this: Illness as Metaphor, Illness as 
Metaphor, Illness as Metaphor. Because it is, or was, the name of a 
book, but now, through being written so many times, it is just ill-
ness as metaphor. 
But illness is a thing that really happens. And aren’t metaphors 
supposed to be narratives about the only way an unimaginable 
thing has become possible? Or maybe that’s myth: “finding a hid-
den plot in a metaphor.”1 
Since illness is a thing that really happens, how can it be said that 
illness as metaphor is still the whole myth or still the only narrative 
through which to imagine a possible unimaginability? Since illness 
is a thing that really happens, where is the metaphor of opposing 
belief, the myth that illness never happens as a metaphor or as a real 
thing? A different or opposite or non-metaphor of illness isn’t the 
same as a narrative about how illness never happens. To be a perfect 
myth about the absence of illness, illness can never be mentioned, as 
a myth or a metaphor or anything else. It must be something else. 
It must be wellness. 
Wellness feels good. Wellness feels like smoothies and coconut and 
January all year and whole foods and natural foods and local foods 
and organic foods. Wellness feels clean. Wellness feels like clean liv-
ing, like a detox or like a tonic or like an elimination diet or like get-
ting toxins out of your system. Wellness feels anti-inflammatory. 
Wellness feels so anti-inflammatory it is “cancer-free;” “getting to 
1 Charles Simic, The Monster Loves His Labyrinth: Notebooks (New 
York: Ausable Press, 2008), 47.
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the root of all disease;” “anti-aging.” Wellness is good for you. But 
wellness is delicious and indulgent and decadent and never tastes 
good for you. Wellness is a practice of living. Wellness is homemade. 
Wellness is for life. 
But: what, exactly, are toxins? This is never clearly defined: I have 
yet to see in any wellness-related media a list of bacteria or patho-
gens that accumulate in your body, cause demonstrable harm, and 
can be removed through things like “tonics.” Especially as tonics 
can consist of anything from lemon and cayenne pepper in water to 
raw apple cider vinegar. Or they may even be a juice cleanse, which, 
again, can be anything from a drink that is more or less fiber to one 
that is more or less entirely sugar. Whether through a tonic or a juice 
cleanse, toxins are subject to being flushed out of the body. This is, 
in fact, already the job of several organs, notably the kidneys, liver, 
and intestines: human excrement can contain as many as 8 mil-
lion bacterial cells. This is a design feature of the human body, one 
utilized with little to no additional support necessary from lemon 
water. In other cases, “toxins” can also include more deeply embed-
ded or imperceptible substances, like the toxins that are found in or 
leach into your body through plastic, iPhones, cans, food packaging 
of any kind, multiple kinds of cookware, water, proximity to indus-
trial or urban sources of pollution, pesticides, fruit or vegetables 
grown in non-organic conditions, as well as several other sources (all 
of which cause cancer). 
The well body is at a surprising amount of risk for being so 
healthy. 
Wellness, when it feels like January all year, full of commitment 
and resolutions, as well as during everyday practices of clean liv-
ing and shorter periods like a detox, is an amount of time. As an 
amount of time which is assigned as a period during which certain 
tasks should be accomplished (i.e. “3-day juice cleanse”), wellness is 
work. But wellness is doing what you love: when periods of time are 
assigned for the completion of tasks that include the preparation of 
decadent and indulgent foods that are toxin-free, clean versions of 
common baked goods (by virtue of being wheat-, dairy-, soy- or egg- 
free), or the creation of decorative objects made by hand, such as 
wildflower arrangements or plant hangers (thereby reaping the ben-
efit of increased exposure to oxygen-producing, air-toxin-cleaning 
plants as well as avoiding toxins in mass produced goods), then 
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wellness never feels like work. This is further enhanced by the fact 
that wellness is, above all, a form of consumption. Not only because 
clean living necessitates the purchase of specialty clean ingredients 
or products, but also because it necessitates the consumption of 
wellness-focused media. Wellness requires instruction. As a set of 
practices that encompasses food, exercise, time management and 
consumption, wellness is labor as leisure. Wellness is unpaid labor 
that one does, actually, pay for, but it’s always a fair price: wellness is 
its own reward. 
Wellness is also many objects in and of themselves, mostly as 
conveyed through images and inspirational merchandising: mason 
jars, fresh fruit and vegetables in whole pieces or cut decoratively, 
especially as arranged by color or in an ombre pattern; natural 
fibers, particularly linen and wool, in muted earth or jewel tone 
colors; beeswax; bees themselves; wooden spoons; ceramics; hand-
made ceramics; handmade ceramics in slightly unusable forms but 
nonetheless filled with decadent clean foods; Edison bulbs; any 
type of plant; candles; branches; coconuts; gym clothes that do not 
look like gym clothes; denim; flower arrangements; flower arrange-
ments in mason jars; flower arrangements in repurposed Edison 
bulbs; bright light and aerial, overhead, shots (so as to better illus-
trate the body’s / viewer’s position over the objects and therefore the 
body being in an optimal position to consume); also the Whole 
Foods bag (paper) printed with “Healthy Looks Good on You;” 
also the Whole Foods bag (reusable) printed with “Kale Quinoa 
Chocolate.”
Wellness is a consumer good, and, like other forms of consump-
tion, it is or has become a responsibility. Wellness is just the right 
thing to do. 
Wellness is also much more than this. These are just the objects, 
images, and vocabulary through which it is communicated. 
Through these objects, images, and vocabulary wellness has 
become, if not by this exact name itself, still instantly recognizable 
as a lifestyle and perspective or rhetoric. Wellness means much more 
than its objects; it is, of course, a metaphor. 
But continuing to examine the social practices through which it 
is expressed can yield valuable insights. As Susan Sontag writes in 
Illness as Metaphor: “Responses to illnesses associated with sinners 
and the poor invariably recommended the adoption of middle-class 
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values.”2 Money drives the practices of wellness and makes its objects 
available. And to update Sontag’s observation, written in the 1970s, 
it is only appropriate that now, in a time of a dissolving middle 
class, the practices and objects of wellness are not just moderately 
more expensive than cheaper versions of comparable goods: they are 
hugely inflated. But wellness as class marker is not purely economic, 
as Sontag continues: “With a slow motion epidemic, these same 
precautions take on a life of their own. They become part of social 
mores, not a practice adopted for a brief period of emergency, then 
discarded.”3 Wellness is for life. 
When Illness as Metaphor was getting written over and over 
again and dissolving into illness as metaphor, into a taken-for-
granted condition of an unimaginable thing or a thing that never 
happens — or a thing that only happens “in theory” or in litera-
ture — where was wellness? I imagine wellness circling around ill-
ness (as metaphor), looking for a way in, through the mass of cancer 
as uncontrolled growth metaphors or the invisible but difficult to 
pierce layer of aids as alien invasion. But these diseases are not part 
of the objects, focus, or concern of wellness. Wellness is not a meta-
phor or a narrative about the kinds of things cancer or aids were 
used to discuss, which changed over time but mainly consisted of 
fears about industrialization, capitalism, immigration, homosexual-
ity and shifting cultural values. Wellness is not a narrative about any 
diseases, really; it is protection against them. Wellness is for life. This 
does not mean that there are not diseases lurking around the edges 
of wellness (perhaps just as wellness circled illness). These diseases 
on the fringes of wellness are those (thought to be) caused primar-
ily by exposure to toxins and immersion in unclean environments, 
namely: autism and autoimmune diseases. 
The relationship among autism, autoimmune diseases, and well-
ness centers around the idea of exposure to toxins. Blatantly, that 
exposure to toxic substances causes the body to malfunction on a 
deep, almost mysterious level. Both autism and many autoimmune 
diseases remain poorly explained in terms of pathophysiology, spe-
cifically in terms of triggers and causes. There are numerous models 
2 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and aids and its Metaphors (New 
York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1978), 142.
3 Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 162.
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of “the autistic brain,” none of which have been conclusively proven, 
especially given the wide variety or scale of autistic individuals. Like-
wise, autoimmune diseases and specifically those that develop later 
in life and frequently present as or include various kinds of food 
allergies or intolerances (or other environmental allergies), which 
are most often the focus within a wellness model of autoimmune 
diseases, also remain poorly explained. Most often the reason given 
within the personal narratives found on wellness-focused blogs and 
within popular science or health journalism is that contemporary 
crops are toxic, whether because of gmos or pesticides or simply the 
fact that “modern humans” are not “designed” to eat certain foods. 
The high incidence of food allergy and autoimmune narratives in 
wellness is self-perpetuating: autoimmune diseases take years, on 
average, to diagnose, during which time people may be more likely 
to reach a stage of holistic, “natural” remedies than they would be if 
given more prompt, accessible and clearly explained medical treat-
ment. Being more likely to participate in this kind of media makes 
the incidence of food allergies or autoimmune diseases seem dispro-
portionately high; it also makes it seem like practices that people 
with documented medical problems need to do are things that all 
people should do, regardless of how well they may be to begin with. 
The standards for wellness are thus an inspirational goal for every 
body while paradoxically being set by those who are the least well. 
On the other hand, within a wellness rhetoric, autism is eas-
ily explained: autism is caused by vaccines. Despite study after 
study and the personal statements of scientists involved in the ini-
tial research that clearly document the deep and unethical flaws 
incurred, a 1998 study showing correlation between the mmr 
(mumps, measles, and rubella) vaccine and autism continues to be 
taken as fact. This is not actually very different from a few of the 
narratives of illness that Susan Sontag cites in Illness as Metaphor: 
Turgenev’s On The Eve, where “the hero of the novel realizes he 
can’t return to Bulgaria . . . he sickens with longing and frustration, 
gets tb, and dies”; Uncle Tom’s Cabin, wherein Little Eva is able to 
“announc[e] to her father a few weeks before the end,” and then 
promptly die at the announced time; or James Joyce’s The Dead, 
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when “he said he did not want to live and a week later he dies.”4 
Wellness, too, is an easy explanation. 
It is not really accurate to say that wellness only makes it seem 
like food intolerances and autoimmune diseases are hugely com-
mon because they are, in fact, increasing in incidence rates. And it 
is also true that there has yet to be a proven explanation for this rise 
in related diseases. But it is still not inaccurate to say that wellness 
attracts people who have or think they have one of these conditions 
and, furthermore, that the rise in autoimmune diseases makes it 
that much more likely for a person consuming wellness media to 
know someone with an autoimmune disease or allergy. Autoim-
mune diseases and allergies are very real. At the same time, not only 
because they  remain poorly understood but also because the array 
of symptoms such conditions can cause is vast, it makes it seem that 
much more likely that only something foreign to the body, some-
thing unidentifiably toxic, could cause this much damage. This is 
further reinforced by the frequent invisibility of both cause and the 
condition itself. As Sontag writes: “The marks on the face of the 
leper, the syphilitic, someone with aids, are signs of a progressive 
mutation, decomposition; something organic.”5 An absence of vis-
ible signs makes it all the easier for it to seem like something inor-
ganic is happening. 
Wellness is good and feeling good and looking good but it also 
allows for or asks for necessarily strong, almost harsh, discipline. 
This is obvious in the kinds of measures suggested for failure in 
everyday practices (i.e. the 30-day cleanse post-holiday season) as 
well as in responses to the perceived toxic inorganicness of auto-
immune diseases and food intolerances. One need look no further 
than “gluten-free” to see a prime example of this attitude. “Gluten-
free” is a set of dietary practices that involves a complete removal of 
gluten, a protein found in wheat and other grains, from one’s diet, 
in addition to the purchase of specialty “gluten-free” or “certified 
gluten-free” items and the preparation, at home, of “gluten-free” 
recipes utilizing said “gluten-free” ingredients in order to create a 
perfect simulation of foods that do, in fact, contain gluten. In other 
words, the best and most well way to be “gluten-free” is to do it by 
4 Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 22–24.
5 Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 129.
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buying and spending time preparing things that make it seem like 
there is no absence of gluten whatsoever. Like you are giving up 
nothing. Like “gluten-free” is identical to living with gluten, only 
more well. 
It would be easy to dismiss “gluten-free” as just another fad diet if 
not for three key features. First, because “gluten-free” is a set of prac-
tices involving consumption, labor, and social activity, all of which 
is, crucially, tied to a set of beliefs, it encompasses far more than 
other fad diets. The set of beliefs involved centers on a conviction 
about the toxicity of gmos or the toxicity of modern wheat or the 
toxicity of modern agriculture and food processing. Because it is not 
just a diet, “gluten-free” is also not just or at all about weight loss. It 
is about feeling better. This feature also highlights the way in which 
sub-practices of wellness can and do dovetail with other forms of 
lifestyle-beliefs; in this case, the emphasis on feeling well and de-
emphasis on weight loss, even through diet, align closely with mind-
ful eating practices and the “Health at any size” movement. Lastly, 
“gluten-free” differs from fad diets like low-fat or low-carb because 
those diets encompass, essentially, all foods and by their very names 
suggest limited but still present quantities of the vilified substance. 
“Gluten-free,” on the other hand, demands complete eradication of 
a single protein found in a handful of grains. There is no scale or 
level of acceptability: only total eradication. “Free.”
Total eradication in the face of mysterious, inorganic, toxin-
caused disease is the mechanism at the heart of most wellness prac-
tices. Wellness urges not only “gluten-free” but also: many other 
forms of eradication diets (Whole30, paleo, refined-sugar free), 
technology-free time periods, clutter-free living (see: Marie Kondo 
and the cult therein),6 reducing plastic items entering the home, and 
so on. All of the practices and the media surrounding them are self-
perpetuating and assert, over and over, that clean living is all that’s 
needed. Wellness thereby denies the reality of illness and asserts 
itself as the only condition: if you live well (if you really live well and 
clean and do the detoxes and cleanses in the event of mistakes), then 
you will not get (these) illnesses. The wellness body is the prevented 
body. 
6 See Marie Kondo’s website: http://tidyingup.com/.
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Prevention is a privilege. It is somewhat remarkable that, within 
wellness media, chronic illness seems a privilege as well. On the one 
hand, it is true that by the middle of the 20th century, “adults who 
would have previously died of infectious diseases were saved by sul-
phanomides and postwar antibiotics and thus moved on to the dis-
eases of middle and old age.”7 Living long enough to get the kinds 
of disease frequently characterized as chronic is indeed a privilege. 
On the other hand, this flies in the face of epidemiological morbid-
ity research that clearly demonstrates the correlation between ill-
nesses like obesity, for example, and conditions of systemic oppres-
sion like poverty: chronic illness, of some kinds, very much does not 
come from living in and with privilege. How, then, does wellness 
figure chronic illness as a privilege? It is an impression gathered 
based on the various kinds of illness mentioned most frequently 
within wellness: food intolerances are the perfect example here. 
Not just because this is a chronic condition that generally requires 
little to no medical treatment perhaps beyond consultation: a food 
intolerance is a condition that can be managed entirely through diet 
and lifestyle. Like through buying specialty “certified gluten-free” 
items and having the leisure time to do so. Also, inasmuch as a food 
intolerance is distinct from a food allergy, a condition characterized 
by an immune system response that can result in emergency states 
like anaphylactic shock, a food intolerance is not deadly. And what 
a privilege being sick in this way is (provided there is no actual eco-
nomic hardship preventing the purchase of “certified gluten-free” 
or other needed products, a hardship never mentioned in wellness). 
Additionally, chronic illness in wellness is a privilege because of 
the kinds of disease not mentioned therein: heart disease, obesity, 
stroke, hereditary diseases, diseases of old age, degenerative condi-
tions, other physical disabilities. Not mentioned: diseases associated 
with poor people, people of color or other marginalized popula-
tions, that could have been prevented if given enough education 
(obesity, heart disease) or could never have been fully prevented in 
the first place (genetic diseases, short of genetic diseases caused by 
genes being turned on because of toxic exposures). It is as if well-
ness can only imagine and discuss diseases it would be a privilege to 
7 George Weisz, Chronic Disease in the 20th Century: A History (Balti-
more, md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 8.
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have when compared to many other, unimaginable, diseases. The 
well body is only “likely” to get certain diseases related to exposure 
to toxins and never anything associated with less privileged popula-
tions — many of whom may indeed be exposed to toxins as a result 
of economic, geographic, and racial discrimination, as in the recent 
case of lead contamination in the water of Flint, mi. “Considering 
illness as a punishment is the oldest idea of what causes illness.”8 
Discussing privilege within wellness necessitates a larger discus-
sion of the well body. Thus far, the objects, practices, and images 
associated with wellness have been identified, but who purchases 
them, participates in, and aspires to these things? What are the 
characteristics of the well body? And it is a clearly definable body, 
especially when extrapolating from these images and related con-
tent, just as there was often a clearly identifiable body that was ill-
ness (as metaphor). For example, tuberculosis produced a body in 
which “debility was transformed into languor,” with illness becom-
ing “a kind of interior décor of the body,” analogous to clothing.9 
In short, tuberculosis was inseparable from the aristocratic, artistic, 
and highly romanticized individual it produced. This individuality 
was so valued and idealized during the Romantic period that Son-
tag details, and this idealization fueled the production of a tuber-
culosis body during a time period in which rapid industrialization 
and a dissolving aristocracy meant that class markers like these could 
be entirely constituted visually. Furthermore, it was not only the 
bodies of those who actually had tuberculosis that were marked by 
it. The delicacy, paleness and thinness of the tb body continued to 
influence fashion well into the 20th century — see: heroin chic. 
The well body’s defining characteristics are its hypersensitiv-
ity and vulnerability to the environment. This contrasts with the 
simultaneous trait of physical fitness, usually expressed by partici-
pation in yoga, Soul Cycle, or related activities (Soul Cycle, in fact, 
seems to have such strong support within wellness it could easily 
be said that Soul Cycle is the new sanatorium). The hypersensi-
tive nature combines with fitness to reinforce the requirement that 
the well body surround itself with clean organic objects, as much 
to avoid exposure as to support its level of fitness. Through this 
8 Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 133.
9 Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 29.
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hypersensitivity and fitness, the well body is thin and pale, but more 
so, it is the epitome of health: wellness is the glowing body. 
Through this aesthetic, wellness marks a body with a very par-
ticular blend of vulnerability and fitness, presenting a hypersensi-
tive feminine whiteness. These are class markers that further mark 
a body as one with ample leisure time and income (for paying for 
and attending yoga, Soul Cycle, specialty grocery stores, farmers 
markets, time for participating in wellness media itself): this leisure 
time and income is in no way wasted on the well body. It recognizes 
its purchasing power and votes with its dollars (see: the rapid shift 
among large food companies to incorporate cage-free eggs, natural, 
non-gmo, or fair trade items into their product lines) and has the 
education to do so. In short, the well body is one that can continu-
ally attend to and get the very best for its own support and care (out 
of choice and leisure and not out of medical necessity or debilitating 
illness). Wellness is its own pursuit. 
Wellness is a body glowing with good health, but it is crucial 
here to draw a distinction between health or healthy and wellness. 
Doing so is best supported by providing an example of a prototypi-
cal well body: Carol, the protagonist in Todd Hayne’s 1995 film Safe, 
played by Julianne Moore. Living in Los Angeles, Carol suddenly 
finds herself suffering from bizarre attacks: headaches, nose bleeds, 
shortness of breath. These attacks come seemingly at random, when 
a new couch is delivered to her house or as she is driving or at a 
baby shower. One day, Carol sees a flyer for a talk being given about 
something called environmental illness, and having received little to 
no treatment from both her doctor and psychiatrist, she decides to 
attend. The talk she hears not only confirms Carol’s illness (as envi-
ronmental) but provides much needed support, emotional support 
she had not been receiving from her husband or doctors, who seem 
mostly to consider her illness hysterical and psychosomatic. But it’s 
not. And it is worth noting that it is only around this time, as Carol 
becomes sicker, but more importantly as she learns more about 
environmental illness, that bruises begin appearing on her face. As 
if, like the marks on a leper, now that the disease is known, definite 
and organic, what had been invisible can be made manifest and 
clearly marked, and can seem organic. 
It may seem paradoxical to suggest that Carol, a sick person, 
is the prototypical well body. But she is exactly this body, like a 
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resuscitated poster child. Carol asserts the importance and valid-
ity of wellness through her very physicality, by demonstrating 
that (even in the absence of a single identifiable cause or source) 
“environmental” toxins can and will make you ill. Carol asserts 
the supremacy of wellness as a rhetoric as well, inasmuch as her 
turn away from her family and traditional medicine and towards 
the environmentally ill group she finds, ultimately going so far as 
to move to a retreat center the group runs, demonstrates that those 
around you may never believe in and validate a hypersensitive vul-
nerable nature: only wellness is really there for you. Carol goes 
beyond just the wealthy, white, sensitive femininity that represents 
wellness so well, because her experience of finding a community run 
by people who have had the same experiences she has demonstrates 
a core wellness value: the need for communities led by individuals 
who have been through it themselves, and the value of the indi-
vidual experience turned expert advice. This expert advice and the 
fact that wellness requires instruction is exactly what distinguishes 
wellness from healthy. Healthy is the fda, myplate.gov, salad bars, 
a gym; healthy is mediocre. Healthy is mediocre because of its insis-
tence on democracy and accessibility, especially when compared 
to the exclusive, individualized, and expert advice offered by well-
ness. The value placed on individual experts within wellness illus-
trates key attitudes towards control and trust, reinforced continu-
ally within wellness media: that practices related to health should 
not be trusted when prescribed by the government (see: vaccines, 
gmos); that managing wellness should be firmly within the hands 
of individuals (which may paradoxically provide a veneer of acces-
sibility, until it’s noted that the practices for best managing wellness 
remain, financially and geographically, inaccessible for the majority 
of people); that only other people with authentic experiences can be 
trusted. Frequently, personal blogs devoted to wellness will note, in 
“About Me” sections, that their writers are not certified nutrition-
ists or medical professionals, as if their advice should be taken with 
a grain of salt when, ironically, this very lack of credentials is what 
lends them credence. Carol’s doctors had no idea what was wrong 
with her: only others like her did. 
This attitude demonstrates further aspects of the role of the per-
sonal within wellness. First, just because Carol can be considered a 
prototype of the well body does not mean that wellness really allows 
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for that level of sickness anymore. By placing value on the personal 
over the professional, wellness presupposes an absence of any seri-
ous medical condition that would require care beyond the advice 
of other people who have been through it. After all, the reoccurring 
and predominant personal narrative found in wellness media — “I 
left my [boring, toxic, draining] [job, city, relationship] for a new 
practice of [vegan, clean, whole] [baking, cooking, making], along 
the way healing [my autoimmune disease, my food intolerance, my 
child’s autism]” — points to one thing, and one thing only: wellness 
is the best medicine. 
Wellness is and is not new. There are certainly new developments 
and trends within wellness but some of its basic premises are long-
standing. As John King wrote in the 1800s: “Although there are 
many maladies in which medical and medicinal treatment cannot 
be dispensed with, yet I am fully convinced that nearly, if not quite, 
one-half of the sicknesses which come under the care of medical 
men, could and ought to be cured solely by recourse to hygiene.”10 
As old as an idea of illness as punishment is, illness as punishment 
for uncleanliness is perhaps even older. What is contemporary and 
distinctive about wellness is the nature of the uncleanliness it seeks 
to manage and the media through which it does so. The exposure 
and fear at the heart of wellness is one of a distinctively chemical and 
industrial nature. It is not the uncleanliness of darkness or damp-
ness that King was most probably thinking of when he called for 
hygiene. The cleanliness of wellness is not about germs or infectious 
diseases or, really, any disease other people could probably give you. 
It is entirely about things that can be done to your body without 
your even knowing it, because the “done to” is transmitted through 
acts that seem perfectly innocuous, like vaccines or eating wheat. 
Staying clean is about avoiding things like “industrial” or “envi-
ronmental”: things that are directly opposed to the personal and 
individual. Wellness is hyper-attentive to the individual. Wellness 
is for you. And what benefits, beyond the physical, it can provide: 
“The Romantic view is that illness exacerbates consciousness. Once 
that illness was tb; now it is insanity . . . [that brings] paroxysmic 
enlightenment.”11 Now it is wellness. 
10 Weisz, Chronic Disease in the 20th Century, 3. 
11 Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 36. 
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The enlightenment of wellness is directly related to the media 
through which it enlightens. Instead of relying solely on books, in-
person meetings, support groups, or brochures distributed through 
doctor’s offices or governmentally, as many public health campaigns, 
fad diets, and general health media does, wellness is accessible and 
participatory across many social media platforms. Instead of rely-
ing on only the publication of cookbooks, which may only be able 
to focus on a single dietary approach and a set number of recipes, 
wellness can exist through blogs, whose endless format and constant 
updating allows for multiple approaches (i.e. the vegan and gluten-
free baking blog). Blog formats similarly allow for their authors to 
revise in real time as  recommendations and nutritional advice shift, 
as seen in the years-long narrative arc of soy, once thought of as a 
healthy and readily available vegan source of protein but now a food 
to be avoided because what is readily available is only gmo. Instead 
of a single brochure with advice and a few images you may pick up 
from your doctor, wellness can exist on Instagram, which creates a 
daily and ongoing visual demonstration of a wellness lifestyle. Like-
wise, Pinterest also allows for a visually accessible and ongoing col-
lection of wellness content. And across any platform, wellness is as 
easy to participate in as clicking a “pin it” button. Wellness is for 
you, by you. 
While inextricably linked to the development of social media 
inasmuch as the widespread, ongoing, visually present nature of 
wellness would not have been fully possible prior to this media, 
wellness can also be linked to several other recent developments: 
growing awareness of climate change and the way that certain forms 
of media coverage of climate change make it seem, at once, like a 
way in which our environment is becoming toxic to us and as a set 
of responsibilities in consumption habits; governmental failure to 
contain certain things identified as toxic, both figuratively and liter-
ally, whether terrorism or lead; the local and whole food movements 
and, specifically, media coverage therein and the way this media has 
been created and adopted by both science journalism and foodies, 
i.e. both as science and aesthetic; the medicalization of everyday 
life and an increasing number of recognized conditions (to the 
point of beginning to distinguish between a condition, like a food 
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intolerance, and a disease, like Celiac’s); an increasing number of rec-
ognized conditions while simultaneously more and more diseases 
are becoming treatable, creating a catch-22 of becoming healthier 
and healthier while wondering what else you may have; globaliza-
tion and the reoccurring discovery of uniquely healthy populations 
(being expressed, for example, in popularizing the “superfoods” 
these populations eat); the obesity epidemic and the growing belief 
that everything that has been popularized by both the government 
and fad diets is incorrect, funded by multinational corporations, 
and directly and solely responsible for said obesity epidemic. But, 
most notably, wellness can be linked directly to the rise in rates, as 
previously mentioned, of autism and autoimmune diseases. 
In aids and its Metaphors, Susan Sontag notes that “illnesses 
like heart attacks and influenza that do not damage or deform the 
face never arouse the deepest dread.”12 Until now. There is some-
thing paradoxical about the degree of fear that is generated around 
autism and autoimmune diseases, because neither is (commonly) a 
disease that will kill you nor visually deform you. And yet wellness 
does generate exactly this fear. Because in a culture that values not 
only long-standing beliefs about self-made people but also more 
recent ideals about the presentation and representation of one-
self, especially in the very social media in which wellness operates, 
these diseases represent one of the biggest contemporary fears: the 
inability to be oneself. Specifically the inability to authentically be 
oneself and the inability to authentically represent oneself. And 
furthermore, autism and autoimmune diseases represent the worst-
case scenario in which this inability could happen because in both 
diseases you — whether through a body that cannot identify its cells 
as itself or through “the autistic brain” — are the one preventing 
yourself from doing so. Wellness is easier. Wellness and the “toxins” 
it posits as the worst imaginable sources of danger are actually much 
easier to admit than a problem that is, ultimately, you; a disease that 
is inseparable from you and who you are is worse and more difficult 
to imagine than a disease caused by your iPhone or wheat or gmos. 
Not just difficult to imagine that a disease and its cause are one and 
the same as you and your body, but an outright impossibility: vac-
cines cause autism at an age between a few months and a few years, 
12 Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 128.
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indicating that “the autistic brain” is not something that simply is. 
Everything could have been prevented. Illnesses are not things that 
really happen, that do not happen for any unidentifiable reason, 
and that do not happen to you. Wellness is the impossibility of ill-
ness. Wellness is the notion that ultimately, avoiding exposure to 
toxins is not enough, because the aesthetic of wellness and its prac-
tices provides a way to continually demonstrate the importance of 
how you are really being the best and most well and most authentic 
you possible. Wellness is you being your own impossibility of ill-
ness. Wellness is the best medicine. 
How, then, and within this context, to understand a sick body 
that is comically, insanely, paradoxically, or fittingly, the most well 
body possible? Which is to say, through and because of illness and 
the specificities of what a pancreas needs, I am all of this. Having 
been sick long enough, cared for it long enough, and absorbed these 
practices of care deeply enough, this is not just a matter of practic-
ing wellness: it is being wellness. Not a well body, necessarily. But 
one that is, beyond being visibly white, thin, and feminine, engaged 
constantly in practices of protecting-from-harm-through-ingestion. 
I have a low-fat, low-glycemic, low-allergen diet. I don’t eat wheat, 
most dairy, any meat, legumes, a handful of certain fruits and veg-
etables, processed foods, refined or added sugar, anything that is 
fried; there is an obvious reason I refer to this generally as either the 
water diet or the nothing diet. Having done this for long enough, I 
am at least thirty pounds lighter than the average American woman, 
especially given the exercise I do daily (exercise being one of the 
best diabetes preventions even in an unavoidable case of pancreatic 
damage-induced diabetes — called Type 3, an unpopular form). 
Instead of achieving and enjoying, relaxing into, the glowing well 
body this (should) produce, my wellness is distinctly uncomfort-
able. Though the well body may be the prevented body, prevention 
is often uncomfortable; constant perception of risk within a daily 
environment is uncomfortable. This, no money can adequately 
attend to. This, this is the only true wellness and authenticity avail-
able to the sick: the perfect appearance of ultimate health through 
illness. The joke is on all of us. The joke is embedded in and per-
petuated through the play of privileges in different spheres. The 
joke is being so thin that routine surgeries, like a possible gallblad-
der removal, become dangerous in a body with so little room to 
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move equipment around in, or in other procedures during which 
pediatric-sized equipment becomes necessary. The joke, a crueler 
joke, is in social moments when my eating disorder is assumed, or 
when it is assumed that I must enjoy and take pride in being so thin 
and not, in fact, see it as a sign of imminent bodily decomposition: 
pancreatitis is characterized by pancreatic enzymes that digest and 
injure surrounding tissue, essentially digesting the body itself and 
how else can I see weight loss except as an extension of this? This is 
what is authentic. This is the thin well body produced by itself. This 
is what you want? This is what you think looks good? Wellness may 
be the best medicine, but sickness is what is only, truly, for life. 
Untitled (Everything is Visceral)
Mind on my Tummy 
I can’t remember things right now. Some things, anyway, nor can 
I really remember the order of things or how something began by 
the time I get to the end. It’s my grasp that’s gone, my ability to hold 
on and sort things out and remember the things and the sorting. 
Even these few sentences are getting repetitive because I can’t really 
remember what I had been thinking to say next. This isn’t the first 
time I’ve had this complete lack of grasp. The first time was when 
my cat died and I didn’t even bother trying to read anything in Eng-
lish for days afterward because I couldn’t remember the beginning 
of the sentence by the time I had gotten to the end of it (that I can 
remember). I’m not sad, now, and no one’s dead. Now, my grasp is 
gone because of Amitriptyline hcl 10 mg.
Tummy on My Mind
It’s not what you think. While it is true that Amitriptyline hcl 
10 mg is a tricyclic antidepressant, it has a long history of off-label 
usage as a treatment for nerve pain or nerve damage, like nerve dam-
age caused by a chronic illness, and the whole time my doctor was 
discussing the prescription and its use in relation to the gastrointes-
tinal system with me, I couldn’t tell if he was saying gastroenterol-
ogy or gastroneurology.
Mind on My Tummy
It’s like my gut is sad and needs antidepressants. It’s like, unlike so 
visceral
64
many other people who take antidepressants for sad minds only 
to find themselves facing physical side effects of which weight gain 
and constipation are some of the most common, I, instead, am tak-
ing it for my sad gut only to find myself with mental side effects 
which, while not being able to remember things doesn’t make me 
sad, exactly, do make me absolutely and completely infuriated. I can 
only say “it’s like” because I don’t have a lot of other information 
about sad guts, yet, and because, as an off-label usage, it is difficult 
to find information about Amitriptyline hcl 10 mg and nerve dam-
age, and the whole time my doctor was saying either gastroenterol-
ogy or gastroneurology, he was discussing Elavil, a version of Ami-
triptyline that AstraZeneca doesn’t even make anymore.
Tummy on My Mind
The first step in determining whether guts can even be sad (and 
whether I should continue taking the Amitriptyline hcl 10 mg) is 
to decide what “gut” means. Because the gut is a complex system or 
network, including organs all the way from the salivary glands and 
esophagus to liver and pancreas and anus.1 It is often characterized, 
within popular scientific journalism, as a computer system, a little 
brain or a second brain, because the enteric nervous system, which 
innervates the whole gut, contains every neurotransmitter that the 
central nervous system contains; there is nothing peripheral about 
it. Because there is nothing peripheral about it, the gut is also, more 
widely speaking, at the center of things: it may not be at the heart of 
the matter, but it is what runs entirely through it and because it is 
at the center it provides, in its own way, an answer to or model for 
an answer, to the question of whether my doctor was saying gastro-
enterology or gastroneurology, because he and I are still trying to 
determine what is at the center.
The enteric nervous system is extensive. It is commonly quoted 
that “the small intestine in humans has as many nerves as the spinal 
cord.”2 The gut feels. What it feels, though, is not always obvious. 
1 Cathy Gulli, “The Brain-Gut Connection,” MacLean’s 121.45 (2008): 
64–67.
2 Elizabeth Wilson, Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body 
(Durham, nc: Duke University Press, 2004), 31.
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The enteric nervous system consists of three main kinds of nerve 
groups, divided between two main networks (called plexuses) 
which serve to detect thermal, chemical, and mechanical condi-
tions (done mainly by sensory neurons) and augment these con-
ditions by manipulating muscle movements (like of the gut wall) 
and secretions (like of digestive enzymes, performed by motor neu-
rons). Interneurons facilitate communications between sensory and 
motor neurons. The little or second brain labels come in because 
there is, relatively, little communication along the vagus nerve 
between the gut and the brain. The gut makes its own decisions.
As a somewhat disparate collection of organs whose main func-
tions are best facilitated via muscle movements and secretions, who 
are you to make decisions of this kind? Doing so would require spe-
cific and constantly, minutely, changing information and the ability 
to make decisions based on this information. For instance, what is 
the difference between the amount of lipase and amylase, enzymes 
needed to break down fat and carbs, respectively, in a piece of pizza 
as opposed to an avocado? How do these amounts change based on 
the time of day or the temperature or how much water I’ve had to 
drink or what else I’ve eaten or how much pain I’m in or whether 
I’ve done my part properly in these decisions by taking Creon, a 
neatly capsuled dose of amylase and lipase? Maybe a sad gut is one 
that can’t make decisions. Maybe a sad gut is one that hasn’t been 
given enough information about what is at the heart of the matter. 
Maybe if losing my memory is enough to make me angry than being 
confused is enough to make my gut sad.
This confusion fits neatly into the computer model of the gut, 
because it depicts a network of nerves and information hubs 
(organs) in disarray or with crossed connections. One main aspect 
of the computer-gut model not often noted is how reliant this 
analogy is on invisibility. Because just as the stuff (hardware) that 
makes a computer actually compute is hidden within smooth silver 
surfaces, the stuff of the gut is hidden beneath skin and muscle and 
a rib cage and other organs. Both computers and guts rely on this 
invisibility to produce, continually and reliably, seamless interfaces 
and user interactions. “The portions of the gut innervated mainly 
by the enteric nervous system tend to remain outside awareness 
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until they break down.”3 Maybe a confused gut is enough to make 
me sad.
Mind on My Tummy
A second model of the gut seems to refute this invisibility entirely. 
Instead of envisioning the gut as a computer, it can be depicted as 
another (more apparent) body part, that of the skin. The gut can 
be seen as similar to the skin because both serve as barriers, with the 
gut acting as “a tunnel that permits the exterior to run right through 
us. Paradoxically, whatever is in the lumen of the gut is thus actually 
outside of our bodies.”4
The funny thing about the skin as a metaphor or model for the 
gut is that the skin is the largest organ humans have and the one 
that you never think of as being a real organ, so in some ways the 
gut / skin metaphor doesn’t, actually, move beyond or stop relying 
on and reinforcing the invisibility of the gut, because it likens it to 
another object that seems beyond the realm of real organhood. 
If the computer model of the gut serves mainly to illustrate the 
workings of the enteric nervous system, the skin model seems to 
be more so about the function of the gut (as organs rather than as 
nerves) as a barrier, as a thing that controls the flow of what enters 
and is released by our bodies, much as the skin does. Maybe having a 
confused gut very much on the inside of my body instead of (being 
able to envision it as) on the outside of my body is enough to make 
me sad.
Wouldn’t having an external barrier within the body mean that 
the gut is really just a barrier to ourselves, from ourselves? Maybe 
being isolated is enough to make my gut sad. 
Tummy on My Mind
Maybe a determination of what constitutes a sad gut doesn’t need 
to be based on, or only on, defining what the gut, itself, is, but 
on whether the gut is able to experience sadness. As in, if what 
you are noticing is chemical, thermal, or mechanical, what about 
3 Wilson, Psychosomatic, 37.
4 Wilson, Psychosomatic, 44.
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this information can cause sadness? But even this question would 
depend on whether the gut is being defined by what it is or by 
what it does. Is the gut a collection of organs that do stuff or is it 
a bunch of nerves that decide stuff? Privileging one conceptualiza-
tion over another seems to depend on another set of privileges: does 
your gut work or does it not work? Is your gut a thing that does 
things for you, that makes its own decisions, or do you have to con-
stantly consider your gut’s needs and decide, for it, what it should 
do and when? (Keeping in mind that any such decisions are guess 
work because how can you fix hardware, which inherently requires 
mechanical repairs, when all the hardware is inside and, anyway, 
what kind of hardware can be fixed just by putting more stuff, like 
food or Amitriptyline hcl 10 mg, into it?) 
If what you are noticing is your gut’s ability to notice (and regu-
late) mechanical, chemical, and thermal changes, what about your 
noticing (or what you are noticing) determines whether you want 
more skin or an internal computer? When your perception of an 
object includes “the motor adjustments we made to obtain the per-
ception in the first place and also include[s] the emotional reactions 
we had then,”5 does your perception of your gut as either a com-
puter or as skin imply your perception of your gut as a thing you 
used or a thing that covers you at all times? 
Mind on My Tummy
Part of the determination of whether a gut can be sad is related to 
the question of having either more skin or an internal computer. 
Because part of whether a gut can feel sad depends on how much 
it is yours. That is, if “ownership and agency are, likewise, related 
to a body at a particular instant in a particular space. The things 
you own are close to your body, or should be, so that they remain 
yours.”6 Is your gut a thing, like a computer, that you own and is 
inside you because through this ownership you keep it close, or is it, 
like skin, which is simply there with this invisible, inherent, always 
already embeddedness, so close to you that it is like a barrier, like 
5 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in 
the Making of Consciousness (New York: Mariner Books, 1999), 148.
6 Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 145.
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a second skin, that defies ownership because, really, how do you 
own your skin? Whether you own it or not matters not only for 
the objecthood of your gut but because this ownership is related 
to agency and, therefore, maintains (or consists in part of) a spatial 
relationship to your body, it also matters in considering whether or 
not your gut can be sad: are gut feelings ones that your gut has or 
feelings that you have or feelings that your gut gives to you? And 
when you stop taking Amitriptyline hcl 10 mg and find your-
self much more able to write (because you are much more able to 
remember), now, is this satisfaction a feeling that you have or one 
that your gut gave you or one that you are having at the expense of 
your gut? 
Tummy on My Mind
The question of ownership, of how you have (or feel yourself to 
have) your skin, and therefore the rest of your body, is at the heart of 
the matter of having a gut that is skin or a computer. Or, more pre-
cisely, the question is not so much one of similarity between your 
gut and skin or a computer, but rather a question of how differently 
you perceive your gut to be from the rest of your body and whether 
this difference (or lack thereof) is more like a computer or like skin. 
Meaning: if your gut is in no way dissimilar from the rest of your 
body, then your gut is like skin, because having a gut that is skin 
means having a gut that is more of the same, more of what’s already 
there. Because your body is not, actually, a computer, having a gut 
that is a computer means having a gut that is different from the rest 
of your body. 
Different in part, perhaps, because of the kind of thinking 
(or non-thinking) your gut does. That is, because of the kind of 
information the enteric nervous system pays attention to, namely 
mechanical, thermal, and chemical, namely not emotions, the gut 
as computer model is a way of encasing the gut as a data set. This 
encasing effects not only the gut but the way the data of the body 
throughout is thought of as well: if the gut is data, then data is a col-
lection of matter and nerves and organs. Information is mass. 
Information is mass and the gut is weight and this is most obvi-
ously illustrated by the fact that weight is a number, in pounds and 
bmi and in 10 mg being an appropriate dose of Amitriptyline hcl 
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for a gut my size. Is the preclusion of emotional information from 
data based on thermal, mechanical, and chemical changes indicative 
of the way we think about our own emotions, the liveliness of our 
bodies, or the way that processing is so often portrayed as being at 
odds with higher level emotional thinking? Maybe being isolated is 
enough to make my gut sad. 
Mind on My Tummy
All of these questions and the perceptual maneuvers they require are 
because this question of what the gut is is not one easily answered 
within standard considerations of embodiment. Because embodi-
ment is so often taken to mean the way that we experience and are 
embodied within our physical bodies. But the question of whether 
the gut can be sad can’t be answered entirely within such a matrix 
because it ultimately asks the question of how bodies, how physical 
matter, is embodied within us. What is it about this question that 
makes it so difficult to answer? 
Consider, for a moment, the way that “stomach” often acts as a 
cipher for the entirety of the digestive system. Which, in turn, means 
that a word like “stomachache” can be used to mean anything from 
nausea to pain to hunger; it becomes not a cipher, exactly, but a 
way of creating opacity over physical sensations. “Stomach” is the 
gut / center / tunnel of the matter because a tunnel is a hole and 
“stomach” is a hole that indicates an inability to completely perceive 
and account for the complexity of the gut and I say “stomachache” 
even when I know the pain I’m in is in no way caused by my stom-
ach. “Stomach” is indicative of a hole in embodiment, of a failure 
in perception that is similar to a kind of agnosia. Agnosia is a neu-
rological condition in which a lack of one specific kind of sensory 
information (i.e. visual, auditory) prevents the recall of an object. 
Which, in turn, prevents a current perception of an object because 
how can you recognize an object if you can’t remember having seen 
it before and how can you tell if your gut is sad if you can’t even tell 
what your gut is or recall how it was before?
The gut is a black box that is distinct from the black box that the 
brain has been thought of for centuries. Because the problem of the 
brain’s black box-ness was about an inability to access the workings 
of the brain based solely on physical and visual information. The 
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problem of the black box gut is not one of mechanics but of mecha-
nism. We know what the gut does: we put things into it and other 
things come out in ways that are both obvious and invisible (but 
not insensible). We know what the gut does but not how it decides 
to do those things. How does a gut determine what to shit and 
what to distribute? How can you have something if you don’t really 
know what it is? 
Tummy on My Mind
This question can actually be answered by a return to the gut com-
puter model. Because it could instead be asked as: how do you 
own an unknown (or unknowable) product? And Apple easily 
answers this question: you buy it for the packaging. And, in turn, 
you develop that smooth shiny packaging precisely because you are 
aware of the unknowability of what’s inside. 
Mind on My Tummy
In terms of the relationship between forgetting (or an inability to 
remember) and an inability to recognize an object, does the fact 
that I stopped taking the Amitriptyline hcl 10 mg two days ago 
and my ability to remember is returning, somehow mean that I 
will or should now be better able to recognize my gut? Or, maybe, 
this inability only ever constitutes itself. Maybe it takes a consider-
ation of what depression is to determine what the (sad) gut is. For 
example, if depression “is a breakdown not of the brain, per se, or 
of the liver or of the gut. It is a breakdown of the relations among 
organs,”7 then maybe my gut is sad because I don’t even know what 
it is. 
What if my gut is sad not only because I don’t know what 
it is, whether it is skin or a computer, but also because I never 
decided what it was before, before now, before I needed to, 
before it became sad. And maybe this confusion or inability only 
7 Elizabeth Wilson, “The Work of Antidepressants: Preliminary Notes on 
How to Build an Alliance Between Feminism and Psychopharmacolo-
gy,” Biosocieties 1.1 (2006): 130 [125–31]; doi: 10.1017/S174585520505012X.
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ever constitutes itself because consider the following excerpt 
from Antonio Damasio’s The Feeling of What Happens:
We begin with an organism made up of body proper and brain, 
equipped with certain forms of brain response to certain stimuli and 
with the ability to represent the internal states caused by reacting to 
stimuli and engaging repertoires of preset response. As the repre-
sentations of the body grow in complexity and coordination, they 
come to constitute an integrated representation of the organism, a 
proto-self . . . But all of these processes — emotion, feeling and con-
sciousness — depend for their execution on representations of the 
organism. Their shared essence is the body.8
What if something happens during the growth in complexity of 
bodily representations that disrupts both the complexity and ensu-
ing coordination? What if, before you fully realize or decide what 
the gut is, you are taught (if that’s the right word) that this decision 
is meaningless or unnecessary because your gut is just a thing you 
have or a thing you use and what is complex about that? What if the 
disruption to complexity is the utter simplicity of the gut-computer 
and gut-skin models? What if the development of complexity or 
coordination is on some level related to other neurological devel-
opment, like growing up, and you have been sick since you turned 
18? What if these disruptions to complexity, because they create 
an inability to depict accurate representations of the body, further 
inhibit coordination because you cannot communicate nothing, or, 
you can, only this means the communication of confusion. What if 
this series of disruptions creates a situation of alienation, wherein 
the gut is neither a skin nor a computer but a different actualization 
of the gut being external, in that it has become external to the know-
ing self. And, therefore, because it is within me but without me, the 
gut has no choice but to have its own feelings. 
Tummy on My Mind
And, now, what kind of interruption to complexity and coordi-
nation is going on when my stomach hurts to the point that it is 
8 Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 248.
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distracting and I can barely focus on what I’m reading, let alone 
write anything? It’s a deceptive interruption because in this situa-
tion it only seems like the simplicity of my stomachache is interrupt-
ing the complexity of my thinking, because, really, what is going on 
is a series of disruptions: the simplicity of the pain of my body, fol-
lowed by an immediate awareness that even as I say “stomachache” 
I know that it’s not my stomach, so if it’s not my stomach then what 
is it, and if I don’t know what it is, really, today, then how can I do 
anything about it, and if I can’t even think straight, now, is this bet-
ter or worse than not being able to remember anything?
I’m too distracted by this simple pain to continue being able to 
focus on questions of the embodiment of the gut, so perhaps it’s 
time to fully, actually, consider sadness now and leave the gut at this: 
it’s a hole, like a tunnel, but not empty. If it’s a lack, as a hole, that’s 
only because it’s a lack of awareness; as a body part for which there is 
no complete awareness, the gut exists in a state of unembodiment. 
This isn’t the same as disembodiment because the problem is not 
one of detachment. Rather, the gut is within and without and we 
are within and without the gut as well. 
Mind on My Tummy
So, depression. Allowing for a standard hierarchy of complex-
ity within emotions, it would perhaps be prudent to start with a 
definition of sadness, as feelings of sadness are the building blocks 
of depression. In fact, by some accounts, depression is simply sus-
tained feelings of sadness. This continuity of feeling, regardless 
of other criteria, is always a part of determining (or diagnosing) 
depression. In turn, this linking of diagnosis and defining raises the 
question of whether depression can be defined in a way that differ-
entiates depression as only ever active (as in actual) when it is a thing 
a person is doing from depression as a state separate from a stan-
dardized enactment of that state. Or, is there a core quality or state 
of depression that can be identified through its isolation from the 
set of symptoms that arises in being depressed? If so, it would seem 
to be this core depression that the gut is capable of because how can 
a gut exhibit other behaviors associated with depression like not get-
ting out of bed and substance abuse, and I wonder if it is harder 
or easier to diagnose depression in a person than it is to diagnose 
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a physical illness in a gut. The statistics would seem to indicate it’s 
easier, on the basis that psychiatric medications are some of the 
most widely prescribed, and I have been sick for years with, in part, 
the condition of being in a diagnostic “no man’s land,” to quote the 
same doctor who said either gastroenterology or gastroneurology 
while providing me with an unpopular usage of a popular drug and 
I do understand that this is not exactly a one-to-one comparison but 
how much easier is it for you to think of and know a time when you 
felt sad than it is to identify, locate, and define what, exactly, your 
pancreas does? 
Tummy on My Mind
My simply painful gut is distracting me again. 
Mind on My Tummy
Given the frequency with which gastrointestinal symptoms are 
reported by people with clinical depression, namely changes to 
appetite and weight, to the degree that such symptoms are part of 
the criteria for a diagnosis of depression, it may seem like a sad gut 
is really just a similar psychosomatic state. But the way that physical 
symptoms arise in depression is such that they are as a result of an 
existing emotional state. Which, yes, as a set of neurological char-
acteristics is itself definitely physical, but the point being that the 
entire concept of psychosomatic illness is based on the idea that the 
body is entirely under the influence of the mind. A sad gut, a gut 
that is its own physical symptom generator, as in a gut that is already 
sick, is not producing these symptoms as a result of existing emo-
tions. This in turn gives rise to two questions: one, what to call or 
how to consider this kind of anti-psychosomatic or psychosomatic 
resistant sadness, and, two, addressing the kind of internal anthro-
pomorphism at play here. 
It’s an anthropomorphism inherent in the term “sad gut” because 
a gut is not a person and a person is the only thing that gets sad. 
Many body parts, though, are subject to this kind of anthropo-
morphism: the heart’s (or penis’) mind of its own, for example. 
This kind of part–whole anthropomorphism, wherein a part of us, 
because it’s us, must therefore be comparable to or simply a smaller 
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model of the whole of us, is useful to our discussion here, but lim-
ited by its unidirectional nature. First, it does provide an existing 
understandable model through which to think sometimes unin-
telligible or unknown questions. However, part–whole anthropo-
morphism fails to take into account how the whole may be, actually, 
comparable to or a larger model of its part, how, maybe, anthropo-
morphizing the gut only ever further reinforces a failure in under-
standing the gut and how much it constitutes us. 
Tummy on My Mind
Even when trying to define sadness, its location in the gut (as 
opposed to “us” or the brain) means that it is always in relation to 
a physical sensation. Despite that oft-cited figure meant to illus-
trate the sensitivity of the gut, what it is capable of being sensitive 
to is still defined narrowly and physically. Can an organ (especially 
one which is not one, but many) have a feeling that is more than 
the physical feeling of pain? (Is pain only physical, ever?) More of a 
feeling meaning exactly that, a feeling that is more like an emotion 
than a physical sensation. Is it that the physical pain of a sick gut 
becomes, over time or through interpretation or through interpre-
tation over time, a feeling of sadness? 
Sometimes I feel pain but I don’t also feel sick and sometimes 
I feel sick but I’m not in pain but whether I’m in pain or feeling 
sick or feeling neither, there is always the physical presence of sick-
ness. There is always a sick gut. There is no clear causation, no psy-
chosomatic linking between psychological emotions and physical 
symptoms, or things that happen that become symptoms, or things 
that are felt that become symptoms, because, in this already sick sad-
dened gut, the sheer force of physical fact overrides any attempts 
at separating the physical from the emotional; pain is pain is sad-
ness is sickness is the gut. Saying that sad guts are always also sick 
guts doesn’t mean that the sadness is being caused by the sickness, 
because not all sick guts will be sad and because here, in the gut, 
sickness and sadness are one and the same. Saying that sad guts are 
always also sick guts isn’t the same as saying that sick people are 
always also sad, but that certain physical sensations within sickness 
are always also emotions. Emotions that organs are having. Consider 
again the diagnostic criteria for depression set out in the dsm-IV, 
untitled (everything is visceral)
75
and the inclusion there of items like changes to behavior or loss of 
interest in prior activities, and, alongside this, consider symptoms 
of a gastrointestinal illness like ulcerative colitis or Crohn’s, which 
can include alternating diarrhea and constipation, and bloating 
and nausea and bleeding. Alternating diarrhea and constipation are 
nothing if not a change in behavior. A sad gut is one that no longer 
wants to do what it (maybe) used to do. A sad gut is one that can no 
longer remember how to do what it used to do. A sad gut, in this 
not remembering and not desiring (because it doesn’t know what to 
desire anymore) recognizes that sadness is the absence of informa-
tion. A sad gut, knowing that information is mass, concurrently rec-
ognizes that the absence of information has direct physical effects. 
In this sad gut, alternating diarrhea and constipation become a 
mechanism for the regulation of or searching for information: hold-
ing onto, letting it all out, trying to communicate. Because sadness, 
any emotion, is not just about having the capacity to feel the emo-
tion but also the ability to communicate it. A sad gut is one that is 
trying to tell you something. 
Upset Stomach
If the gut is a hole in embodiment, and if sadness, or at least the 
sadness of guts, is a lack of knowledge or information, then these 
states lead to a third condition of misunderstanding because of too 
little information: what if I never tell you how it feels? What if, 
throughout this whole discussion of guts and sadness, I never tell 
you how my gut feels and all that is really felt, here, is how unfelt, 
how unembodied, the gut is? Because I can say “pain” and “stom-
achache” over and over, but what do you actually know? But this is, 
in a similar but slightly different way, exactly how my gut feels: I feel 
what I don’t know. I feel, exactly, what I don’t know how to feel, 
as in how to interpret, except that, also, at the same time, my gut 
hurts almost all the time and also, at the same time, I know exactly 
that something is wrong and the core of this feeling is more correct 
than any specific information (diagnosis, pancreatic physiology) 
can ever be. This is part of what I mean when I say psychosomatic-
resistant, in that it is simultaneously, always, both of these feelings, 
and there is never really one without the other, and (after years of 
this shit) it no longer matters which is causing the other. This is 
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why, in part, continuity is such a main part of the diagnostic crite-
ria for depression: it no longer matters why but that; that it con-
tinues; that the gut is a hole, but like a tunnel. Continuity is also 
important in diagnosing depression because it helps to distinguish 
between sadness that is related to individual life events and that 
passes, as expected, and sadness that persists, with or without appar-
ent external causes. But how do you know what’s expected? How 
can you determine what sadness is if there is no standardized or reli-
able baseline? Because, maybe, not knowing a baseline, non-sad, gut 
feeling means that I’m constantly mis-feeling, miscommunicating 
with my gut. All I remember from before, from before I was sick, 
was never feeling anything, never knowing, and I still don’t know 
(that much) now, even though I feel all the time. Maybe this is actu-
ally how it’s supposed to feel. Maybe the psychosomatic resistance 
is all in my head and I’ve begun to think that maybe everyone feels 
like this, like this is what digestion is supposed to, normally, feel like, 
and I’m just feeling it wrong. But I’ve been asking, especially after 
meals shared with family or friends, and it seems like not everyone 
else is in pain most of the time, though this doesn’t entirely clear up 
the issue of whether what I’m feeling as pain is, actually, being cor-
rectly interpreted as such; maybe everyone else feels what I feel but 
their guts don’t hurt. And then I was watching television with my 
parents and we were interrupted (or the show was) by a commercial 
for Victoza™, a blood sugar-regulating drug, a pancreas-regulating 
drug, and the commercial, as mandated by law, told us that pancre-
atitis, a side effect, may be fatal and you may have the worst stomach 
pain you’ve ever felt (maybe they didn’t say that exactly) that may 
extend through your back, with or without vomiting, and we were 
interrupted.  What if no one ever tells me how it is supposed to feel? 
Mind on My Tummy
This interruption may be telling. Because what it illustrates is the 
way that a sad (sick) gut makes itself felt and present, or at least one 
way that it can do this: as an interruption to normal communica-
tion, as a break, like a commercial, but one that communicates side 
effects. Remembering that the key aspect of the gut as skin meta-
phor was the way that the gut came to function as a place of inter-
action between the inside and outside of the body, consider the 
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following description of Andrew Solomon’s depression, mainly 
the way he dealt with it: “Largely unable to feel or connect with 
others, Solomon is able to enter into a relation of reciprocated care 
with his father through the gut.”9 Meaning that Solomon, through 
having meals prepared for and fed to him by his father, is able to 
find enough support in this relationship to ultimately further his 
recovery from clinical depression. This would make sense given, 
again, that the gut is “a vital organ in the maintenance of relations 
to others.”10 The gut is about communication, as a conduit (or 
barrier) for the weight of information, and if sadness is the lack of 
information, then this lack disrupts communication between what 
two things, exactly? It doesn’t have to be more complicated than to 
say that the sadness of the gut interrupts internal to external, and 
vice versa, communications: it makes obvious the lack of clarity, the 
lack of information, between what is apparent and what is in the 
hole running through what is apparent. 
Upset Stomach
Even as I’m writing this, trying to communicate, what I am mostly 
thinking about (being distracted by) is the way that the pain I’m 
feeling now (a slight departure from, more urgent than, the pain I 
usually feel) how it feels almost like hunger pangs except that instead 
of emptiness I feel a tunneling. And I am still wondering if, maybe, 
it really could be just hunger pangs. Wouldn’t it be easier if my gut 
was just irritable instead of sad? Wouldn’t it be easier if I could fully 
join the ibs masses instead of that pancreatitis interruption which 
may be fatal? How do I know it’s not just ibs? Even when I am told 
this is also what it is, under every hypothetical model of ibs, hav-
ing had acute pancreatitis or having chronic pancreatitis creates the 
physiological changes thought to be responsible for causing ibs — is 
this really two diseases, one larger one, or two insurance billing 
codes? How do you know what a disease is supposed to feel like? 
Maybe the memory loss caused by the Amitriptyline hcl 10 mg 
was never a side effect but a desired and desirable main effect, so that 
this whole time I could have been forgetting how sad my gut is. 
9 Wilson, Psychosomatic, 47.
10 Wilson, Psychosomatic, 45.
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Mind on My Tummy (Again, Differently)
Maybe it would be even easier if there was nothing to remember. 
Maybe biology is just that scary and the answer to fear like this is 
to frame ideas like those being articulated here as just trafficking 
too heavily in biology and biological determinism and the attribut-
ing of agency to things that are just things as not only poor (queer, 
feminist) scholarship, but as trivial. See: “Discussion of the bio-
logical causes of depression might be plausible, but I find them 
trivial. I want to know what environmental, social, and familial 
factors trigger those biological responses — that’s where things get 
interesting.”11 Because it is only within the environmental, social or 
familial that “things” are interesting? Because the body (as in, biol-
ogy, not as in the Body) is boring? Because it seems like the problem 
is not as much one of biological determinism as it is one of biologi-
cal predeterminism, because the problem is not one of how your 
body is now but of the (seeming) impossibility (or at least intense 
undesirability) of your body, as it was or always has been or (prob-
ably) always will be, biologically, determining you, or (more threat-
eningly) determining your fate. Biologically predetermined as in, 
your body, a physical form, existed before you were conscious of it 
(or conscious at all). 
I wasn’t born this way, actually; shit happens. 
This biological predeterminism is such a problem because, if true, 
it would mean that “you” are not better than your body. It would 
mean being unable to think your way out of a physical form. Not 
only think your way out of it, but the mind–body separation that is 
necessarily maintained by a struggle against biological predetermin-
ism means thinking you can overcome your body. 
I can’t. (And would I really want to? That would be a lot of 
effort, for what? Not more life, really, nor even, probably, a more 
intellectually satisfying one. One less filled with shit? Maybe.) 
And, as a side note, how can you find biological relations to 
depression trivial after, as Cvetkovich writes, having just witnessed 
multiple friends die of aids?
11 Ann Cvetkovich, Depression: A Public Feeling (Durham, nc: Duke 
University Press, 2012), 15.
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Full of Shit
Maybe there is something biologically predetermined about the gut 
that leaves it susceptible to depression. Like the fact that it handles 
shit all day. The constant presence of or continuous engagement in 
the process of making shit opens space for another gut–brain con-
nection or point of similarity. Within neuroscience, and the way 
that neuroscience is written or rewritten within critical theory, the 
main process that the brain is engaged in and which effects all fur-
ther possibilities and processes of engagement is plasticity. That is, 
the brain, like a computer, is open to the reworking of neural net-
works, the formation of new connections, forged through patterns 
of behavior and information input, that produce both positive and 
negative change; plasticity is the quality that allows for everything 
from the learning of new behaviors to the formation of habits to 
the personality changes that may come from brain injuries. Every-
thing the brain does is related to plasticity, however circuitously. 
Because the gut is always full of shit and all behaviors and processes 
that happen within it are tied to this fundamental engagement, a 
relationship can be drawn wherein the brain is to plasticity as the 
gut is to shit. Much as plasticity is the main vehicle for change in 
the brain, shit is for the gut. Because shit is entirely about repetition 
with difference. Plasticity is about being open to change, whether 
positive or negative, through inscription and reinscription. The 
shitty plasticity of the gut is about repetition as opposed to inscrip-
tion because inscription implies a continuous or constantly pres-
ent surface on which things happen, being erased or laid over one 
another, whereas shit is entirely gotten rid of and started anew; it is 
both continuous and begins and ends and begins all the time; shit 
allows for newness (and ongoingness) over habit. Shit is not habit-
forming because its main purpose is to find the best in things, to 
sort through what could go into it and save those things most use-
ful, passing them on; plasticity more or less has to take what it is 
given, developing habits that may be ultimately harmful or losing 
traits that were useful. It’s not that shit is above malfunction, either, 
but even in times of alternating diarrhea and constipation, shit is 
happening.  
Shitty plasticity trivializes mind–body separations. Shitty plastic-
ity trivializes notions of biological responses triggered by a you that 
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is (somehow) separate from your shit(-producing gut). Shitty plas-
ticity illustrates the way that, because determining what is needed 
from what should become shit requires an orchestrated series of 
actions across multiple organs, across multiple kinds of cells, even 
including non-human microbes which reside in the gut, this is more 
than a reaction. A reaction is a simple mechanism, like an unstop-
pable Rube Goldberg machine. Shitty plasticity requires commu-
nicative decision-making. And emotional variation as well: imagine 
the difference between the way that intestinal eukaryotic cells must 
communicate with non-human microbes versus the way that the 
pancreatic cells negotiate differences in function between endocrine 
and exocrine portions of the organ. Finding biologically oriented 
gut–brain or mind–body connections trivial turns all of this into 
an extended metaphor, but remembering the way that the gut is 
like barrier or conduit to the outside world means that none of this 
communication is hypothetical. 
The looming specter of the constant reinforcement of the impor-
tance and supremacy of the social, environmental, and familial over 
the biological within critical theory creates the condition of theo-
retical determinism. 
Upset Stomach
I find environmental, social, and familial conditions that may be 
contributing to my being sick plausible, but trivial, because my doc-
tor and I are no longer, and haven’t been for years, looking for why 
I got sick in the first place but why I continue to be. As in, it no 
longer matters why, but that. Like depression. 
I cried twice this week. The timing seemed off, because earlier in 
the week, for days, I was in enough pain that I should have gone to 
the emergency room, but didn’t, and it was only a day or two after, 
after I was already feeling better, that I started crying. Maybe, like 
shit, it takes some time to come to the surface. Maybe I wouldn’t 
have cried if I was still taking the Amitriptyline hcl 10 mg. Maybe 
if I wasn’t in the face of others’ perceptions of the trivialness of my 
gut, I wouldn’t be feeling so defensive, so sad, on behalf of my sad 
gut. 
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Full of Shit
Being full of shit, both in the way that the gut is and as an idiom-
atic expression, is about disbelief. Which is also a reoccurring theme 
within neuroscience and popular narratives therein, namely the 
“epistemic shock that is said to accompany trauma.”12 Earlier I felt 
conflicted in my decisions to link or not link being sick and being 
sad, for the way such linking often contributes to reinforcing the 
presence of epistemic shock after trauma as the (only) appropriate 
or accurate response. But what if it’s not that the trauma of being 
sick has caused me to disbelieve my own (perception of) my gut but 
that the trauma of realizing how little I (am able to) know about my 
gut causes me to disbelieve that any of this shit could be trivial?
Upset Stomach
A large part of Ann Cvetkovich’s project in Depression is to open 
up the idea that depression is firmly within and constituted by the 
everyday and the ordinary, a linking that has been taken up and 
reinforced by many queer theorists’ considerations of queer depres-
sion or queer melancholic affect. The thing about Cvetkovich’s 
efforts in particular is the way that the ordinary and everyday are 
often, overtly or not, linked to the insignificant (and trivial): for 
example, her description of “what seemed like ordinary or insignifi-
cant activities — going swimming, doing yoga, getting a cat, visiting 
a sick friend.”13
Having a sad gut that is in pain almost all the time means that it 
is never clear what within the everyday is ordinary or trivial or insig-
nificant and sometimes, like shit, you only know after the fact. 
Dead Serious
Even while I’m full of shit, I’m also dead serious. I’m not joking. 
I take shit seriously. Just because it’s something that seems com-
monplace, just because you may not want or need to talk about it 
(when it happens), just because this may seem like an extended joke 
12 Cvetkovich, Depression, 1.
13 Cvetkovich, Depression, 82.
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aimed at the shittiness of (some) queer / feminist theory, some jokes 
kill me. Because what is at stake here, and what is being changed by 
the work going on here, is my body. Really, physically. This is not 
theoretical. As much as it may speak to taboos or being anal there is, 
simultaneously, nothing theoretical about shit. Shit is a fact of life, 
which is what I mean when I say “shit happens.” 
I’m interested in shit and the processes of shitty plasticity it facili-
tates precisely because it happens every day; it leaves open the most 
opportunities for gut–brain communication because, as we saw in 
Andrew Solomon’s negotiation of depression via communication, 
through the gut with his father, sometimes the answer to sadness 
is not a “cure,” but to do exactly that: answer it, communicate with 
it, including any and all internal varieties. This could be made even 
clearer through my Amitriptyline hcl 10 mg, because the mecha-
nism at work there was one that dealt directly with the communica-
tion between gut nerves and brain nerves, disrupting this pathway 
in an attempt to stop pain. Maybe this disruption was why Ami-
triptyline didn’t fully work for me; while it did stop (some of) the 
pain, it failed to provide the communication and information my 
sad gut sorely needs. 
Full of Shit
Maybe it’s unfair to trivialize Cvetkovich’s “trivial.” Maybe it’s 
unfair because what if a perception of triviality was not a matter of 
opinion but of experience? As in, maybe Cvetkovich (or others who 
are firmly in a certain anti-biological determinism camp) just hasn’t 
experienced the kind of necessity that makes apparent what is and 
isn’t trivial. What if before you decide what your gut is it’s clear that 
this decision is meaningless or unnecessary and, therefore, trivial, 
so that by extension, the gut itself is trivial as a lack of unnecessary 
information? What if the gut de-trivializes itself, makes itself appar-
ent, through the only mechanisms it really has access to, namely shit 
and nerves, and therefore through pain and upset stomachs and 
alternating diarrhea and constipation? What if the comedian Tig 
Notaro was somehow right when she says that maybe (just maybe) 
it was all those jokes she made for years about her small breasts that 
came to result in her breast cancer? What if the sadness of the gut is 
purely a product of its taken-for-granted-ness, which has resulted in 
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a lack of information (which no longer seems trivial) that has been 
shaped by forces of the everyday, the insignificant, the apparently 
unnecessary? 
How do you learn to pay attention? 
Maybe my doctor would know better. Maybe it’s called “medi-
cal attention” for a reason. Because that’s also about paying for and 
getting a kind of attention specific to a part you may not know. 
But medical attention is an oddly circuitous route of perception 
that is more like a Mobius strip than a straightforward relation-
ship between two separate things. See: a definition of disease as 
“something which always speaks a language that is at one in its exis-
tence and its meaning with the gaze that deciphers it . . . a language 
inseparably read and reading.”14 Medical attention constitutes itself. 
Disease, to follow Foucault, via its signs and symptoms, communi-
cates its presence to the medical gaze that is, simultaneously, always 
already seeing disease. What if this same logic applies to the relation-
ship between you and your gut, but in an even more pronounced 
way? Because in the case of the medical gaze it can be said that, 
physically, signs (as original, real, signs of symptoms) exist indicat-
ing the presence of disease before or regardless of the medical gaze; 
the medical gaze validates this presence, validates the disease, and 
constitutes it as such, but it does not (usually) (always) do this in the 
absence of an original sign. Meaning, there is always already a pres-
ence of a physical sign before there is also a gaze; there is an order of 
events that describes the way medical attention becomes a relation-
ship between two things, between the sign and the gaze; what medi-
cal attention truly constitutes are symptoms. But, now, consider the 
kind of attention you can give your gut: there are no two separate 
things. In order for you to be a you capable of paying attention, you 
have to be a you in a body capable of sustaining the physical func-
tions necessary for, in turn, sustaining that attention. You are your 
gut. It can be shitty. The attention you can give your gut is a form 
of inseparability. Like the gut is a hole, like a tunnel, but not empty, 
that is inside and outside at once. Like the gut is a hole, but not 
empty, heard in a language that is being generated and understood 
simultaneously, a language “read and reading.” Read and reading as 
14 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical 
Perception, trans. Alan Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 2003), 96.
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in a form of attention that is both ongoing and already happened 
(but not over). What if before you need to or knew you would need 
to, you decided that the gut is either a thing you use or a thing you 
have, and now, having read it (but not understood) it is difficult to 
keep reading?
The applicability of Foucault’s consideration of the medical gaze 
to the kind of gaze and attention possible within oneself, as consti-
tuting and constituted by, illustrates an important point to which 
we will return, later. Namely, that given the physicality inherent 
in both the medical gaze and the gaze you can give yourself, while 
maintaining distinctions between the two, it is clear that the medi-
cal model is not nor should it stand as the only (or, as a cipher for) 
the entire concepts of “biology” or “physical.”
Maybe my gut is already engaged in processes of being read and 
reading, even if only through the seemingly non-narrative informa-
tion of chemical, mechanical and thermal changes. Maybe my sad 
gut is better at paying attention because it’s sad. This is not wishful 
thinking or unfounded. Because depression is a problem for phi-
losophers and neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists beyond 
the situation I am articulating here. Because why would depression 
have evolved? Given that there are accounts of depression and dif-
ferent kinds of melancholy dating back to premodern times, why 
would evolution select for traits or personality features prone to 
developing depression? What beneficial purpose could depression 
serve?
Maybe it’s about attention. Maybe being sad means being able 
to pay attention better. Maybe “the anatomy of focus is insepara-
ble from the anatomy of melancholy.”15 The thinking behind this 
hypothesis is as follows: being depressed triggers processes of intro-
spection, specifically concerning situations that may have given rise 
to said depression, and that this increased analytical concentration 
serves to, ultimately, help people find paths out of negative situa-
tions. While obviously such an effect does not cancel out the loss of 
life that clinical depression is responsible for, this doesn’t mean that 
there is not something useful to take from this, for sad guts. Because 
15 Andrew Solomon, “The Anatomy of Melancholy,” The New Yorker, 
January 12, 1998, 48, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1998/01/12/
anatomy-of-melancholy.
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multiple studies have shown that this increased introspection does, 
indeed, increase analytical capabilities in depressed persons, to the 
extent that such introspection is included in diagnostic criteria. The 
term for such an increased introspection is rumination. 
All the gut does is ruminate. Rumination is digestion. Rumina-
tion is the reason that children put things in their mouths in order 
to know them; because it is perhaps implicitly understood, before 
it is understood that the gut must be either a thing you use or a 
thing you have, that ingesting an object is critical to understand-
ing. Rumination is a simultaneously physical and cognitive process. 
Consciousness has physical effects; thought and attention are physi-
cal processes; why should this process not take place within a space, 
like the gut, that has the capacity for endless input and output? 
Shitty plasticity and unending repetition allow for the temporal dif-
ferences that rumination may create, the gaps between input and 
output, or the kind of attention spent on one but not the other. 
Like that fact that I only took Amitriptyline hcl 10 mg (and it was 
only 10 mg) for one week but I have spent the past month still with 
it, here. 
Upset Stomach
Who knows better what acceptance means, me or my gut? On the 
one hand, I understand enough to feel that being in pain every day 
is actually preferable to being in pain and constantly trying to get 
better, especially in the face of medical and personal understanding 
of words like “progress” and “chronic;” because at least just being 
in pain isn’t disappointing. On the other hand, what is remark-
able about this sick gut is the way that there are many ways it could 
perform badly, be hindered by a couple bad parts, but shitty plas-
ticity allows for the fact that my gut is still doing things, a lot of 
things, comparably pretty well. What is adaptation if not a form of 
acceptance?
As rumination is shaped by physical processes of the gut and 
shitty plasticity, it both relies on and creates a state of flow. By flow 
I don’t mean flow like being in the zone, like being in a state of 
easy, fluid attention. By flow I do mean that rumination is about 
movement, specifically the movement of the gut–brain space, 
which moves things and is moving. By flow I mean the movement 
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surrounding and generated by things that have the quality of fluid-
ity. Things that are viscous. Like organs. Like the gut, where every-
thing is visceral. 
Visceral, meaning having the qualities of viscera; meaning organs, 
usually the gut; meaning organs usually in the center; meaning the 
organs that take up and make up the majority of the space often 
called the body cavity. Visceral, as in having to do with the center of 
things. Visceral, as in having to do with the center of the body. 
So what if I never tell you how it feels? So what if all I can do is 
try to say the same thing to you as I say to myself over and over? So 
what if all I do is say things (maybe the same thing) over and over? 
So what if over and over is the clearest thing I can tell you about 
how it feels?
I think you probably already know: the statistics are in my favor. 
Take, for example, the fact that out of a sample group of fifteen 
coworkers, expanded slightly to include immediate family members: 
one has rheumatoid arthritis, one is in remission from lung cancer, 
one has skin cancer, one has a pancreatic disease, one has a brother 
dead of brain cancer, one has parents dead (one sudden, young, one 
of old age), one has a son dead in an accident, one is caring for a 
mother-in-law with colon cancer (stage IV, advanced, the same one 
herself in remission from lung cancer). I think you maybe already 
know. I could go on: one has a father dead, recently, of unknown 
cause but not old age, one has a mother with double hip replace-
ments, one has an uncle in remission from colon cancer, one has a 
close family friend with ms. So what if I never tell you how it feels? 
These are not things I’ve remembered as much as things I’m com-
ing to realize, or coming to realize that I already knew, too. First, 
again, rumination is a physical process. Because of this, and because 
rumination is a way to name both digestion and thinking, rumina-
tion and (especially) attending to rumination via practices of atten-
tion is about accumulation and absorption. It is a process of becom-
ing through absorption. Because the gut is either like the skin, like 
a permeable barrier, or like a computer, like a thing with multiple 
interfaces, or like a hole, like a tunnel, like a space, full of shit: the 
gut is about accumulation and the absorption of accumulated 
materials through rumination. 
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Gut Feelings
When I said “everything is visceral” what I meant was that there 
is the potential for visceral moments everywhere. I meant that the 
sample group of coworkers are people both involved in their own 
visceral moments and capable of producing ones I experience. 
When I said that one of my coworkers has skin cancer what I didn’t 
say was that he also has a six-month-old baby at home and I feel this, 
viscerally, within the possibilities inherent in my own body and in 
some ways I feel the six-month-old to be within my own bodily pos-
sibilities as well. 
The accumulation (through a capacity for sensitivity inherent in 
the gut, through the way the gut is innervated, literally given nerves, 
throughout) of visceral moments is the process of becoming a vis-
ceralized body. Even as I’m remembering things, a few things, now, 
I’m not quite sure what to do with these things, how to tell you. 
Because this is simultaneously the easiest and hardest thing I’ve had 
to learn and it is difficult to articulate because it has been charac-
terized not by a series of articulated realizations but by a series of 
disarticulations. Such that when I say “the visceralized body is the 
body in a state of accumulating visceral moments,” I am also mean-
ing to say that the visceral is striking, as in being caught in (by) the 
gut, as in you feel it being caught, as in maybe this hurts, as in how 
do you dislodge an object caught in the inside of your body, as in 
how do you dislodge an object that is really a feeling from the inside 
of your body, as in maybe this hurts, as in there’s no feeling better 
because how do you dislodge a feeling that’s really an organ from 
the inside of your body, as in maybe you already know how this feels 
(and maybe you don’t): visceral as in a collection of organs that cre-
ate the body cavity, as in the viscous qualities (related to movement, 
and therefore space and time) of these organs, as in the things that 
organs are capable of feeling and being made felt. Visceral as in bod-
ies having feelings. Visceral as in bodies making themselves felt. 
The Visceralized Body
The visceralized body is the result of the accumulation of visceral 
moments, accumulated through the body and specifically through 
the gut, because the gut is entirely about absorption. Because the 
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gut is a hole, like a tunnel, it not only is space but creates a path to 
the brain through rumination: a term for the kind of absorption the 
gut performs and the process of becoming, through digestion and 
thinking, this describes.
Even as I don’t know what my gut is, even as sadness is the lack of 
information in the face of need, the information I need now is not 
a definition of nor even a definitive perception of my gut. Because 
I know what I do sense and I know that my gut is sad and that this 
sadness is like a hole, but not empty. I just need to know how else it 
could feel. I do and do not need you to tell me how it feels (because 
you probably don’t know either, because is your gut like a skin or 
like a computer? You know). Because nerve endings do not in and 
of themselves create feelings, information (even a lot of it) is not the 
same as meaning. But what information (especially a lot of it) can 
provide is context.  
Because a cavity is a hole, like a hollow, a body cavity, it is also a 
kind of decay: a relational kind of decay in which decay is a prod-
uct of the relationship between your teeth and the bacteria in your 
mouth. In the visceralized body, this can become a kind of decay 
that is a product of a relationship between your body and lack of 
information that comes to constitute and decay the relationship 
between you and your body. (Even as I’m writing “you” and sepa-
rately “your body,” I wish I wasn’t. It still feels somewhat true. At 
the same time, I am my body and my body is me and maybe this is a 
kind of acceptance that my gut and I can both come to and practice 
together — only together.) 
If you don’t know how this feels, and I don’t know if you do, 
this may be because the inside of the body is a philosophically-
historically inaccessible place, as Drew Leder writes it in The Absent 
Body, wherein “a viscous [internal organ] is largely irreversible with 
corporeal foci. It cannot be summoned up for personal use, it can-
not be turned ecstatically upon the world. It’s recessiveness is not 
simply a function of a current gestalt but of an innate resistance.”16
Really? Tell that to my sad gut. (Asshole). 
“Innate resistance” only in an able body. “Ecstatically” being ideal 
or possible only in an able body. “Irreversible” only in an able body 
16 Drew Leder, The Absent Body (Chicago, il: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), 54.
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not full of shit, continually reversing and releasing. “Recessive-
ness” only when your gut is only ever a thing you use or a thing you 
have. “Innate” only when you do not care about this recessiveness; 
“innate” only when you do not have to care. 
Or, in a visceralized body, there is no “turned ecstatically upon” 
because the gut, like a barrier, like a tunnel, like the skin, is already 
the inside and outside at once. In a visceralized body, there is no 
“turned ecstatically upon” unless you consider shitting (or any 
other form of profuseness and excessiveness) ecstatic. This, even just 
saying (being able to say) “visceralized body” is a “turned ecstati-
cally upon.” In a visceralized body, there is no “innate resistance” 
(to attention) because innate resistance to corporeal foci is only pos-
sible when there’s nothing to pay attention to. In the visceralized 
body, there is everything to pay attention to. “Innate resistance” is, 
really, a misnomer for what is really the most basic and intense privi-
lege of the able body: there is no resistance if there is no need. 
The relational quality of the decay at the cavity of the visceralized 
body extends to an overall externally relational quality as well. The 
visceralized body is not just about the inside of your own body. In 
part because the experience of visceral moments includes moments 
where other bodies make your own body felt, differently. As in my 
coworker with cancer and a baby; I feel all of this, though differ-
ently, of course, than he does. Not only because I am removed from 
the pragmatics and the daily experience of it but because all I am 
ultimately feeling is still my own body: within the context of the 
information of his. Visceralized bodies, characterized as they are by 
a simultaneously internal–external, relational body cavity, are open 
to each other. Secondly, being so open, visceralized bodies provide 
room for feeling the things you don’t have. For instance, consider 
the term hiv–. Because information is mass, an absence of informa-
tion about one’s own body and especially information that is or is 
not determined to be absent in relation to others’ is also a state that 
can be viscerally felt. 
This capacity of the visceralized body, its ability to make itself 
felt, its felt-ness, can also be put another way: even with centuries 
devoted to the development of medical imaging and auditory tech-
nologies for surveying the inside of the body, the stomach (and 
other visceral organs, the intestines) is still an organ you can hear 
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clearly with only your own ears. You can also hear other people’s, 
clearly, with only your own ears. 
The “innate resistance” that characterizes the able body and 
Leder’s body is ultimately irrelevant to the visceralized body because 
it’s sickness that begins to diminish any notion of “innate.” It’s sick-
ness that both causes the accumulation of visceral moments and 
causes the moments themselves; it’s sickness that creates the need 
that changes a lack of information into such a need, that changes 
“innate” perceptions only when you become suddenly aware of 
how much you can’t perceive and why can’t you — and would I feel 
better if I could? 
Maybe a resistance that can be found or felt in the visceralized 
body is one not about the body itself but of a resistance to resisting: 
a resistance to getting better, in certain ways, to becoming un- or 
de-visceralized. Because it’s (almost) easier to be in pain every day 
than it is to be in pain and try constantly not to be. Because at least 
in pain, you know how you feel. Because the visceralized body isn’t 
looking for context that would inform a way out. 
Talking about being sick in this way, linking sickness to a visceral-
ized body, is an obstacle for me here and one I’m hesitant to address 
head on. Because it is one thing to say that sickness can cause visceral 
moments; it is another to say, or to imply, or to write a definition, 
that all visceral bodies must be sick. As if there were nothing else vis-
ceral to experience. On the other hand, I feel and know these things 
through and because of a body that is sick at the center, at the gut; I 
have a gastrointestinal disease characterized in part by malnutrition. 
Everything I ingest and absorb passes through this, is fully absorbed 
and passed on or not. Everything else within my body becomes, 
because of this. The pain, too, travels, encompasses my stomach 
and back and sides, changes my posture; changes the movements 
that become available to me. Everything is visceral. And I remember 
enough from before this happened to know that it is only like this 
now because of being sick. 
And perhaps I shouldn’t worry about defining visceral through 
sickness because as my sample group shows, there are already plenty 
here with me. 
And in these moments, with others, I do not really mean 
“moment” as a singular event but as an ongoing time. As in: there 
was the moment I found out my coworker has cancer, the moment I 
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remembered that he had a baby, the moment I went home and told 
my partner about this, as if it were one moment, and the moment 
after that when I said I was still thinking about it. And, now, much 
later, when I continue to think it and write it here. 
Shit is continuously beginning and ending.
What an ongoing visceral moment includes is the ability for the 
visceralized body to attend to its possibilities as well as to its pres-
ent. On the one hand, “my future is written in my body,” and at the 
same time, “I am not writing a will or medical report.”17
What does so much absorption produce? Consumption? Con-
sumption as in all-consuming, but not totalizing. As in, just as the 
gut constitutes the body through digestion, consuming can include 
the way the gut can take of even as it is adding to. Because the gut 
is a hole, like a cavity, and because cavities must always include a 
relationship between at least two things, and because everything 
can go in either direction in a gut, the gut can begin to produce a 
decay through too much absorption as well, not only not enough: 
the gut can absorb so much it begins to absorb, to consume, the 
rest of the body. In one way, the gut becomes consuming when, 
in a visceral moment, I find that I’ve lost weight between doctors’ 
appointments, despite no changes to diet or exercise; having failed 
to absorb everything else I’ve put in it, the gut must turn to the rest 
of my body. In another way, the gut demonstrates its ability to be 
consuming every time I’m unable to pay attention to the thing at 
hand. Every day, whether I always realize it or not, my gut consumes 
my attention. This dual absorbing–consuming quality of visceral-
ized bodies, their guts, makes clear a key aspect about a relationship 
of decay: while I can decide what goes into my gut, I cannot control 
what comes out of it nor can I control what it decides to take. A cen-
tralized sense of agency, like a brain, like a computer, like a body that 
doesn’t have parts to which a sense of autonomy are always attrib-
uted, like a body that probably doesn’t have a heart with a mind 
of its own, like an able body, is lacking. Nothing is centralized in 
a visceralized body. Especially agency, because even though the gut 
is a tunnel, like a hole, in the center, it is also internal and external 
simultaneously. 




I am not very apologetic about saying things like “Tell that to 
my sad gut. (Asshole),” because by saying things like that I am also 
already beginning to articulate a theoretical-political position occu-
pied by the visceralized body. Because it’s not, it can’t be, only about 
how it feels. Because what do you do with how it feels? Because a 
visceralized body is open to others and what do you do when you 
find that so few are open to yours? Because the personal is politi-
cal, right? Because what is more personal than shit? Because, for 
instance, when I tell my partner about the weight loss, how it’s 
tied to shit and being sick, am I not only forging a new openness 
between bodies but simultaneously occupying a political position 
that argues for exactly a kind of unapologetic nature that runs coun-
ter to existing sexist and heteronormative constructions of femi-
ninity (i.e. a feminine body that never shits, let alone tells a partner 
about it)? Because the visceral is political, right? 
Furthermore, by saying things like “Tell that to my sad gut. (Ass-
hole),” and thereby continually reinforcing the feelings my organs 
are having, by attending to those feelings, and by depicting a body 
wherein attention and therefore agency is a force subject to both 
absorption and consumption — because are these gut feelings 
my organs are having or feelings I am having at the expense of my 
gut — by ultimately finding the gut–brain space to be a space of 
decentralization, I am really saying that the visceralized body is not 
about biological determinism. How could this be possible? How 
could a physicality-reinforcing body be outside of such reduction-
ism? But consider the following as a definition of biological deter-
minism: “To be determined by biology is to surrender to limitations, 
to deny the possibilities of change.”18 “Surrender” is like “innate 
resistance.” It is constituted in part by its generation through or in 
proximity to an able body. “Surrender” is only seen as such when 
what is being surrendered is a form of ideal, universalized ability. 
Able bodies are not supposed to have limits; to acknowledge and 
surrender to limitations is inherently to acknowledge a lack of an 
able body. Even in theory, this lack should be avoided. 
The visceralized body has its limitations. 
18 Lynda Birke, Feminism and the Biological Body (New Brunswick, nj: 
Rutgers University Press, 2000), 1.
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What, actually, is wrong with acknowledging these limitations? 
I understand that when the idea of “surrender to limitations” is 
applied to gendered bodies, when limitations become identity con-
stituting, such limitations or just the idea of them, or when the idea 
of them is taken as fact, become hugely problematic. But, within a 
sick visceralized body, when I am reading that sentence I am being 
asked to think about the limits of my body only in terms of surren-
der, including a surrender to the fact that this sentence, like so many 
others, is written in a way that “limitations” is implicitly taken to 
mean limitations as only applying to a gendered body; an able body, 
limitless as it is, is never mentioned. The surrender becomes one of a 
surrender to the limitations of ableism. 
The limitations of the visceralized body are “actual” as much as 
theoretical. Limitations are physical. Like, taking care of baby while 
receiving chemotherapy must be shaped by limitations like exhaus-
tion or nausea. Like, how I run, but only within a certain radius of 
my home in case I need to run home. Like, how often I don’t go 
out. Like, how difficult it is to hold a job. What is really the problem 
with surrendering to these limitations? What is the problem with 
surrendering to the difficulties of caring for a newborn while receiv-
ing chemo if it means you may receive more support from family or 
friends? What is the problem with not wanting to find a word other 
than surrender if this is what feels accurate? Is “acceptance” any 
better? What is the problem with wanting a sentence about a sur-
render to limitations in which “limitations” is not inherently nega-
tive, surrender feels accurate and realistic, unapologetically physical? 
And following such a sentence, a moment where surrender, like a 
coworker’s surrender, becomes visceral and the limitations of other’s 
bodies become felt as and in one’s own? 
“To be determined by biology” can also mean several different 
things to a visceralized body, most of which depend on what “biol-
ogy” is taken to mean. If “biology” means the physical body, and 
particularly the way that the body, the inside of it, is thought of as a 
separate, purely biological sphere (“purely” separate from the mind) 
and the way this biological body becomes full of hidden-from-view 
processes then, yes, the visceralized body is determined by biology. 
If biology is taken to include medical science and human biology 
then, yes, the visceralized body is determined by biology. Because 
if I didn’t follow my doctor’s advice, if I didn’t have advice from 
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doctors with decades of pancreas-specific training, there would only 
be a body to bury, not a body to be determined. On the other hand, 
if biology is taken to mean something purely scientific, as if science 
was something that just happened, as if biology wasn’t a thing that 
people do, then the visceralized body is not determined by biology. 
Because what biology can mean, what it actually must mean, ety-
mologically, is not at all something that can just be discovered: it is 
a “study of.” Studying, like observation, like thinking, like rumina-
tion. The visceralized body is an ongoing study. 
I understand the problematic nature of biological determinism, 
the way that biology is and has been used to make universalizing 
claims about bodies applied particularly to Other(ed) bodies and 
the way that disciplines emerging from biology, like medicine and 
genetics, are used to reinforce norms of Otherness and inferiority. I 
understand the physical effects this kind of “biology” has on bodies 
and I am not arguing that a continued interrogation of this form of 
biological determinism within theory is irrelevant. But the way this 
form of biological determinism is written into theory such that it is 
taken as applicable to only racial, gendered, or queer others is itself 
a determining gesture. Even “disability studies,” with its focus on 
social construction, tends to downplay or ignore or deny the biol-
ogy within and behind disabled bodies. Which is to say: the rhetoric 
of anti-biological determinism gets rid of biological bodies along 
with biology. It is as if all of this theoretical work takes biology to be 
a definitive answer. 
Because of biology, medicine creates and enforces bodily norms. 
Because of biology, people of color have been subject to centuries of 
oppression, fueled by fields like eugenics or phrenology. Because of 
biology, hormonal and neurological “causes” for lgbtq people are 
being sought, because with that kind (any kind) of difference, there 
must be a locatable source. For a visceralized body, biology is never 
an answer but a question. The visceralized body is (in) an ongoing 
study. Is my gut sad because of biology? Does shit happen because 
of biology? Will biology make me feel better?
Probably not, but neither will structuralism nor social 
construction. 
When I read sentences with words like determined and surren-
der and limitations, when these words could be about my body but 
never are, I feel like I’m in a space, like a hole, like a tunnel, that’s 
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empty. If a fear of biological determinism becomes formulated 
through an intense theoretical anti-biological determinism, anti-
biology, what it has created is exactly this hole: the hole of theoreti-
cal determinism. A hole that envelops, tunnels fully around, the vis-
ceralized body. 
I can understand why biology might be scary, in addition to fuel-
ing gender-, race-, or sex-based discrimination. Am I going to get 
sick suddenly (again) because of biology? Will I die earlier than I 
would have (if I didn’t get sick) because of biology? How much shit 
happens because of biology? Is my gut sad because of biology? How 
much biology can a body take? 
Does biology really happen in this way, though? Or is it more 
like: tbd by biology. More like: it’s up in the air and biology is the 
question. More like: there are definitely social aspects of being sick 
that exacerbate it, but in no way did I get sick because of social or 
external factors alone. Even in cases with clear external causes, a 
body is just responding, biologically, however it can. 
One person who did know how it feels was Oliver Sacks. Writ-
ing about a loss of sensation in his leg following an accidental fall 
and a surgery, he realized that this loss was something many of his 
patients had similarly experienced: “[E]very single one of them has 
this fear — known it and been unable to share it.” The fear is one 
of loss and specifically a loss of “the sense of part of their body.”19 
Oliver Sacks knew how much being unable to know comes to con-
stitute what it feels like. 
In writing further about this experience, Sacks pointed to a key 
part of such a visceral loss. On his own leg he says that “not only was 
I unable to perceive the leg, I was in some sense unable to remem-
ber it.” He uses the term “amnesia.”20 The temporal relationship 
such an amnesia describes is one of “having / had.” Like, having / had 
cancer. Or, for the visceralized body, having / had a sense of a body 
where nothing was like a hole, like a tunnel, both remembers this 
sense and feels an amnesiac lack of memory about what exactly this 
felt like. If you don’t know how something feels, now, how can you 
remember what it felt like when, before, it felt like nothing? Or, the 
19 Oliver Sacks, “The Leg,” London Review of Books 4.11, June 17, 1982, 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v04/n11/oliver-sacks/the-leg.
20 Sacks, “The Leg.”
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visceralized body having / had the loss of “the sense of part of their 
body,” now feels everything keenly because in the face of a lack of 
information every single small piece comes to feel important. 
Having / had becomes a temporal relationship useful to clarifying 
the way I am using the term “loss.” Because having / had is a time 
frame that includes the possibility of ongoing conditions, the expe-
rience and memory of finished past conditions, and imperfect past 
conditions. A loss of sensation is not the same as an absence of sen-
sation. Having / had does not create only a (permanent) surrender 
and limitations. 
Oliver Sacks, in this same article, also provided the best term for 
condensing what I mean when I say that the gut is a hole, like a tun-
nel, but not empty: “negative phantom.” He uses “negative phan-
tom” to describe the way that his leg felt like a phantom limb yet 
paradoxically was still very much present and attached to his body. 
The gut is a negative phantom. The gut is a negative phantom and 
the power of unknowingness it can generate is such that maybe I 
knew (somewhere — felt) even more than I realized when I said 
“ghostbody.” 
Absent-Minded 
Another term I didn’t have yet, when I did have ghostbody, was 
theoretical determinism. Theoretical determinism: the way that 
critical theory shapes experiences of bodies. The way that critical 
theory writes bodies, provides information about bodies, in such a 
way as to directly affect the experience of readers’ bodies. The way 
that, because of anti-biological determinism, because of the way this 
demanded that scholars get rid of biology, with or without decid-
ing whether biology was “purely” scientific or a thing people do or 
a body, as in physical matter, means that the only body in critical 
theory now is The Body. The Body is a product of theoretical deter-
minism. The Body is capitalized because it is more like a slogan or a 
brand name than a body; because it is just a cipher, because it, as a 
hollow figure, can hold whatever things, whatever things people do, 
in it. 
untitled (everything is visceral)
97
Gut Reaction
I know I’m not the first to say this, that the body functions as a 
cipher within critical theory. See James Porter: “The mere concept 
of the body shields theory from its objects; it prevents us from con-
fronting the body in any other way than as a fascination.”21 I know 
that theories of bodies as entirely social constructions are not with-
out their discontents. But I also know that as much as there may be 
cries about “The Absent Body,” it is still necessary to say (over and 
over) that it is the sick body that is made especially absent. 
It is as if no one will admit to sickness. 
Absent-Minded
Theoretical determinism is why I have been saying, here, repeatedly, 
that there is no information. Because in the same way that biology 
can be taken to mean the physical body and medicine and the study 
of both, by information I mean both medical information (like a 
diagnosis, like what does “damage” mean? Like what does “perma-
nent” mean?), phenomenological information from first- or sec-
ondhand sources (like will my coworker tell me how it feels?) and 
theoretical information (like an analysis of first- or secondhand 
accounts of the phenomenology of illness, or like Being Sick and 
Time, or like Illness Not As Metaphor). Theoretical information is 
a structure that acts as a full realization of the term “framework:” 
because it provides a frame through which to see (you, your body, 
your experiences), a support onto which other information or 
experiences can be put, and it involves a certain amount of work, 
both the work of seeing as well as the work of building up and 
experiencing. 
When I say that I want Being Sick and Time or Illness Not As 
Metaphor, I don’t mean to say that I want a readymade framework 
or one that allows me to not put in any work. I mean: how different 
my experience of my body (and my time, and my relationships, and 
my future) would have been if I had been able to read Being Sick 
and Time years ago, if I had known (more, differently), about how 




it could feel. It could have been a framework that could have helped 
to fill in, in small parts, at least, other medical or phenomenological 
information that was also (still) missing. 
Gut Reaction
At the same time, theory isn’t everything. Maybe I would never have 
felt I needed Being Sick and Time if I had only been a little sick or 
if it didn’t last. I didn’t, actually, at first, want Being Sick and Time. 
I was content to just read Being and Time. Theoretical determin-
ism tunnels slowly. Because it took years of reading, took years of 
sentences about “surrender” and “limitations” as well as sentences 
about “impairment” and “disability studies” to realize that none of 
these sentences described my body. To realize that I in no way have 
A Body. 
Absent-Minded 
It took longer for me to see how this failure to describe, to just leave 
my body out of it, was not a neutral act of exclusion. As if you just 
didn’t have room in your word count. It was and is an act of exclu-
sion predicated on exactly the same kind of reductionism involved 
in biological determinism. Because theoretical determinism reduces 
bodies to The Body, reduces experiences of yourself as / in a body 
to you as A Body: instead of the “you are your body” of biological 
determinism, theoretical determinism means that you are what is 
made of you. You are what is seen of you. You are what cultural fac-
tors determine you to be. In a perfect neoliberal shift, you are what 
you make of yourself. 
Theoretical determinism is a hole, like a tunnel, around the body, 
that mirrors the hole of the gut. Theoretical determinism is a hole 
because The Body is constituted by cultural factors, because The 
Body is (only) what is seen, and so the hole is like a trap, one cov-
ered by camouflaging ground. Theoretical determinism reduces the 
body only to its surface. And uses this surface, spreads it, to cover 
the depth of the hole left in its reductionist wake. Theoretical deter-
minism renders the inside of the body empty. 
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Gut Reaction
Maybe I didn’t want Being Sick and Time at first because critical 
theory, as strong a framework as it may be, doesn’t exactly make 
being sick better. 
Absent-Minded
The exclusion of the body through theoretical determinism, while 
in and of itself is not neutral, has, in some ways, passed neutrally 
through decades of scholarship. That is, both the hole of The Body 
and the exclusion of other bodies have both passed neutrally, as in 
with little notice, through those decades. Which is something I’ve 
been trying to say, more or less successfully, for some time now. 
Something I’ve tried to say in multiple ways, like when I said “com-
pulsory able bodiedness.”22 It’s not that this was wrong, just some-
what incomplete. Compulsory able bodiedness has also been noted 
before, by others, as a way to name the ways in which space, cultural 
and physical, is shaped for and by able bodies. But theoretical space 
is not without its shaping factors either. It seems like philosophical 
lineage is something that should be easy to trace, to locate references 
and vocabulary and the movement of ideas, cohesively; it’s easy to 
see this as a space more or less shaped freely. That is, more or less 
unshaped by unacknowledged ideologies. 
But see, even now, when I am trying to just say the thing I’ve been 
trying to say, it’s like I have to, like I can only, tell you through this 
kind of grounding lineage. Like this lineage is the only thing capable 
of grounding and validating ideas. 
The thing about this lineage, though, and the space it creates, is a 
feature of its foundation: the entire history of Western metaphysics 
and philosophy is based on an able body. 
Gut Reaction
It’s funny, because in a lot of ways, for years, I have been angrier 
about this fact than I have been about being sick. It’s funny, because 
22 Maia Dolphin-Krute, Ghostbodies: Towards a New Theory of Invalidism 
(Bristol, uk: Intellect, 2017), 69.
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this is easier to be angry about than being sick. It’s funny, because 
this is also something that it feels easier to do something about. 
Absent-Minded 
In her book Ongoingness, Sarah Manguso writes about her practice 
of diary keeping, which spanned decades. She adds to these docu-
ments every day, sometimes more. She describes this intensely daily 
process as “more than daily.”
“More than daily” is how I would describe the able body that is 
the basis of all metaphysics, of phenomenology, of The Body. This 
more-than-dailyness is what makes compulsory able bodiedness 
seem incomplete. Because that concept is taken from the idea of 
compulsory heterosexuality, which itself depends on the idea that 
heterosexuality is positioned as “wholly natural.”23 What doesn’t fit 
about this, here, is that able bodiedness is more than natural. The 
able body is the thing that makes (human) nature possible, the able 
body is the thing that is more natural than anything else. Compul-
sory able bodiedness names a condition of invisibility. But the way 
that the able body is the basis of The Body, the way that this foun-
dational fact has been able to pass neutrally through so much work, 
is more than invisible. It is a force that I have also elsewhere called a 
prototype; but the able body, again, is more like the prototype on 
which all others are based. It shapes The Body because it is (only, 
always, right?) the body. It shapes The Body, and it is the body, and 
this seems so neutral because doesn’t “human,” doesn’t the body, 
only ever mean one that is definitively alive, one that isn’t sick, one 
whose wholeness is never threatened, one whose mind is and can 
remain superior, one whose inside is never distracting, one that isn’t 
stuck in its hole of a gut; a body that is these qualities is never The 
Body. The Body, in the way it writes the body, in the way it excludes 
these possibilities, deploys the very idea of the body in an almost 
absent-minded way. More than daily. More than invisible. More 
than taken for granted. It’s like no one will admit to sickness.
23 Robert McRuer, Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disabil-
ity (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 151.
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Gut Reaction
Is biology really so scary?
Absent-Minded
Sickness is something that needs to be admitted. Sickness takes 
up space. Sickness pushes other things aside; sickness distorts the 
boundaries of The Body. Sickness is a thing that must have room 
made for it. Sickness is a thing that pushes aside the more-than-
invisibleness of The Body. 
No one will admit to sickness because, in a body where the mind 
is and can remain superior, where embodiment is something that 
can be studied in way closely bordering on “detached,” there is no 
room for threats from things, from biology, that theoretical deter-
minism has judged inferior. 
The visceralized body, with its holes, like tunnels, but not empty, 
has room for sickness. 
Theoretical determinism has no room for sickness. Theoreti-
cal determinism drives theory to tunnel fully around sick bodies, 
because sickness is too large an obstacle; sickness cannot be reduced. 
The able body, the way that the able body is a prototype before all 
other prototypes, is the ultimate reduction. It is the easiest reduc-
tion (so clean! so whole! so able!) and therefore the easiest starting 
point. It is the easiest starting point on which to pile on all those 
cultural factors. It is the easiest starting point, the most common 
of common denominators, because it ultimately erases the source 
of the greatest variation and difference and, simultaneously, same-
nesses, among people; it reduces all of this to The Body. It elimi-
nates the problems of bodies. It, more than invisibly, eliminates any 
notice of this until, suddenly, The Body is no longer possible, until 
it is no longer possible to imagine yourself in A Body while reading 
about Bodies; until it becomes clear that the able body is not your 
prototype. And then where is Being Sick and Time? 
Absent-Minded (Again, Differently)
Or: sick is not a quality. Sick is not an aspect or feature or trait. Sick 
cannot be reduced through theoretical determinism because sick 
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is a sheer physical fact. Sick is always already in its simplest, essen-
tial, form. Theoretical determinism cannot reduce it and so it just 
tunnels fully around it; by completely excluding sick, by making 
its absence more than invisible, theoretical determinism neutralizes 
sick; it makes the absence of sickness (within theory) seem neutral. 
Saying “sick” is in its simplest and most essential form is not the 
same as saying that being sick lacks complexity. If theoretical deter-
minism creates a tunnel, the visceralized body provides a form 
capable of moving through such a tunnel, provides a way of giving 
complexity to sickness, to being sick, while never ignoring (because 
how do you not feel something in your own body, including the 
absence of sensation) physical fact (which is a fact that announces 
itself physically, which is why it can’t be ignored, because how do 
you ignore urgency in your own body). 
I’ll admit to sickness. 
Just because I asked for Being Sick and Time doesn’t mean that I 
haven’t been able to find anything else. It’s just a matter of applica-
tion. Like this, another consideration of the space of “able body,” 
from Foucault in “Madness, the Absence of Work:” “It will not be 
said that we were at a distance from madness, but within distance of 
it.”24 It cannot be said that we (“we,” able bodies) are at a distance 
from sickness but always constituted in part by being within a dis-
tance of it.
He goes on in that essay to write that, in relation to said distances, 
there exists “this desire to establish the limit yet at once to compen-
sate for it through the framework of unitary meaning.”25 The able 
body is the limit. It sets the limits of The Body. To compensate for 
this limit, sickness (people who are sick) becomes the object ground 
down to the anchoring (as in holding in place, deeply, as in suc-
tioning, as in this is not comfortable or comforting, as in weighing 
down) surface of “able body.” The unification of the able body with 
its limits is made in the idea (the framework) that sickness is a thing 
that happens (not that just is), that sickness is socially constructed 
(that it happens, somewhere else, somewhere at a distance to the 
24 Michel Foucault, “Madness, the Absence of Work,” trans. Peter Stastny 
and Deniz Sengel, Critical Inquiry 21.2 (1995): 290–98; 292.
25 Foucault, “Madness, the Absence of Work,” 293.
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able body). That sickness is a thing that happens, that it is not an 
inherent (or natural) flaw in the surface of the able body. 
The limit of the able body is also its limited capacity to make itself 
felt (in all senses). 
Gut Reaction
Writing about her experiences caring for her son, who has neuro-
logical impairments, Julia Kristeva refers to the urgency and utopian 
nature of negotiating for disability rights and the day-to-day nego-
tiations of being sick.26 This urgency can be blinding. This urgency 
has been a main difficulty in my trying to name the able body and 
The Body here, the source of so much messiness. This urgency is my 
limit, though this is really just the product of moving urgently on 
slippery surfaces; skidding. 
Absent-Minded
Theoretical determinism is the compensation for the limits of the 
able body. Sickness is the only limit that matters. Sickness must be 
admitted but will, can, never truly be. To compensate, theoretical 
determinism admits so much else; it admits socially constructed 
bodies and marginalized identities and systemic oppression enacted 
through (seemingly) bodiless modes of corporate, governmental, 
and institutional neglect. 
But it cannot admit, cannot reduce to the level of human action, 
sickness; it cannot admit that sickness is a thing that is. 
This has always been about this limit. Not that that has always 
been recognizable. Not that there have always been the words to 
name this. 
Gut Reaction
It took my sad gut, realizing its sadness, feeling it, not being able to 
feel it, to come to these words. This seems like the opposite of the 
popular theoretical rhetoric surrounding pain, the idea that pain is 
26 Julia Kristeva, “A Tragedy and A Dream: Disability Revisited,” Irish 
Theological Quarterly 78.3 (2013): 219–30.
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resistant to language, that it dissolves words. So what does it mean 
for a sad gut, for a visceral experience, to have actually provided the 
words “the able body is the basis of Western metaphysics and phi-
losophy”? What does it mean that one (but not singular) personal 
experience of the limit of perception made clear a much larger limit, 
a lack of information? It means that maybe the body, maybe pain or 
sickness, is nowhere near as language-resistant as has been thought. 
It means that experiencing within a visceralized body opens new 
areas of knowledge. Because even learning of a lack of information 
itself generates understanding. Because when there is not enough 
information about my body, about my sick body, within my body 
itself, why is it that there is nowhere else to look for and find such 
information? Why are there no words? Because it is not pain that 
takes away words; it just makes clear their need. It is not pain that 
takes away words; it is the able body. The able body is the lack.
I don’t want a medical narrative, I want a theoretical narrative.
Even recognizing this grinding, slipping, reducing, reductive, 
force at the heart of critical theory, why does theory remain desir-
able? Even before that question, the answer to which is about the 
work that theory does, it could be asked whether the able body is 
even a problem for theory at all. Who cares? Who is theory for? 
(Ask that of my sad gut, asshole.) Why does theory remain desirable 
even if, as it is now, it is really only for people in an able body (or 
who want one, or who can think about having one), people who 
can believe in The Body?
Because I don’t want a medical narrative, I want a theoretical nar-
rative. Because medical narratives are always already filled in but 
theoretical narratives are open space, space that can open around. 
Because medical narratives are inescapable. Which I say even though 
I hate the word “inescapable” but it’s also true; theoretical narra-
tives are open to (for) escape. Theoretical narratives are about pos-
sibilities. I don’t want a medical narrative not because I’m opposed 
to progress or getting better but because I would rather (given the 
odds, given the day-to-day work involved in a medical sense of bet-
ter) think about what else “better” can mean. Because theory is 
easier than being sick. Because being sick makes theory (more) pos-
sible, makes theory a possibility. Because being sick and theory both 
turn everything into possibilities.
Because I have the right to a theoretical narrative.
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Because when you are sick and reading and / or producing the-
ory, when everything is a possibility, narratives are never linear. A 
theoretical narrative both matches the time of a visceralized body 
and provides a way out of it. Like, is my gut sad because of theory? 
Do I not know what my gut is because of theory? How can I think 
about this unknown? How much theory can a body take? How 
much non-linearity can a body take? How many escapes can a body 
be provided? If it’s better that pain becomes language-generating 
instead of language-resistant, how many words must be found to 
“make it worthwhile?” How much, of what, is “worthwhile”? 
Worthwhile “in theory” or “in life?”
In theory, and in the lineage that I am thinking of here, backwards 
from disability studies to queer studies to feminist critical theory to 
Simone de Beauvoir to Lacan and Freud, is one based on an able 
body whose main attribute (or defining characteristic) is sexuality. 
That is, the person’s sexuality, because the main work of feminist 
critical thought was to separate the biological body from the mind, 
the mind that produces (enacts) “the female” on / through / upon the 
body. It is this enactment that ultimately produces The Body. It is 
this enactment and performativity of such a foundational aspect of 
identity that makes it seem so obvious that the rest of identity is an 
enactment as well. This follows through feminist critical theory to 
queer studies to critical race theory, to examinations of the socially, 
linguistically, constructed experiences of queerness or race. Which, 
in turn, continues in examinations of all other aspects of identity, 
including being disabled.
Enactment is what makes invalids. How can you theorize an 
enactment of identity when it takes place in a body that itself is 
enacting both “alive” and “dead”? (Ignore the body.) How can you 
theorize an enactment of identity in a body that is never in one place 
long enough for anything to be enacted upon it? (Ignore the body.) 
How can you theorize an enactment of identity upon a body whose 
surface is meaningless, when confronted with the even more mean-
ingful meaninglessness of its insides? How do you enact being dead, 
but still alive, now?
Because being dead cannot be enacted, being sick cannot be 
either. This is not such a stretch; being sick is not the same as being 
dead but nor is it ever really very different; it cannot be said that we 
were at a distance from being sick, but within distance of it. When 
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being sick is seen as an identity, when disability studies theorizes 
itself into being, invalids are made. Because it is not enough to talk 
about sickness as a thing that happens or a thing people do. Because 
how does it feel? Because having words is not enough without also 
having information.
The thing about all of this theory, about feminist and queer and 
disability studies, is that this is not just about a lineage of erasure 
and no words and non-identity. This is not just about lineage, as if 
lineage were just a thing that happened, a history. This is not just 
about lineage because this is also how I was taught. I was taught 
that this is what critical theory is. I was taught that this is what is 
included within critical theory. I was taught this lineage. I was given 
readings. I was not taught about being sick, although I have been 
sick for six years and could have a Masters by now. It is the lineage of 
critical theory that is enacted.
Gut Reaction
The ironic thing about a difference constituted by sickness or dis-
ability is that this is actually a difference based on the most same 
of samenesses. The real difference is not the sickness itself but an 
awareness, even if it’s an awareness of the limits of perception. An 
awareness of the limits of information.
I also cannot unlearn what I was taught about critical theory 
and its lineage. It’s a lineage taught and enacted by people who 
can still think, comfortably, of The Body. What is taught through 
this Body is a paradigm in which the object of theory is identity, in 
which identity is constituted as a set series of differences from estab-
lished norms, and that the most transgressive differences are those 
concerning sexuality and gender. “Everyone shifted over from pro-
duction to perversion.”27 Coming out of Freud and Lacan, critical 
theory is based on The Body as (only ever) the sexualized body.
The visceralized body is not the sexualized body.
27 Terry Eagleton, “It is not quite true that I have a body and not quite 
true that I am one either,” London Review of Books 15.10, July 22, 1993, 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v15/n10/terry-eagleton/it-is-not-quite-true-that-
i-have-a-body-and-not-quite-true-that-i-am-one-either.
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I cannot unlearn what I was taught about differences and norms, 
but, within such a system, how can you think about a difference 
predicated on the most normal norm? Being alive, but dying, is the 
most basic, unavoidable, norm. Sickness is no different.
When I said that I have a right to a theoretical narrative, what I 
meant was that I have the right to theory centered not on the sexual-
ized body but on the visceralized body. The visceralized body can 
serve not only as a way to talk about visceral bodily experiences, 
it can also be a model for theory; it can be a new paradigm. And, 
indeed, it would have to be a new paradigm, because how can you 
write sickness within a theoretical paradigm where sickness cannot 
be admitted? Only ever partially.
Was disability studies supposed to be the new paradigm? Was crip 
theory? A huge amount of the work of disability studies has been a 
“positioning [of] disability as a set of practices and associations that 
can be critiqued, contested and transformed.”28 But this work has 
been exactly the kind of enactment that writes out sick bodies, that 
is (a) “set,” that’s “practices,” that’s “associations,” but what does 
this actually mean for living in a body every day? Disability studies 
has continually pushed aside these issues, pushed aside messiness, to 
focus on questions framed as (only) larger (more important) politi-
cal issues. Because theory is easier than being sick. I would suggest 
that a theory whose object is the visceralized body is less about con-
testation or transformation and more in line with Being Sick and 
Time: an elucidation, a phenomenology, a filling in of gaps. Think-
ing in the gut–brain space. Being aware of the slippery surface of the 
able body. Being sick.
To not focus on contestation or critique, or at least what cri-
tique commonly means, doesn’t mean that a theory of the viscer-
alized body wouldn’t be critical. To inhabit a hyperphysical, fully 
felt, body in a theoretical context where “bodies are ways of talk-
ing about human subjects without getting all sloppily humanist”29 
is inherently a critique of existing theoretical norms. Simply being 
aware of theoretical determinism is critical. Sloppiness can be criti-
cal. Shit is critical.
28 Alison Kafer, Feminist, Queer, Crip (Bloomington, in: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 2013), 9.
29 Eagleton, “It is not quite true.”
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Was disability studies supposed to be the new paradigm? What 
does it mean to find that this doesn’t include sickness? It begs the 
question of defining sickness as something opposed to disability, 
an easy definition to fall into. But my issues with disability studies 
have less to do with how disability is commonly defined and more 
to do with how it is written as a “set of practices and associations,” 
as something that almost always visibly marks a body, something 
that has more to do with wheelchairs and ramps than shit and 
guts. Something also generally written as a permanent state, prob-
ably something you were born with. Something that feels static, 
something that never includes or admits to being in pain every 
day, something that never makes you have to discuss diarrhea with 
your partner. And no, sickness is not always these (static) things. 
It is less aligned with the freaks paradigm of disability studies and 
more about ghosts and the walking dead and the undead; less about 
obvious monstrosity and more about figuring out what, exactly, is 
monstrous.
On the other hand, what does it really matter whether sickness 
and disability are mutually exclusive terms? At least within theory, 
because there are definite legal implications for how disability is 
defined, which I don’t mean to ignore and to which we will return 
later. But, here, within theory, whether sickness can or should be 
considered a disability should be something of a nonissue. First and 
foremost because defining bodies, defining bodies by their condi-
tions and practices and associations, will always end up at The Body. 
By focusing on disability as such, by relying on and reinforcing 
definitive differences between disability and people with disabilities 
and impairments, disability studies only winds up writing Another 
Body. Even (or especially) crip theory, which, in part, seeks to better 
integrate disability studies with queer theory, to be more inclusive, 
but must first define that which it includes. All of this defining is an 
attempt to avoid sloppiness. Or to avoid a confrontation.
Secondly, shifting away from a theory focused on defining catego-
ries of identities to one based on the visceralized body also means a 
shift in vocabulary. This is why it doesn’t really matter, within the-
ory, whether disability and sickness are the same or mutually exclu-
sive; everything is visceral. The visceralized body is open to others 
to the extent that it is not really necessary to first define what to be 
untitled (everything is visceral)
109
inclusive of. The visceralized body needs a theory understanding of 
the fact that theory is easier than being sick; why close it off?
Was the category of being sick ever that much of a difference? At 
first, I thought that perhaps the lack of sickness within disability 
studies was because, historically, sickness really was that distinct, 
and so it would, now, be more accurate to say that sickness is no 
longer a difference. And I could see why this could be true, I could 
see how the huge rise of conditions like obesity and diabetes make 
it seem like suddenly everyone is sick; now that so many people 
are sick, it’s like sickness is no longer a difference. But, on the other 
hand, people have always been sick. People have always been sick 
and historically even more people have been sick than are sick now 
and even more people have died, often at home, from sicknesses the 
majority of which are no longer fatal. This, actually, is the only real 
difference, now, that the majority of people no longer expect to get 
sick and die. Especially given that with so many diseases being made 
nonfatal, now, many more people will be walking around sick; alive, 
but maybe already a little dead. Sickness is both not the norm, now, 
even as it once was, and simultaneously, is still the most basic norm. 
If the able body is the most natural natural, sickness is the most nor-
mal difference. It invalidates itself.
Absent-Minded
I want to return to these legal implications of “disabled” now, spe-
cifically to think about obesity. Because it’s not just that with the 
rise of obesity and diabetes there are suddenly millions (more) sick 
people. It is also the fact that with the declaration that obesity is a 
disability, there are suddenly millions (more) disabled people in the 
us. Further, the more or less concurrent passage of the Affordable 
Care Act included within its provisions ones that directly affect the 
protection of sick people; in a way, creating legal protections similar 
to those already in place for the protection of disability rights. For 
example, the fact that the law made it illegal for insurance compa-
nies to refuse to cover or raise charges for people with pre-existing 
conditions meant that millions of chronically ill people had their 
right to accessible health care protected.
But what do these legal rights have to do with theory? There 
is more than one lineage to theory. When looking at a history of 
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disability studies, there is a remarkable concurrence of successful 
disability rights activism with an increase in the popularity of dis-
ability studies. Like how the passage of the ada in 1990 happened 
during a period, from about 1990–1995, that saw a large amount of 
sociological scholarship about illness and disability produced. This 
production slowed to a halt in about 1995 — more or less the time 
that the release of protease inhibitors and their success in turning 
aids from a death sentence to a chronic illness (which itself is a kind 
of right) happened, meaning that there were now very many less sick 
people. It no longer seemed like a crisis, of health or attention. Now, 
between crip theory and disability studies, The Disabled are every-
where; this rise seems to have happened within the past 10–15 years, 
as debates about rights like the aca raged. Debates, and media sur-
rounding the debates, and scholarship done at the time, brings to 
mind Rosemarie Garland-Thompson’s writing about freak shows 
and their relationship to disabled bodies: “The immense popular-
ity of the shows between the Jacksonian and Progressive eras sug-
gest that the onlookers needed to constantly reaffirm the difference 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’ at a time when immigration, emancipation 
of the slaves and female suffrage confounded previously reliable 
physical indices of status and privilege.”30 The immense popular-
ity of disability studies between 2000 and 2015 suggests the need 
to constantly reaffirm the difference between “them” and “us” at 
a time that’s included the passage of the aca, the declaration that 
obesity is a disability and rising rates of autism, diabetes, and auto-
immune diseases (for example): Who’s disabled now?
I am not normally disabled.
The people who are disabled now are not depicted as freaks, 
but as the direct opposite, as incredibly mundane, unexceptional, 
because of the huge number of Americans affected. The people 
who are disabled now are not freaks but they are “the obesity epi-
demic,” which, although not “freak,” has the same effect. “The obe-
sity epidemic” names millions of people, makes it seem like these 
sick bodies are everywhere, but, by naming these people as singular, 
renders them invisible. “The obesity epidemic” is everywhere and 
nowhere at once.
It can’t possibly, really, be your problem.
30 McRuer, Crip Theory, 103.
untitled (everything is visceral)
111
“The obesity epidemic” is not at a distance from “disabled” but 
within distance of it. But any distance here is crucial because what 
would it mean for, suddenly, millions of people to now be disabled? 
Can you be disabled by an illness? Can you be disabled by an illness 
that seems to have such clear external causes, causes like food deserts 
and hfcs and a lack of educational and health resources? An illness 
that seems to be both physically present, in that it has clear physical 
effects, and remarkably disembodied. What will these bodies mean 
for other disabled bodies, bodies whose disabilities seem so physical, 
so definite, and solid? Sickness can’t possibly be admitted. It can’t 
possibly be your problem, because with an illness like obesity you 
can just avoid those behaviors that cause it. And then not get sick. 
And then maintain your distance. And then.
I am tempted to say: what does it matter what effects obesity will 
have on the larger category of disabled? It’s not that I don’t under-
stand the fact of limited resources, the distribution or lack thereof 
of such resources, to all kinds of bodies. But, theoretically, linguis-
tically, (empathetically,) why isn’t there room for admitting these 
bodies? If your body is legally protected, why can’t it be theoreti-
cally protected?
The bodilessness of obesity, the way it is seemingly constituted 
by only actions, not internal mechanisms, actually makes it a perfect 
test case for illustrating the possibilities of thinking through and 
around and with a visceral body. Because obese bodies are bodies 
that are experiencing the very physical effects of an illness that (they 
are being told) is a product of their behaviors, of their minds, of the 
minds and behaviors of those around them. Obese bodies are bodies 
existing within and experiencing (and exemplifying) the gut–brain 
space. Obese bodies can make this space apparent in ways that more 
invisibly ill bodies may not be able to (at first). Obese bodies are vis-
ceral bodies. Furthermore, the obesity epidemic has seen a huge rise 
in nutrition studies, in the evaluation of various diets, in the long-
term tracking of various metabolic data. What these data show, and 
the metabolic data in particular, is concurrent rise of people who 
have health problems identical to those caused by obesity, despite 
their non-obese weight: the term is metabolically obese normal 




The visceral bodies of the obesity epidemic, and the inherent insep-
arability of mind and body when considering their illness, coupled 
with historical concurrence of disability rights activism and disabil-
ity rights studies, makes clear that now is the time for rights. Not 
just further legal rights. And it’s not disability studies that’s needed, 
now, not work that works on definitions, but theoretical rights that 
collapse definitions and works towards more information. Theo-
retical rights that respond to the inseparability of mind and body 
in a visceral body; that recognize that visceral bodies deserve legal 
rights that attend to physical needs as much as they deserve theoreti-
cal rights that attend to the need for information.  Rights in theory; 
rights to a narrative in theory. Rights to Being Sick and Time. And 
rights to Illness Not As Metaphor but also rights to seeing or doing 
the rewriting and reapplying of existing theoretical narratives to vis-
ceral bodies. Like what if, for once, a discussion of Foucault’s Disci-
pline and Punish was about the different power dynamics within a 
body, about varying cellular or organ level regulatory mechanisms 
and what these mechanisms could show about larger political or 
social systems? What if Kristeva’s concept of the abject was taken 
to include the things one’s body finds abject within itself, like all 
that shit or those food intolerances or a faulty autoimmunity? 
What if différance / difference wasn’t just about the linguistics of 
terms, the play, but the way the negation inherent in them applies 
to the non-difference of sickness? What if, to continue with Der-
rida, an idea of a specter could be used to think about a specter of 
saturation (as related to rumination)? What if the author is actually 
dead or dying? What if there was a body of text that was disjointed, 
tongue-in-cheek, where the argument really didn’t have a leg to 
stand on; what if there were a sick body of text? What if, these ques-
tions answered, these theoretical rights fulfilled, then what? “What 
should I be cured of? To find what condition, what life?”31
31 Roland Barthes, Mourning Diary (New York: Hill & Wang, 2010), 97.
Daily Survivor #2 
(Living With, or An Afterword)
All of the time, I work. 
I would like to have a nice life. I would like to have a nice life with 
many things in it. I imagine these things as being more or less easily 
separated from my life or the things in my body. I work at imagining 
as much as I work at pulling apart. 
How do you live with something for a long time?
* * *
My doctor thinks I should run off and live my life. These are more 
or less his exact words: ride off on a horse, he tells me. Presumably 
because I am not quite like his other pancreatitis patients. I can still 
ride a horse, definitely. I have not (very) recently suffered a cata-
strophic illness. As he reminded me at our last appointment, I do 
still have a pancreas. I’m not facing an average 15-year post-diagnosis 
survival rate? Does he know something I don’t? Or is the opposite 
true, does he think that this is, in fact, exactly what I’m facing and 
therefore should find those horses while I can? Either way, the atti-
tude is the same: take advantage now, enjoy now, because there is 
(maybe) no next. Does it really matter why not? Regardless, all of 
the time I imagine the “maybe” becoming my present: I fall down 
the stairs carrying my laundry out. Someone knocks into me at 
work. Accidently, I eat something I shouldn’t. And these are not 
truly, or only, scenarios within my imagination. Every day I do 
these things or work to avoid them. See, once, during a conversa-
tion after a series of events involving months of negotiation with my 
visceral
114
insurance company, a definitive diagnosis of chronic pancreatitis, a 
colonoscopy the day before Thanksgiving, and the removal of a pre-
cancerous intestinal growth I was told they would “never find in a 
22-year-old,”  my mother said I would have to be diligent. The word 
got stuck in my head. I knew she was right, but also surprised by this 
word choice: why not careful, or patient? Diligence is the opposite 
of riding off. Both are living. 
In imagining, mostly imagining becoming again very sick, I am 
not extravagant. The scenarios I imagine are intensely mundane, 
unavoidably so. A month ago, there was suddenly a sharp pain. I 
knew this pain. And I thought: maybe now is the next time. And 
so I went to the hospital and in the waiting room, during the first 
few minutes before I could do nothing but sit, change position 
minutely, and begin to cry, I wrote: “Now that it has come again, it 
is and is not like I imagined or remembered.” In the waiting room 
I read El Mundo. My horoscope says that I will soon visit a special 
place. Later, I listen to a man getting an electrocardiogram five feet 
away from me in a hallway. I think, today I have. 
It is not that either my doctor or my mother were right or wrong 
about diligence or running off. Living with is both of these, also nei-
ther of them, or is the desire and necessity of both, alternately and 
unavoidably continuously. 
* * *
I start to read books about aging. That is almost like living with 
something for a long time, right? Or at least is just something that 
happens for a long time. Besides, I remain attached to a few age-
related fantasies and figures. Middle age. Specifically, middle-aged 
men. How, statistically, I am one: I have the pancreatitis of middle-
aged men, the precancerous intestinal growth of middle-aged men. 
The treatment plans and procedures determined because of these 
statistics on the bodies of the other middle-aged men. Even know-
ing the growths and organ damage involved, being middle-aged 
remains a fantasy. An odd one, maybe. Who wants to be 50? It 
seems like almost no one; I can’t wait. In one sense, anyway, in that 
that will mean I have lived for another 25 years. At the same time, as 
I said, chronic pancreatitis has a 15-year post-diagnosis survival rate, 
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though with diagnosis happening, on average, at 43. I would like to 
be nicely middle-aged.
I imagine myself reading this when I am very old. Or very sick. I 
will, I know, have gotten many things wrong, and I wonder what I 
will then find embarrassing. It won’t really matter. This is not Let-
ters to a Young Poet, it’s Letters to a Sick Young Poet. It will turn out 
differently.
The funny thing about prognostic information for a disease you 
have but that may or may not apply to you (or, at least, may be 25 
years out of sync with you) is how warped the idea of “old age” 
and the speed of “aging” become. You read: diabetes happens most 
often after about 20 years of illness. (I thought there would only be 
fifteen?) This seems like a long time. It seems like I’ll be old then. 
But, then, I realize how I’ve already been sick for almost 6 years. It 
will both go very quickly and always seem like the longest time, a 
seemingly impossible temporal dichotomy: chronic. Intractable.
About those middle-aged men: the majority of them have 
alcohol-induced pancreatitis that has damaged the overall structure 
of the organ and, for this reason, is easy to visualize using existing 
imaging technologies like mri and ultrasound. Young women, it is 
now increasingly being found, are more likely to have a kind of pan-
creatitis not specific to alcoholism, in which the majority of organ 
damage is to the small, internal network of ducts: small duct pan-
creatitis. As there does not yet exist imaging technology sensitive 
enough to show this damage, its possible severity, all existing treat-
ment plans are based on the large duct pancreatitis of middle-aged 
men. Hence they become an inescapable fantasy and (imposed) 
reality. They make my body more and more like theirs. For instance, 
I take so many nsaids (non-steroidal anti-inflammatories) that I 
become convinced, having done some research, that these nsaids 
have caused me to stop ovulating.1 And I am so surprised how nei-
ther my middle-aged male doctor nor my 75-year-old male doctor 
mentioned this possible side effect (albeit presumably rare, or rarely 
1 See M. Akil, R.S. Amos, and P. Stewart, “Infertility may sometimes be 
associated with nsaid consumption,” Rheumatolgy 35.1 (1996): 76–78, 
doi: 10.1093/rheumatology/35.1.76, and S. Stone et. al., “Non-Steroidal 




noticed; one assumes the majority of women taking this many 
nsaids are over the age of 40 or 50 and would perhaps not notice 
this effect). They treat me in their image. 
Sometimes, I remember how I used to get these stitches in my 
side as kid, while running or being out of breath. They were just 
stitches. I’m sure. But this pain in my side that I have now is the 
only side pain I can remember or imagine, and it creeps not only 
forwards but backwards. What if it has been longer than 5 years? At 
what point do you start counting? What if it’s genetic? I remember, 
also, one of the first things I ever wrote about being sick: what is ill 
in chronic illness is time.
There’s a term for this, one used commonly in writing and theory 
about chronic illness: living in prognosis. At its core, living in prog-
nosis is about experiencing a continuous temporal flux, brought 
on, perhaps, by a feeling that it is “as if there were a right to a cer-
tain lifespan,” and you are or are not really being granted this right. 
Furthermore, “prognostic time constantly anticipates a future.”2 
Which is, in short, exactly what a prognosis is: an estimate, based on 
the current severity, expected progression, experience of bodies like 
yours, of how much of a future there will be for you. In this way, a 
prognosis is entirely and only about a measure of time. A prognosis 
is less good at predicting how this time will feel. “Living in progno-
sis” is therefore a useful term, and description (as elucidated by writ-
ers like Sarah Lochlann Jain and Jasbir Puar), for describing how it 
feels to have a prognosis, what its progression, its estimates, feel like. 
What if, though, you do not have a prognosis, it is difficult to esti-
mate, you do not exactly know when you first got sick (and there-
fore where you should be counting from) or all estimates are based 
on bodies yours may be more and more like but remain distinct 
enough from to not, fully, be applicable?
What if you are living not in prognosis, but in mortality rates? 
* * *
Say it is a rather deadly disease. Like, maybe there is a 25% mortal-
ity rate during certain acute episodes, that this increases with each 
2 Sarah Lochlann Jain, “Living in Prognosis: Toward an Elegiac Politics,” 
Representations 98.1 (2007): 77–92; 81.
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reoccurrence. Such a state, coupled with an inability to accurately 
predict episodes such as this, and the inapplicability of existing prog-
nosis, would make “living in prognosis” not useful. This, instead, 
is “living in mortality rates,” which can be used to describe at least 
one aspect of living with. After all, when statistics about the prob-
ability of survivorship are not applicable, it makes sense for these 
statistics to morph, in a way that necessitates a reliance, instead, on 
the likelihood of death. A different kind of anticipation, maybe. 
And what, exactly, is there to anticipate in living in mortality rates? 
It is not the constant anticipation of the future as in prognosis. It’s 
not that there is no future, either. It’s that you’re already living (in) 
an impossible future. Living in the “could have died.” Living in the 
known premalignant. Living in mortality rates and therefore living 
not among the survived, alive, bodies of prognostic information but 
among those excluded from prognosis: dead bodies and the feeling 
of this mass. In mass, at least there is a lot to live with. 
By “impossible future” I mean exactly the future of the “could 
have died.” Or would have. And how much time, in a historical 
sense, can create this distinction: formal guidelines for the diagno-
sis and treatment of acute pancreatitis (with the 25% mortality rate) 
were not developed and put out by organized medical groups until 
1995. I was born in 1993. (The joke: they saw me coming!)
By “impossible future,” I am drawing on Michael Ralph’s notion 
of “surplus time,” the idea, and feeling, of “a moment they should 
not have been able to experience based on the perceived itinerary.”3 
Living in the “should not have been.”
Or, perhaps most viscerally: living in the “been spreading.”
Writing in “Living in Prognosis: Towards an Elegiac Politics,” 
Lochlann Jain describes a woman whose “cancer had spread (had, in 
fact, been spreading during the interim of hope, of ‘survivorship’).”4 
And what does the “progressive” in “progressive chronic illness” 
mean if not always already been spreading? Living in the been 
spreading feels the most solid of these phrases to me, the one with 
the most mass. The one, really, with always more and more mass. 
3 Michael Ralph, “Flirt[ing] With Death But ‘Still Alive’: The Sexual Di-
mensions of Surplus Time in Hip Hop Fantasy,” Cultural Dynamics 
18.1 (2006): 61–88; 79.




I know, this must sound hopeless. The attraction of “prognosis” is 
how it always holds open a future in which you live, disease-free. 
“Mortality rates” does not (or at least not in the same way) promise 
this but it does promise a known, knowable end; in this way, one 
altogether more easily imagined and dependable than a future of 
being disease-free. How easy is it, really, to imagine “25% survival 
rate in 5 years”? Yet having been very sick, before, it is easy to imag-
ine becoming very sick again. Even if I am not always entirely right 
in my imagining. Furthermore, what kind of prognosis can there 
even be in a chronic illness? One that somehow disavows the very 
meaning of “chronic”? Is it not more hopeless to remain attached 
to a prognostic fantasy that ignores the reality, the mass, of what is 
progressive, of what has been spreading? The thing about chronic 
illness is that you are only a survivor (of a kind) up until the point 
at which you die: why not start there? “So thou shall feed on Death 
that feeds on men, / And Death, once dead, there’s no more dying 
then.”5 Why not start with the middle age I get to be, now? With 
the old married couple, with the sadness, even, this can hold now? 
When hope remains a risk perhaps hope in “living in mortality 
rates” is exactly the persistence of these figures and images, how they 
persist despite being refigured temporally and the risk this presents, 
the risk of actually being (like) middle-aged at 23.6 When hope is a 
risk, is it riskier to have a life sentence or a death sentence? If a prog-
nosis, a poor one, is a death sentence, shouldn’t an illness you have 
for a long time be a life sentence? 
Maybe diligence itself is a form of hope: diligence towards hope, 
diligence in living with the feeling, the likelihood, of your death. 
Its mass. Also, hope in and as homeostasis: a biological hope in the 
form of a body practicing an intrinsic kind of diligence, one unique 
to matter. To mass. 
I’ll take it day by day.
5 William Shakespeare, “Sonnet 146,” Poets.org, https://www.poets.org/
poetsorg/poem/poor-soul-centre-my-sinful-earth-sonnet-146.
6 Jasbir K. Puar, “Prognosis Time: Towards a Geopolitics of Affect, De-
bility and Capacity,” Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theo-




How does right now become right now? How do you get to a place 
where you’re thinking about living, how to live, with something for 
a long time? The point at which you realize “a long time.” How do 
you get to a place where you’re thinking about living with some-
thing for a long time while also already doing the living? In a way, 
living in mortality rates (or in prognosis) papers over the reality 
of this boredom, how now just creeps up on you; mortality rates, 
while true, sounds also too melodramatic. It’s not dramatic. It’s just 
the slow, maybe over years, closing off of other possibilities until, of 
course, it’s only this: and you will be living with this for a long time. 
It is that simple. 
In becoming encroaching, now is enacted over many smaller 
moments. I’ll take it day by day, because I have to. How will I get 
home today? What will I take to eat? And on and on. I plan to plan. 
“The problems with which ill people struggle are often existen-
tial; their solutions are organizational.”7 
Slowly, more and more decisions. More constant awareness of 
needs. How do you sustain decision-making and diligent, boring 
planning for years? The feeling of always needing something is not 
a comfortable one. Perhaps because of this, I’m not always sure if it 
makes it harder or easier that I haven’t been sick since I was born: I 
remember what it’s like to not need. 
There is, though, incentive for maintaining these daily plans: 
“[F]or nowadays, I feel like plans are all that stand between me and 
the end of my life.”8 Throughout The Light of the World, written 
after the death of her husband, Elizabeth Alexander talks a lot about 
edges; what she grasps onto, lingers on. This makes sense in the face 
of such enormous and specific loss. Every day, though, is a much less 
specific kind of loss, also because so much remains. I do not want to 
continue grasping. 
Instead, I’ll take it day by day. 
7 Kathy Charmaz, Good Days, Bad Days: The Self and Chronic Illness in 
Time (New Brunswick, nj: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 138.
8 Elizabeth Alexander, The Light of the World: A Memoir (New York 




The pain makes that difficult sometimes. And more so now, when 
I seem to have a problem with friction. Not only do I not want to 
continue grasping, I have also completely lost the ability to push, 
to push through the pain and exhaustion. I simply stop. I stop so 
much more frequently now than I used to. That, the ability to keep 
going, I do not quite remember or understand it now. What exactly 
was I relying on? And I think a lot about why this is, how many 
ways I can explain it: the medication side effects, the malnutrition. 
These are believable explanations, but not entirely true. Really, I 
think this is just the feeling of being an entire year sicker. That is the 
only true difference between this year and last year. A year of living 
in the been spreading. 
Despite being occasionally haunted by the feeling or knowledge 
(on some level, physically) that this is the best it is going to be, prob-
ably for a long time, there is also an odd relief in simply acknowledg-
ing the feeling of this progression. I try to convince myself I am just 
relaxing, not fighting, not just giving up. 
The pain makes it hard sometimes. I’ve written so much about it 
before, described it in so many ways, I’m not sure what else there is 
to say. Except for how it’s always changing, also always the same, and 
always surprising, so that even in describing it over and over again, 
I am always a little right and a little wrong. Every time, it is like I am 
trying to tell myself as much as you. As if only in finally describ-
ing it accurately will it get better. It becomes endlessly fascinating 
in this way, “fascinating” in a tactile sense, like turning something 
over again and again, some things becoming worn away. I try out 
sentences and phrases. I try to explain it to myself: chronic inflam-
mation leads to scar tissue; acute inflammation causes higher and 
higher levels of enzyme production, digestive enzymes that can’t tell 
the difference between the matter of the pancreas and the matter of 
food, how you digest yourself; how of course it has begun to hurt 
when I lift my right arm, everything being connected, encroaching, 
right?; how anti-inflammatories act chemically, how opiates attach 
to receptors in your brain stem; so much hard science, so many 
kinds of cells, just cells, as if, over and over, the hardness of this sci-
ence can block out, through sheer force, how much these words are 
responsible for, how much I cannot always stand it. 
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So, I take it day by day. 
* * *
The ironic thing about living with, at least sometimes, is how it also 
feels like my body is made of nothing. How there is nothing inside 
to be metabolized, to produce; the feeling of running on empty, but 
total. I am also living with (this feeling of) nothing. 
I am not living with very well because of this nothing. It makes 
it difficult to do things like hold a job, or work at one enough days 
out of the week to make money that is more like rent money and 
less like change. How do other people live with this nothing? I start 
Googling “chronic pancreatitis disability benefits.” Some results 
are specific to pancreatitis: how it is impossible to secure benefits if 
you have pancreatitis because you are an alcoholic, and it is because 
of this very common cause that I suspect pancreatitis is not listed 
in the Blue Book of accepted conditions and disabilities.9 The rest 
of the results are for law practices that specialize in helping people 
secure benefits. Helping them “win.” I could write an entire schol-
arly monograph on the linguistics of disability benefits within 
popular culture. Maybe I could write an entire memoir about my 
attempts at “winning,” but I’m not sure yet if winning, in this way, 
is or should be a part of my living with. 
I am also not living with very well right now because I am uncom-
fortable. What I am with seems like a larger object than what I 
am living, if that makes sense. But does living with have to mean 
living with well? People in pain who are addicted to opiates right 
now are also living with (multiply). I am not living with any better 
than they are just because I’m not addicted to my medications. And 
this seems like a fundamental thing to make clear, and then avoid, 
about living with. It is not about some ideal state. It is not about a 
hierarchy, either based on the quality of living or on ideas of how 
some things are easier to live with than others. It is really just a state 
of mind and this is just a way to describe its biological, linguistic, 
social, and affective facets. It’s to say what it feels like, not how best 





to do it; to imagine multiple bests. While the desire towards open-
ness and multiplicity is one I usually find myself moving with, here 
I am also haunted by what is, perhaps, already the ideal model of 
living with: Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’s five stages towards acceptance. I 
am not really saying “acceptance.” But I’m wary of how it can sound 
like I am. Living with is a biological fact and physical object that is 
more complex than coming to terms with and moving through grief 
over, essentially, this biology. Namely because Kübler-Ross does not 
really discuss biology. Also because, by outlining a series of five steps 
that end in an ideal, idealized state (that then gets laid over others 
who may be grieving or living with, differently, pressuring patients 
to move rapidly towards a single prescribed end goal), Kübler-Ross’s 
acceptance becomes narrowly defined and universal. Living with 
does not, necessarily, mean acceptance nor does acceptance always 
look the way you think it will. 
Part of this disavowal, though, is like an adolescent refusal of a 
parent’s suggestion. I can see exactly the way I’ve moved through 
Kübler-Ross’s pattern. I’m in bargaining now. Denial was the year 
and a half after I first got sick when I did not stop drinking or 
make any other changes (though, to be fair, I was not at that point 
being told that this was permanent). Depression was shortly after, 
when I did stop drinking and when, given that I was 19 at the time, 
promptly lost the majority of my friends. Anger is ongoing. 
But even so, are these steps really for me, for bodies like mine? On 
a fundamental level, they presuppose the horribleness, the loss, of 
what has happened and this is the thing I cannot agree to. It is not 
all bad. Concurrently, it is not (cannot be for all of us) about this 
specific form of survivorship. Along with the biological diligence 
of homeostasis, there is also a state called allostasis: how the body 
suffers a huge change and adjusts, brings its homeostasis to mainte-
nance at different levels.
* * *
Once, I had a fit of anger. Like it fit, around and inside me, well. 
And is still there, an amorphously bounded object, dissolving while 
remaining the same, creating an “increasingly subtle fluid.”10 How 
10 Gilles Deleuze, “The Fold,” trans. Jonathan Strauss, Yale French Studies 
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do you tell two things apart, on levels of visible flesh or molecules? 
How do you negotiate, especially within a fit of anger, a “perceptual 
displacement of contours” that is entirely ongoing?11 I am exactly 
where one thing ends and another begins, being continually pro-
duced by the movement of these two things and sometimes I think 
it is only my anger that is holding these two things apart. I do just 
have this thing, in my body, and the thing is pain, and I cannot quite 
believe that pain is not just a substance like any other.
At a certain point, while reading about the opiate epidemic and 
pain patients during an ongoing project, I got a question stuck in 
my head: what’s so bad about pain?  
This is now incredibly ironic to me, that this was the last sentence 
I wrote before the day I had to go to the emergency room. Should 
I read this, now, after, as a joke or as a taunt? As a premonition or 
an instance of hubris, as if I deserved to be reminded about what’s 
so bad about pain? Or to be reminded how little distance is pos-
sible. To be reminded, also really shown for the first time, that so 
many people around me seem to think the (my) pain is so bad, so 
why can’t I admit it? How do I understand being given intravenous 
morphine in the emergency room while listening to a woman down 
the hall being refused anything stronger than ibuprofen? How do I 
begin to reconcile that the pain really is this bad with also thinking 
that it is just this thing, in my body, a substance like any other? 
But even in experiencing this kind of confusion, it becomes eas-
ier, it feels better, to consider pain an object as opposed to a state, a 
nervous system glitch, or an emotion. Objects are definite. Objects 
allow for being made of many things simultaneously. Objects are 
constructed, but also, at a certain point, it no longer always matters 
why or how. Objects are what they are. Objects can be described. 
Objects are a thing you can live with. Pain, as an object, becomes 
substantiated. Pain becomes substantial.
* * *
Another object, also the same one: I have a body made of money. 
A lot of money, as in many costs, also profit to many other people. 
80 (1991): 227–47; 230.
11 Deleuze, “The Fold,” 246.
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I have a body made of money shaped by the pain I’m in. Right 
now, I have about $100 worth of prescription drugs in my house. 
This doesn’t seem like a lot, given what it could be. If I didn’t have 
insurance, it would be about $5,000 every month. I do not, right 
now, make that amount of money, reliably, every year. I don’t make 
that much money because I only work part time, and even at my 
part time job I frequently leave early, having lost the ability to push 
through pain and discomfort. If I could work full time, I would 
make more than twice as much money as I do now at my current 
hourly rate. This gap, between my potential and actual income, 
will only grow over time, both in terms of the jobs (and salaries) 
I will not be qualified for given my work history, and in terms of 
the savings I will not be able to build. (But then, I think in more 
morbid moments, how long am I really saving for?) Over time, too, 
my medical costs will grow. I will need more. More medicine, more 
medical procedures, eventually. Last year, I was billed upwards of 
$5,000 by one hospital alone; by a hospital for which my insur-
ance only pays 30% of the cost. I’ll need more, generally: ice packs, 
heating pads, comfortable clothes, food that adheres to a strict diet. 
None of this is counting the cost of complications. I’ll need to try 
some other objects, too, alternative therapies: acupuncture ($90 per 
session at the hospital my insurance doesn’t pay for), massages (on 
average, $1 / minute). A different, less physically demanding job. 
My body made of the money of pain is someone else’s profit. Jans-
sen Pharmaceuticals, Bayer, AbbVie, Partners Healthcare, Brigham 
and Women’s Hospital, WestMed Group, CareOne, Johnson & 
Johnson. So many other companies I am not even aware of purchas-
ing products from (as in: are you buying Tylenol when you buy 
it or are you meaning to buy a Johnson & Johnson product? Do 
you know what company owns Johnson & Johnson?) Some of the 
industries that profit from pain are more apparent than others (who 
makes the bottles pharmaceuticals come in? The advertisements? 
The pharmaceutical textbooks?). Or some industries rely more bla-
tantly on advertising than others, or appear more readily to be sell-
ing a product than offering relief as such. Like the entire industry 
devoted to alternative therapies. Without disregarding the effective-
ness or helpfulness of such things, like acupuncture, it is still pos-
sible to look at the flood of natural supplements, books promising 
pain relief or improved brain function via special diets and the like 
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and call it what it is: the billion dollar industry of pain, apparent 
pain, or fear of pain. And how deeply interconnected this industry 
is to others, like the way that the food industry has capitalized on 
the growing popularity of gluten-free foods and other health trends 
to up-market products. Where does the money (or pain) really 
begin and end? If my pain begins in a specific organ, does it only 
end when the money of it reaches the pockets of Janssen Pharma-
ceuticals, the makers of Tramadol (albeit only $2.71 of my $100 per 
month is spent on this painkiller)? If the money of pain becomes 
both enormous profit, as in the $35 billion generated by OxyCon-
tin for Purdue Pharma since 1995, and perpetuates and newly cre-
ates pain (and further expenses, here mainly on the governmental 
and law enforcement levels), as in the thousands of people currently 
addicted to or abusing OxyContin, does the object of pain become 
simply larger or something else altogether?12 
At least an object is a thing you can live with.
* * *
I know the word is “limitation.” If bargaining, I am bargaining for a 
different definition of this word. 
I think about a conversation once with an older woman who 
has ms, who was telling me about skiing: how she could still do it, 
despite now being in a wheelchair, but that the process and experi-
ence of getting onto and using a monoski was just too much work. 
Why should she bother? If bargaining, I am bargaining for why I 
should bother, also for “despite” to be a more recognizably mean-
ingless word than it commonly is. 
The thing is, this is not just about living with, for a long time, 
as if it were just any span of time: it is also inherently about grow-
ing up. It can’t not be, simply because I’ve been sick since I was 18. 
Even though I turned 18 first, got sick a couple months later, the two 
events are synonymous in retrospect. I had only about two and a 
half months of disease-free adulthood; it is almost as if I have never 
12 Alex Morrell, “The OxyContin Clan: The $14 Billion Newcomer to Forbes 





not been a sick adult, never been an adult. Even if turning 18, getting 
sick, had been more temporally spread out, there are only so many 
points in time you can look to or across at that age, mostly ahead. 
I am and am not a young woman. I am and am not also an old 
woman. 
Having much more to look ahead to than back at, at 18, I think 
of the passage in Claudia Rankine’s Don’t Let Me Be Lonely, about 
westerns: “Just before he dies he says, I am not going to make it. 
Where? Not going to make it where? On some level, maybe, the 
phrase simply means not going to make it into the next day, hour, 
minute or perhaps the next second . . . . On another level always 
implicit is the sense that it means he is not going to make it to his 
own death. Perhaps in the back of all of our minds is the life expec-
tancy for our generation.”13 
Is my generation people who are my age now, people who have 
had chronic pancreatitis as long as I have, people who are 48, people 
who have the same prognosis or live in the same mortality rates? 
What is the difference between a generation and a peer? Are my 
peers the people who peer-reviewed my first book, written mostly 
when I was twenty, who wrote in their reviews as if, assuredly, I 
must be an older person with a PhD who is also a man? 
This is why I had bought a book called Life Disrupted: Getting 
Real About Chronic Illness in Your Twenties and Thirties after the 
conversation about diligence.14 Being sick, young, is not like being 
sick at other ages, ages at which it may be more normal, have become 
more regular among one’s peers, to be sick. Nor, though, is it at all 
like being a pediatric patient. 
I think about growing up, and growing into, and growing out of, 
and growing pains. 
* * *
I had started to read books about aging, but they weren’t entirely 
helpful. Or I just wasn’t paying attention. What I failed to notice, 
13 Claudia Rankine, Don’t Let Me Be Lonely: An American Lyric (Saint 
Paul, mn: Graywolf Press, 2004), 24.
14 Laurie Edwards, Life Disrupted: Getting Real About Chronic Illness in 
Your Twenties and Thirties (New York: Walker Books, 2011). 
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and what is now astonishingly obvious: where are all the people 
growing up sick? Not just the normal aging-related conditions, the 
mid-life crises and terminal illnesses, the childhood illnesses. Where 
are the sick 20-year-olds? The sick emerging adults? The sick kids 
who became sick adults and not only the sick kids who stayed that 
way, who died as kids or became completely better before becoming 
an adult. As if this, a becoming completely better, was the only way 
they could become an adult. A prerequisite for adulthood. 
As if one cannot conceive of an adult who is not able. 
Because sick kids staying sick is too sad? Because no one wants no 
future? Because staying sick is the opposite of growing up? Because 
23 is not supposed to be middle-aged? But, then, what’s so special 
about middle age that it should be reserved only for the not sick? 
And then, you think, okay: maybe there are just not that many 
20-year-olds writing memoirs. But even this does not explain the 
vast majority of memoirs that do exist: memoirs about what it was 
like to have a sick child, to lose one, or to have been one; all narra-
tives beginning and ending with Tiny Tim and all other characters 
who had to die within their stories because it was inconceivable that 
they may, how it may have even been possible, for them to continue 
living as they were. 
Even as the archetype, Tiny Tim is also something of an excep-
tion. Because given industrial revolution-era Britain, he really could 
not have lived longer (in terms of medical knowledge and technol-
ogy, and attitudes therein). Which actually puts the lack of por-
trayals of sick young adults, now, in an even more questionable or 
illegitimate position, because given the state of medicine, so many 
diseases that had been deadly are not now: more and more young 
people will be living with longer and longer. Where are they? 
I think about growing into, and growing pains. And growing up, 
as a form of reaching. 
And what is and is not reachable and what cannot, will not, be 
reached and what cannot be reached out of.  
Because sick kids staying sick is too sad? Because growing, in its 
very definition, denies the possibility of a low, that reaching a low 
can be a part of growing? How last week, at my doctor’s, my blood 
tests were the worst they’ve been in years. And, of course, you 
think: this is the been spreading. And why am I still surprised to 
see the numbers? Because my doctor had been optimistic? Which 
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I believed; this was not the doctor who told me he would not, and 
then did, find the adenoma. Because, even knowing otherwise, I still 
thought I had just been growing up, how everything is supposed 
to get better when you get older, so much more freedom, how you 
can do everything you want, not how your organs cannot do every-
thing, how growing is more and more and is not, ever, more of a 
bad thing. An incompatible yet simultaneous increase and decrease; 
a flat plane. 
* * *
Taking growing up for granted, taking for granted its being only 
an increase of good things, seems possible and embedded mostly 
because this is not the 1800s or earlier. Historically, “nearly 60 per-
cent of deaths happened to people 15 or younger and another 20 
percent to those between 15 and 45.”15 The fact of growing up, now, 
is not entirely a matter of human biology, given that the life span in 
the 1800s was 70, comparable to the 76 years it is today. It’s just that 
the life expectancies were so different then, approximately 38 and 36 
for men and women, respectively. You just had to make it past that 
to live a long time. 
Being able to grow up, how this happened over time, may not 
have been entirely a matter of human biology, but it was definitely a 
matter of biology, of science and medicine. Also money. And indus-
trial development, public health campaigns, safer birth procedures, 
antibiotics, urbanism. All matters of being able to get people past a 
certain point and expectation. 
The expectation became farther and farther away. 
Not that such a point has ever been a constant, or ultimately 
based on anything other than a social and historical construct: 
adulthood. 
Being a social and historical construct it would be, on the one 
hand, easy to detail the specifics of these constructs through time 
and across medical, biological, legal, and social realms. On the other 
hand, this would quickly become complicated and only serve to 
15 Meghan Daum, “The Prime of Life by Steven Mintz,” The New York 




diffuse the beliefs underlying this construct such that they become 
unrecognizable. 
It would be simpler to define adulthood through its negative, in 
the sense of its reverse image. An adult is not someone, a person and 
a body, who has to have pediatric-sized equipment used during sur-
geries; who has a pediatric-sized body (quite literally; I am basically 
the same weight now, at 23, I was when I was 13) because of weight-
loss in illness; who cannot hold a full-time job; who has not reached 
financial independence; who lacks a freedom of movement (how do 
you move away from the doctors you have to see every few months? 
How do you travel if, on a daily basis, you can barely eat most foods 
and, in the event of unforeseen circumstances, can become seri-
ously ill?); who cannot fully exercise rights in relation to substances 
(I am of drinking age, but did you know that pancreatitis patients 
who continue to drink are significantly more likely to die within 10 
years?); an adult is not someone who, yesterday, had a stranger say 
that they looked fragile, who had not yet realized that fragility was 
an accepted visual marker of adult ablebodiedness. And if adult-
hood is a social construct than does it truly matter what my chron-
ological age is if all of the above are also true, if I am consistently 
unable to fully access the social nature of adulthood and its concur-
rent freedoms? “Freedom is a boundary concept that delimits the 
realm of all other objects we can know.”16 We know adulthood as, 
through, and by its freedom. We know freedom as adulthood, espe-
cially in youth: freedom is the imagined area beyond what we can 
know is coming next. 
* * *
I know the word is limitation. I know I do not feel free. 
I do not feel free, and the following are some preliminary reasons: 
One, that the object of adulthood is freedom. Two, that the free-
dom of adulthood is defined by rights dependent on age. Three, 
being unable to fully exercise these rights is being unable to be an 
adult, ultimately regardless of chronological age. 
16 Corinne Field, The Struggle for Equal Adulthood: Gender, Race, Age, 
and the Fight for Citizenship in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill, nc: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 5.
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Four, that it is inconceivable to be an adult who is not able 
because of the way that sickness and disability prevent the exercise 
of certain rights but also because of fundamental and embedded 
beliefs about ablebodiedness, health and growth. These beliefs 
are seen especially within psychology, and via the way that psy-
chology and therapeutic narratives have become pervasive within 
popular conceptions of selfhood and particularly adult selfhood. 
To quote Abraham Maslow, an influential psychologist in the 
1960s, “[I]n practically every human being, and certainly in almost 
every newborn baby, that there is an active will towards health, 
an impulse toward growth, or toward the actualization of human 
potentialities.”17 Growth and health are synonymous. And you can-
not grow on a flat plane. 
* * *
Months ago, I cried because of how much I want. I said exactly 
this, to my partner, while crying. And across so many drafts of this 
piece, it has always started with this sentence, about all of the things 
I want in my life, how I imagine them in and with my body, or apart 
from them. I know the word is limitation, and I am beginning to 
know or feel that what will come to be most limited is what I want 
and what I am able to have; that because of this tension between 
desire and freedom, I will and maybe mostly will not feel free. It is 
this feeling of not feeling free that will be the hardest to live with. 
It almost doesn’t matter about the specifics of my body, it doesn’t 
really matter that I can’t go out every weekend or eat whatever I 
want. Those things are what diligence is for. But what form of dili-
gence is capable of reshaping the flat plane of limitations, the way it 
flattens (across) a sense of freedom? I am not saying that I am not, 
at the same time, also extremely privileged. Both can be true. I am 
really just saying that this is not about (only) that kind of material 
freedom or privilege. 
17 Eva Illouz, Saving the Modern Soul: Therapy, Emotions, and the Cul-




Because maybe a sense of freedom and especially one supported 
by rights pertaining to the exercise of desire is really just about con-
cealing death. 
How maybe feeling free is just the feeling of not dying, and maybe 
the freedom of adulthood and what makes the synonymy of growth 
and health absolutely necessary for maintaining this freedom is that 
it produces an ability to conceive of a self who is growing, growing 
up, getting better, and not only always already growing towards 
death. 
The illusion, work and feeling of this can be difficult to maintain. 
The impossibility and, therefore, drastic reimagining that 
becomes necessary of the relationship between freedom and adult-
hood is a fundamental aspect of the experience of being sick young 
and growing up sick. 
* * *
I have wondered about the “getting real” in the subtitle of Life Dis-
rupted. Getting real about what? How do you acquire realness? If 
this is something you had to get, what was it you had before?
I remain attached to a fantasy of middle-age. 
In some ways, the fantasy is a joke, made up of the gaps created by 
overlaying a figure of middle age onto my body, how they do and do 
not align. In this way, as per my previous comments about statistics, 
it is really a joke about systemic sexism. Underlying the joke, though, 
is an antagonism against “getting real.” This is not acceptance. 
* * *
While doing research for a project about the opiate epidemic, I got 
a phrase stuck in my head: the idea of getting addicted to thinking 
about your body in the future, or to thinking about your body in 
a different future. The reasoning behind this idea is loosely based 
on the physiology of opiates, and their role in producing placebo 
effects, and the fact that it is ultimately a person’s expectations of 
pain relief, expectations about what is about to happen, that are 
responsible for releasing endogenous and pain relieving opiates 
within a body. Of course, all of these points are more complicated 
than this. But it is still interesting and possible to imagine a body 
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capable of becoming addicted to the pain relief produced by being 
able to imagine that body in a (different) future. Because what such 
a model entails is the importance and function of temporally specific 
imaginings and the both direct and looping relationship between 
what is imagined and the biology involved. “Addiction” is figured 
as the threat of releasing, too far, into this cycle but, still — why not 
middle age, within this? 
“The hope is that the labor of maintaining optimism will not be 
negated by the work of world-maintenance as such and will allow 
the flirtation with some good-life sweetness to continue.”18 
Also while reading for and about the opiate epidemic, I came 
across a Marxist conception of a “freedom with.” In short, a con-
ception of freedom opposed to commonly neoliberal freedoms 
that are formulated as “freedom from” (from other people, from 
encroaching institutions) in that Marx figures the atomistic nature 
of a “freedom from” as inherently anti-free; “freedom with” entails 
always, only, a freedom as freedom with others.19 A freedom suited 
to always already living with. 
And what about internally? If there is no “freedom from” 
externally,20 why should it be assumed that one would be possible 
internally, as if one could be free from encroaching physicality? 
And when it isn’t, why wouldn’t a “freedom with” be the positive 
possibility? 
I mean, I know the word is “limitation.” I know this will be work, 
more and more work. But I also feel it’s possible to follow the con-
tours of a fold, follow it into an “increasingly subtle fluid,” where, 
maybe, everything (some things) are both more fluid and subtler 
18 Lauren Berlant, “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency),” 
Critical Inquiry 33.4 (2011): 754–80.
19 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Moder-
nity (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 1995) and “Learning to 
Love Again: An Interview with Wendy Brown,” Contretemps 6 (2006): 
25–42.
20 Inasmuch as what is initially figured as a “freedom from” — the freedom 
to not have to purchase health insurance as governmentally mandated, 
say, as a freedom from regulation — often becomes something distinctly 
un-free, as in the millions of people who may soon find themselves un-
able to access healthcare and who, in short, may die sooner. 
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in both directions. How can I move along this fold or any without 
retaining a “middle age”?
If this will be a freedom with, it should be a freedom with fantasy 
as much as with biology. 
For years, what was difficult was not knowing exactly what was 
wrong with me. I had gotten sick so suddenly, so acutely, that when 
it was over it seemed actually over. No one was telling me that it 
would become chronic. No one was telling me, either, exactly why 
this had just happened. There was no diagnosis. And this confusion 
and lack of information came to fit with an increasingly synony-
mous lack of information within critical theory and disability stud-
ies: where were all the bodies like mine? The synonymy of these con-
fusions made writing Ghostbodies, my book detailing this very lack 
of narratives within theory, relatively easy to write. Now, though, I 
know exactly what’s wrong with me, even if I do not know exactly 
why; the why is no longer something I am concerned about. This is 
not a diagnostic confusion, but a prognostic confusion. For the past 
year, since last fall when I did finally receive a definitive diagnosis, 
I have started projects over and over. Some I’ve finished, mostly I 
have felt unfinished. This confusion does not fit well with anything 
else. It is difficult to give form to. And in a way, this actually makes 
perfect sense: when you do not know what is coming next, when 
there is a future but what it is is deeply unclear, what else is there 
to do but start over and over? And yet this, now, does feel finished. 
This feels like both a love letter and a goodbye. Throughout not 
only this text but Ghostbodies and every other project I’ve started 
and left this year, the urgency of my questions has been focused in 
two main directions: how can or will I live “in theory,” and how can 
and will I live “in life”? In theory, I demand rights to make up for 
what has been lacking. In life, I work and I imagine. In theory, I love 
what has been found, the idea of what will be found, and the very 
ability to make coherent demands that can be answered. In life, is 
this enough? “What should I be cured of? To find what condition, 
what life?”21 In theory, I can demand and I can demonstrate and I 
can be sick all I want but, in life, is this enough? How far can the-
ory extend? In living with, within the form of a visceralized body, 
a body that is deeply imaginative, a body that is deeply open (to 
21 Roland Barthes, Mourning Diary (New York: Hill & Wang, 2010), 97.
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others), should it not be time to fully turn towards those others? 
How far can we extend this, together; live with, together?
* * *
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